Case law

Mashpee Tribe v. Watt

542 F. Supp. 797 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 30, 1982

Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of the “Mashpee Tribe” are clearly barred by the decision in Mashpee I. … Mashpee I was clearly not a case in that category and does not fall within the exception to the adjudication on the merits in Rule 41(b).

Haidak v. Collagen Corp.

67 F. Supp. 2d 21 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 8, 1999

Collagen Corp., 967 S.W.2d 360, 376 (Tex.1998), establishes that the products at issue here meet the required specificity. … Thus, while four justices of the Court indicated that, “[ujsing the term requirement, Congress clearly signaled its intent not to deprive States of any role in protecting consumers from the dangers inherent in many medical

Defosse v. Bowen

670 F. Supp. 1078 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 2, 1987

Despite plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ found that the claimant’s “assertions of pain, when correlated to the physical findings and clinical features, clearly demonstrate that the complaints appear to be far out of proportion … As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently stated, “[t]he mere existence of evidence in addition to that submitted before the hearing examiner will not constitute sufficient cause for remand____ Rather, to qualify

Richardson v. Fleet Bank of Massachusetts

190 F. Supp. 2d 81 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 10, 2001

To establish a prima facie case pursuant to section 1681e(b), the plaintiff must “produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the inaccurate entry was a ‘substantial factor’ that brought about … Section 1681h(e) has been interpreted “to provide qualified immunity to consumer reporting agencies except as to false information furnished with malice or willful intent to injure.” Wiggins v.

Jean-Baptiste v. Thompson

241 F. Supp. 3d 226 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 15, 2017

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“In this context, ‘clearly established law5 signifies ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta’ ” of Supreme Court decisions.)). … In his brief, the petitioner argues that the government did not establish this fact because the only evidence of his involvement in the crime was the' testimony of Noel, who was given immunity in exchange for his testimony

Genesis Strategies, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.

50 F. Supp. 3d 59 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 16, 2014

“Although whether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact, the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a [Chapter] 93A violation is a question of law.” … His affidavit does not contain clearly contradictory answers to unambiguous *64 questions, and his statements may be evaluated in response to the wineglass shape. .

Chandler v. Raytheon Employees Disability Trust

53 F. Supp. 2d 84 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 11, 1999

An employee may receive full disability benefits for the first two years of disability, at the end of which payments terminate unless the employee qualifies for total disability benefits. B. … If the plan clearly gives such discretionary authority, then the administrator’s decisions are subject to “a deferential ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard of judicial review.” Recupero v. New England Tel. & Tel.

Almeder v. Town of Bourne

922 F. Supp. 2d 160 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 6, 2013

Generally speaking, to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the job, (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against him, … The employer must clearly articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the termination that is legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the employer. Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Aff. v.

Degnan v. Publicker Industries, Inc.

42 F. Supp. 2d 113 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 19, 1999

In our view, such claims clearly do not require allegations and proof of conduct as egregious as that of the defendant Varity Corporation. Degnan’s reliance on Fitzgerald v. … On the other hand, defendants’ state of mind on May 14 and June 10, 1992, when misinforming plaintiff, is clearly material.

Estock v. City of Westfield

806 F. Supp. 2d 294 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 26, 2011

Browning-Ferris Indus., 427 Mass. 1 , 691 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1998) (“[T]o establish a prima facie case of unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of handicap under [Mass. Gen. … Analysis of the second prong, while unnecessary given the court’s ruling on the first, demonstrates this point even more clearly.

Durling v. Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board

789 F. Supp. 457 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 1, 1992

Those claims have clearly been exhausted. In short, I rule that the instant petition is not a “mixed” one subject to dismissal under the rationale of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 , 102 S.Ct. 1198 , 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). … under any of the firmly established exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Bishay v. Ricciuti

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 15, 2021

to abolish this long-established principle, Ta, at 355-56 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). … Bishay clearly feels his rights have been violated from incidents that occurred many years ago.

Cabi v. Boston Children's Hospital

161 F. Supp. 3d 136 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 12, 2016

L. c. 149 § 185 because Defendants do not qualify as employers under the statute. Mass. Gen. … Based on the plain language of the statute, none of the Defendants qualify as an “employer” under the controlling definition.

INTERNATIONAL SALT CO., LLC v. City of Boston

547 F. Supp. 2d 62 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 18, 2008

While the City argues that this provision clearly states that the 75,000 ton figure was only an estimate, ISCO contends that the bidding documents state otherwise. … Even if the court were inclined to apply equitable estop-pel to the instant matter, ISCO would not qualify.

Salem v. Stoneham Police Department

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 2024

The Town argues that the “record was clear that the controlling, most current policy clearly stated that a use of force report was not required for the mere display of a firearm.” [Dkt. 60 at 15]. … abrogate immunity.”).

Oyegbola v. United States Small Business Administration

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 2022

Monroig-Zayas, 445 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that the party seeking the preliminary injunction “bears the burden of establishing that these four factors weigh in its favor”). … It would also require the SBA to change the way it evaluates all EIDL applications, which clearly interferes with internal agency operations.

Dean v. McKie Co.

771 F. Supp. 466 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 30, 1991

In the present case, Dean has the burden to establish seaman status. Bach v. … However, as the foregoing discussions have demonstrated, this is clearly not the standard to be applied.

United States v. Heisson

217 B.R. 1 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 11, 1997

Standard of Review A District Court reviewing the decision of a Bankruptcy Court applies a clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact and de novo review to questions of law. … The definition of the term “claim” does not, however, require allowance of a proof of claim to establish a claim’s existence.

Neighborhood Ass'n of the Back Bay v. Federal Transit Administration

393 F. Supp. 2d 66 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 14, 2005

In short, the record establishes that the FTA complied with “both [its] substantive obligation to weigh effects in deciding whether to authorize the federal action and [its] procedural obligation to consult.” … Clearly, they understand that their proposed statutory construction would be unworkable.

Hudson v. Dennehy

538 F. Supp. 2d 400 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 5, 2008

On May 12, 2004, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. 7 On July 23, 2004, the court issued a Memorandum and Order finding defendants exempted by qualified and official immunity from any claims for monetary damages … A plaintiff, however, must establish that the exercise forms a legitimate part of his or her profession of faith. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a).