Case law

United States v. Jones

609 F. Supp. 2d 113 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 21, 2009

It has been long and clearly established that exculpatory information includes information that is potentially useful in impeaching government witnesses, as well as information that directly tends to negate guilt. … This conclusion is not qualified if it is assumed that the cruiser hit Jones’ bicycle and knocked him off, either accidentally or even deliberately.

Troconis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.

160 F. Supp. 2d 150 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 31, 2001

First, a claim *155 so qualifies if it alleges conduct that arguably constitutes a breach of a duty that arises pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. See United Steelworkers v. … Second, a claim so qualifies if its resolution arguably hinges upon an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Iconics, Inc. v. Massaro

266 F. Supp. 3d 461 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 19, 2017

Iconics builds upon these arguments in its second motion, pointing to Zatarain’s deposition where he struggled to explain clearly how BaxEnergy’s source code supported his opinions. … Opinions as to Liability Kullberg is a damages expert-, and the parties agree he is not qualified to opine on technical matters outside his expertise.

Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 8, 2019

Backman is not qualified to render the opinions at issue, and his opinions are not based on adequate data. … This is clearly an improper attempt to reopen discovery.

Selewich v. Finch

312 F. Supp. 191 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 31, 1969

On September 7, 1966, plaintiff filed an application for establishment of a period of disability under § 216(i) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i) (Supp. … Sloane, M.D., a qualified ophthalmologist, who described her vision as 20/50 in the better eye.

Godette v. Stanley

490 F. Supp. 2d 72 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 16, 2007

The court also notes in the alternative that the officers would receive qualified immunity for conducting the search as Plaintiff does not allege facts from which the court can reasonably infer that the arresting officers … The court also noted that although a medical expert’s testimony is not necessary to establish claims for emotional distress, Plaintiff must still provide sufficient evidence to support his claim of harm. But cf.

Manisy v. Maloney

283 F. Supp. 2d 307 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 4, 2003

In the alternative, Respondent argues that the ineffective assistance of counsel count fails to state a claim since the state court adjudication was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme … Thus, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly

Animal Legal Defense Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp.

626 F. Supp. 278 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 14, 1986

Bacteria immune to antibiotics flourish in animals whose feeds contain antibiotics. … For a drug not to be considered a new animal drug, it must be “generally recognized” by qualified experts as safe and effective for each of its intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (w).

Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. A.L.J.A., Inc.

905 F. Supp. 36 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 3, 1995

Section 2-401(3)(a) clearly applies. Caffrey Ford and A.L.J.A. did not exchange the certificate of title at the time of sale. … Any other interpretation would defeat the purposes of establishing a comprehensive certificate of title registry.

Smith v. Chase Enterprises Corporation

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 23, 2024

Rather, the goggles, which were introduced as a physical exhibit at trial, are clearly polarized, as stated on the lens. … DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY The United States is generally immune from suit without its consent. See Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017).

Li v. Belmont Police Department

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 25, 2019

. § 1827(a) (“The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall establish a program to facilitate the use of certified and otherwise qualified interpreters in judicial proceedings instituted … federal courts to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the claims therein lack an arguable basis in law or in fact, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

Converse Inc. v. Reebok International Ltd.

328 F. Supp. 2d 166 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 5, 2004

Instead, it is a descriptive term clearly meant to refer to the then upcoming NBA All-Star *170 Game. … The Elements and Burden of Proof for Civil Contempt To establish a claim for civil contempt, the complainant must “establish by clear and convincing evidence that the particular defendant violated an unambiguous consent decree

United States v. Lacy

99 F. Supp. 2d 108 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 19, 2000

records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct, while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment … Clearly, § 4A1.3 departures are "encouraged departures” under Koon v.

MacLeod v. Nolan

497 F. Supp. 2d 65 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 9, 2007

Applying these principles to the instant case, the petitioner has failed to establish that the Appeals Court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established … Consequently, Mac-Leod has failed to establish that the decision was “contrary to” clearly established federal law. 4 Similarly, MacLeod has not established that the Appeals Court, having correctly identified the governing

O'NEILL v. Town of Nantucket

545 F. Supp. 449 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 13, 1982

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not consider § 177A as an automatic way for any qualified applicant to obtain a license. Instead, the statute grants local authorities considerable discretion. … Rudman, supra, has clearly drawn a distinction between the interests found in applicants for license.': and the interests of those who already hold licenses.

Framingham Union Hospital, Inc. v. Travelers Insurance

721 F. Supp. 1478 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 27, 1989

I rule that these allegations are sufficient to establish standing to sue under ERISA. 3. … On this basis, the action is clearly timely.

Cofman v. Acton Corp.

768 F. Supp. 392 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 1991

Does it ask a “subjective” question — a state-of-mind question about what the author intended the meaning to be, regardless of how clearly or unclearly that meaning was expressed? … Instead, the court applies the principle that a literal interpretation of a word or phrase may be qualified by the context in which it appears, by the general purpose manifested by the entire contract, and by the circumstances

Doe v. Medeiros

266 F. Supp. 3d 479 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 21, 2017

2015) (determining a lack of control where company did not “interfere with [Plaintiff] and his agents selling the products of competitors”); see also Santangelo, 2014 WL 3896323 , at *8 (explaining that “plaintiff [was] clearly … The Supreme Judicial Court’s analysis turned on its interpretation of the scope of the Vienna Convention, "the scope of a consul’s functions and consular immunity.” Id. at 460 , 457 N.E.2d 1105 .

Miara v. First Allmerica Financial Life Insurance

379 F. Supp. 2d 20 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 16, 2005

Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. … The "practical impact” of ERISA preemption would indeed "immunize” insurance agents and agencies from liability. Id. at 55 .

Younger

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 16, 2025

Younger contends that these harms qualify as “[b]roadcast distortion” and ultimately “undermine[d] citizens’ capacity to advocate[.]” Id. ¶¶ 20–21. … No. 5] does not clearly articulate any causes of action. In his opposition to the Motion to Dismiss [Doc.