Case law

Ora Catering, Inc. v. Northland Insurance

57 F. Supp. 3d 102 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 5, 2014

The insurance policy clearly and broadly states that “[n]o suit or action against [defendant] for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustained” unless it is brought within the two-year statute of … Under defendant’s rationale, equipping and up-fitting the new permanent facility would have qualified as “extra expenses” only if plaintiff was unable to continue its business in the meantime or was in fact charged for the

Baptista v. Lyons

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 11, 2020

Nevertheless, since the EAJA effectively waives part of the government’s sovereign immunity by making it liable for the other party’s attorney fees, it must be strictly construed in … To qualify as a prevailing party, a party must show both (1) a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” and (2) a “judicial imprimatur on the change.”

United States v. Metropolitan District Commission

147 F.R.D. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 19, 1993

The treatment plant’s ability to meet water quality standards established under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., is affected by the toxic content of the wastewater it receives. … MASPC, therefore, cannot qualify as a citizen for purposes of the citizen standing rule under Section 505. Consequently, MASPC is not entitled to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1).

American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc.

973 F. Supp. 60 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 15, 1997

They argue first that application of the Act to these uninsured plans clearly cannot be a regulation of insurance. … In this context, the Court has considered three criteria for determining whether a practice qualifies as the “business of insurance”: “first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder

Singleton v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.

660 F. Supp. 2d 136 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 6, 2009

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was a “qualified” handicapped person — as required under Chapter 151B — at the time Sinclair terminated her employment. … If a Plaintiff can prove bad faith, she is awarded damages for “the loss of compensation that is ... clearly related to an employee’s past service.” Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 3, 2019

The record establishes that Airbnb plays multiple related but distinct roles in the online platform it has established. … Clearly, there are other responses Airbnb theoretically could take to avoid liability under the Penalties provision, including notifying users that it will enforce the indemnification provision that already is part of its

Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Büchel

565 F. Supp. 2d 245 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 11, 2008

Id. at 86 (holding that a set of photographs taken to be used as studies for a painting did not qualify for VARA protection). … The Copyright Act is the long-established statutory instrument used to protect intellectual property rights.

United States v. Shields

522 F. Supp. 2d 317 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 7, 2007

To *328 qualify for commitment under Section 4246, for example, a federal prisoner must already have been hospitalized in a facility and the director of that facility must certify that person for commitment proceedings. 18 … Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 709-11 (8th Cir.2003) (“There is no clearly established Supreme Court law which holds that due process requires a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings or that incorporates the Seventh Amendment

McConnell v. Texaco, Inc.

727 F. Supp. 751 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 2, 1990

Thus, the employee welfare benefit plan at issue in this case, TETAP, is clearly a plan to which ERISA applies. Accordingly, TETAP is subject to the standards relating to fiduciary responsibility established by ERISA. … Grant qualified as a fiduciary and was required to uphold these fiduciary duties in administering TETAP.

United States v. Hines

802 F. Supp. 559 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 24, 1992

establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes”). … Massachusetts law establishes the rule of law as to whether his "guilty-filed" cases are convictions.

Neponset Landing Corp. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance

902 F. Supp. 2d 166 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 22, 2012

Smith (Docket No. 49) to establish the critical facts supporting its motion for summary judgment. Ms. … It provides that [i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness

United States v. Tsarnaev

157 F. Supp. 3d 57 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 15, 2016

Still, he hurled explosives at the police, and when he saw-his brother walk into a hail of gunfire shooting, clearly determined to go out in a blaze of glory, he ran to the Mercedes and escaped as police riddled the. … His way out of the dilemma is to argue that “intimidation” and “extortion” do not establish alternate elements of the offenses but only refer to different means of committing them.

Caesar v. Shinseki

887 F. Supp. 2d 289 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 25, 2012

Similarly, to establish a prima facie case for age-based termination under ADEA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was at least 40 years old; (2) she was qualified for the position she had held; (3) she was fired; and (4 … In the first stage, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Blackstone Headwaters Coalition, Inc. v. Gallo Builders, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 20, 2025

First, the wetland must be adjacent to another body of water which independently qualifies as WOTUS, and second, it must have a “continuous surface connection” with the established WOTUS, such that it is “difficult to … This expansive jurisdictional grant contains no qualifying language making WOTUS status a prerequisite to the court’s power to hear the case.

United States v. Pesaturo

519 F. Supp. 2d 177 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 9, 2007

The Defendant’s affidavit establishes a basis for the entrapment defense. … The cases the Government cites do not establish this approach. In DiBlasio v.

Gill v. Office of Personnel Management

699 F. Supp. 2d 374 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 8, 2010

independent compensation authority,” such as the United States Postal Service, which established its own flexible benefits plan prior to the creation of the FSA. 53 *382 2. … And such a classification, the Constitution clearly will not permit.

Eaton v. Town of Townsend

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 6, 2019

Defendants move to dismiss both theories on grounds of qualified immunity and on the merits. 1. … Third, the information Eaton disclosed in the press release was clearly derived from special knowledge which he obtained as part of his employment as Chief of Police.

Johnson v. Koplovsky Foods, Inc.

5 F. Supp. 2d 48 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 5, 1998

The regulations further provide, with respect to private agreements under Section 499e(c)(3)(ii), that “[t]he maximum time for payment for a shipment to which a seller, supplier, or agent can agree and still qualify for coverage … Clearly three-quarters of the purchase price is beyond the thirty-day maximum period and in violation of the PACA scheme.

Whyman v. Whalen

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 22, 2018

to that finding, Whalen is entitled to qualified immunity. … Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (qualified immunity applies unless it “would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.”).

Cornwell v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.

369 F. Supp. 2d 87 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 2005

Even an individual who is found not to be a “qualified individual with a disability” may pursue a claim of retaliation under the ADA. Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 477 (1st Cir.2003). … There also is not enough evidence in the record to establish, as Cornwell must, that the information was published “unnecessarily, unreasonably or exeessively.” Clearly, there was no excessive publication.