Case law

Felisberto v. Dumdey

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 27, 2021

immunity provided by this subdivision.” … Therefore, this court finds that they qualify for work product protection.

Nisselson v. Lernout

568 F. Supp. 2d 137 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 25, 2008

the other allowable sources of information, and (ii) those facts suffice to establish the affirmative defense with certitude.” … Here, while it is clear that the defendants were stockholders of the new entity, the record does not clearly support the contention that the corporate insiders of Old Dictaphone became corporate insiders of New Dictaphone

Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co.

127 F.R.D. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 7, 1989

Riley denied the existence of laboratory reports and chemical formulas which were clearly called for. Even allowing for Mr. … The plaintiffs’ expert, on the other hand, was a medical toxicologist who is only minimally qualified as a chemist, and his analytical method was relatively crude.

United States v. Moroney

220 F. Supp. 2d 52 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 29, 2002

Applying the factors noted in Lo-chan, Burke has not met his burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. … The tip in White , similar to the information given by the caller here, qualified as the minimal amount of predictability which legitimated the officers’ investigatory “stop and frisk” of Moroney.

Independent Service Corp. v. Tousant

56 F. Supp. 75 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 23, 1944

However, it may be remarked, in passing, that since plaintiff is a corporation its right to invoke that section is not clearly established. Mr. Justice Stone’s opinion in Hague v. … The rule is firmly established that the legislature “may strike at the evil where it is most felt * * * or where it is most practicable to deal with it.” Carmichael v.

Trimark USA, Inc. v. Performance Food Group Company, LLC

667 F. Supp. 2d 155 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 21, 2009

This court finds that to establish “likely confusion” TriMark must establish “more than a theoretical possibility of confusion.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). … American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 928, 935 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (Abercrombie’s use of the word "performance” among other words on labels, advertising and promotional materials, is too descriptive to qualify for trade

Genzyme Corp. v. Shire Human Genetic Therapies, Inc.

906 F. Supp. 2d 9 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 29, 2012

To qualify as a commercial advertisement, “a representation must (a) constitute commercial speech (b) made with the intent of influencing potential customers to purchase the speaker’s goods or services (c) by a speaker who … Second, the public records maintained by the FDA and the United States Trademark Office establish that Shire HGT holds the authorization to market and sell VPRIV, and is the owner of the VPRIV mark.

Diaz v. Johnson

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 29, 2019

To establish standing, a protestor must establish that (1) it is an actual or prospective bidder and (2) it has a direct economic interest in the procurement. … By failing to allege either that his claim is for less than $10,000.00 in damages, or that he clearly waives any amount of monetary damages over $9,999.99,10 Mr.

Duguay v. Spencer

462 F. Supp. 2d 115 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 3, 2006

. § 2254 (d): the state adjudication either 1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States … A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides

Chatman v. Gentle Dental Center of Waltham

973 F. Supp. 228 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 22, 1997

Granting the motion is appropriate only where it appears clearly from the complaint that the plaintiff cannot recover under any theory, under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. B. … , the SJC held that these claims were not barred, stating that "[w]here a fellow employee commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer ... the policies behind the [Act] would not be served by immunizing

Oses v. United States

833 F. Supp. 49 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 1993

As used in this section, the term “offense” means any criminal offense ... which is in violation of an Act of Congress and is triable in any court established by Act of Congress. … Courts have qualified this rule with an exception that applies "if the continued state confinement was exclusively the product of such action by federal law-enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as the

United States v. Shields

597 F. Supp. 2d 224 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 12, 2009

Plaud concluded that Shields’ past treatment also did not qualify as a risk reducer in this case. (Id. at 128.) Finally, Dr. … Tomich was qualified to testify about his own assessment of Mr. Shields and the assessment tools that he utilized, but that he was not qualified to testify about statistical matters. See United States v.

Arthurs v. Stern

427 F. Supp. 425 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 3, 1977

In De Vita , therefore, plaintiff had the choice of either asserting his privilege with impunity, or testifying with immunity. Neither option is available to the plaintiff here. … Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 , 90 S.Ct. 763 , 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970), is clearly distinguishable from the situation before this court.

Duval v. Callaway Golf Ball Operations, Inc.

501 F. Supp. 2d 254 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 7, 2007

According to Defendant, long-established common law principles preclude a plaintiff from attempting to rescind a release after accepting the benefits thereunder. See, e.g., Vasapolli v. … Oubre clearly renounced her rights under the agreement and tendered back the monies received. See id.

In Re Lupron® Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation

295 F. Supp. 2d 148 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 25, 2003

As the First Circuit concluded, “[t]he two 1997 letters are inadequate to establish a closed period of continuous criminal activity. … The plaintiff clearly set out á general scheme, which very plausibly was meant to defraud the plaintiff, and also probably involved interstate commerce.

In re Boston & Maine Corp.

46 B.R. 930 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 23, 1983

Interest does not necessarily accumulate on unsecured claims that qualify for the Six Months priority. … In the court’s opinion, such powers, duties and immunities of the Trustees will be more appropriately defined and described in the Consummation Order.

In Re the Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong

913 F. Supp. 50 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 2, 1996

Risk of flight Lui is clearly not a “tolerable bail risk.” He has no apparent ties to the community, and he has not stated a need or desire to remain in or return to the United States. … For this reason, likelihood of success may have some bearing on risk of flight, but it does not qualify as a special circumstance in foreign extradition cases. III.

McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp.

429 F. Supp. 2d 291 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2006

These questions establish the existence of commonality required by Rule 23. … Mem., Appendix C, and the court is satisfied that they are qualified to vigorously prosecute this case.

Carton v. Trustees of Tufts College

2 Mass. Supp. 213 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 20, 1981

No claim for de facto tenure was made until after it appeared clearly that plaintiff would not obtain tenure de jure. The Claim of Sex Discrimination — Count I We are called upon to decide whether Dr. … She has failed to establish that Tufts discriminated against her because of her sex (Count I); has failed to establish that “de facto tenure claim” (Count II); has failed to make out a case of unlawful retaliation against'her

In Re Computervision Corp. Securities Litigation

869 F. Supp. 56 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 22, 1994

These are clearly allegations of fraud perpetrated on the investing public, so the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) apply. … Litig., 832 F.Supp. 948, 987 (W.D.Pa.1993) (dismissal of § 12(2) claim warranted where insufficient facts alleged establishing that each defendant sold or solicited the sale of securities to individual plaintiffs).