Case law

Perales v. City and County of San Francisco Sheriff Department

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 2017

review of the complaint and may dismiss if it is malicious, frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune … “The term ‘frivolous’ is used to denote not only a claim wholly lacking in merit but also a suit that, for whatever reason, clearly can’t be maintained.” Okoro v.

Morales Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 13, 2021

Cultural Care is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity. … Cultural Care’s policies, as alleged by Plaintiffs, are clearly designed to enforce the government’s regulations, but they are also broader than is strictly required by the regulations.

AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc.

974 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 27, 2013

A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune.” Id. … As the transcript indicates, however, the court “carefully considered” this argument, which was "very forcefully and very clearly” set forth in Defendants’ memorandum, prior to oral argument (Dkt. No. 233, Tr.

Iacaboni v. United States

251 F. Supp. 2d 1015 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2003

Nor do they address whether detention in a community treatment center qualifies as incarceration. Id. at 1511 (citation omitted). … This argument is incorrect and ignores well established case law.

May v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

10 F. Supp. 249 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 15, 1935

This qualified property right is undoubtedly capable of being transferred by will and by assignment, but it cannot be transferred in gross or at large like rights in a patent. United Drug Co. v. … It is clearly apparent that, after an attorney acting for the plaintiffs had suggested to the defendant that it might be for its interest to pay plaintiffs for the privilege of using its own registered trade-marks, the Guptill

Doe v. Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 4, 2022

It was specific because it clearly defined what actions they would take and for how long – Jane would not be left unsupervised at any point, per her IEP, for the entirety of the school … Most courts have rejected the argument that an IEP qualifies as a contract. See L.J. by N.N.J. v. Sch.

Sarro v. Philip Morris USA Inc.

857 F. Supp. 2d 182 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 2012

Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054 , 1057-1058 (8th Cir.2005) (stating that the NFPA 921 “qualifies as a reliable method endorsed by a professional organization”). … When a fire’s origin is clearly defined, the NFPA 921 permits investigators to determine a fire’s cause via a process of elimination, notwithstanding the absence of physical evidence of an ignition source.

Call v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc.

534 F. Supp. 2d 184 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 1, 2008

Third, ... that she qualified for FMLA benefits for one of four statutory reasons.... Fourth, ... that she gave her employer appropriate notice.... … City Metal Co., There is certainly no general rule that medical testimony is always necessary to establish disability.

Livick v. Gillette Co.

492 F. Supp. 2d 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 12, 2007

In response to these cases, Plaintiff admits that Brundige’s actions alone would not qualify him as a fiduciary. … Reaching such a conclusion would be clearly erroneous in light of established precedent explaining that estopppel can only be used to enforce interpretations of ambiguous language, and not to change the terms of the plan.

Roeschlaub v. Commissioner of Social Security

27 F. Supp. 3d 211 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 26, 2014

She did experience a short-term but minimal response to her bilateral L5 transforaminal injection, which is clearly the level where she has her most advanced spondylotic changes. … As such, Saucedo’s opinion would not be enti-' tied to controlling weight, and it “cannot establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment.”

Rosenthal v. O'Brien

814 F. Supp. 2d 39 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2011

This decision is not unreasonable or contrary to “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). … This determination is not contrary to the federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court.

Allen v. National Institutes of Health

974 F. Supp. 2d 18 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2013

The FSRA “follows guidelines established by federal agencies for conducting and reporting risk assessments and has been performed by using available scientific data and established methods of analyses.” Id. … The chapter would benefit if it were to state clearly up front that the results of some calculations cannot be reported because of security concerns.

MEDEROS v. Murphy

762 F. Supp. 2d 209 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 15, 2010

Merits of the Petition A writ of habeas corpus may not issue unless the adjudication by the state court either (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established … Rather, it is well-established that ICE “may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.” Reno v.

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly

84 F. Supp. 2d 180 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 24, 2000

Pike envisions a showing that the burden is “clearly excessive” in relation to local benefits. … With the strong local' interest clearly shown, it remains to inquire about the burden on interstate commerce.

Coughlin v. 750 Woburn Street Operating Company, LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 8, 2019

There appears to be no dispute as to the first element: at 65 years old, Coughlin clearly qualifies as a member of a protected class for purposes of the statute. 7 … As discussed above, Coughlin was clearly a member of a protected class (based on her age), and she was clearly terminated by 750 Woburn.

229 Main Street Ltd. Partnership v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Environmental Protection

251 B.R. 186 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 26, 2000

The Court accepts the bankruptcy court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8103; In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474 (1st Cir.1991). … City of Lockport, 916 F.2d 890 , 892 n. 1 (3d Cir.1990) (giving U.C.C. § 9-301(2) as the prototypical statute which would qualify under the exception); In re Maryland Glass Corp., 723 F.2d 1138, 1143 (4th Cir.1983) (“If that

Cleary v. Knapp Shoes, Inc.

924 F. Supp. 309 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 15, 1996

The MassMutual Plan provided that an employee becomes eligible for coverage “on the first day of the calendar month coinciding with or next following the date [the employee] beeome[s] a qualified employee and completed] 2 … In a recent unpublished opinion concerning a pre-existing condition exclusion, the Sixth Circuit held that “a plan administrator attempting to establish exclusion from coverage has the burden to establish by a preponderance

Spencer Companies v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.

81 B.R. 194 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 1, 1987

Unlike the Reid note, the notes in the present case list no conditions which modify or qualify the demand term of the note. Neither is K.M.C. Co. v. … Although the cases do not clearly define a “special account”, two characteristics emerge from the cases. Accounts which are devoted to one or only a few purposes are most clearly special deposits not subject.to setoff.

Trotto v. Rodrigues

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 8, 2024

Ten years later, after receiving immunity, Carlo testified to the same before a grand jury. … ‘substantial and injurious’] standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish

Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Insurance Co. of America

321 F. Supp. 2d 226 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 15, 2004

Julian Klapowitz (“Dr.Klapowitz”) for the purpose of completing some immunization forms, and he mentioned his schizophrenia to Dr. Klapowitz. … Proof of actual attendance by a physician was a prerequisite for continuing receipt of benefits once a claimant qualified, not for establishing the date when disability began. 18 After interpreting the Policy’s terms, the