Case law

Mazzarino v. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 13, 2022

not reach defendants’ other arguments, including that plaintiff has failed to state facially plausible claims for supervisory liability, see #17 at 6-7, or that Goldberg and Sweeney in their individual capacities have qualified … immunity, see id. at 12-13. 4 Under Fed.

Grady v. Astrue

894 F. Supp. 2d 131 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 2012

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a reason for disqualification. Id. at 196 , 102 S.Ct. 1665 . … Since Plaintiff has not qualified as disabled for purposes of DIB or SSI, he would not qualify for purposes of Child’s Insurance Benefits.

Rakes v. United States

352 F. Supp. 2d 47 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 3, 2005

As a waiver of sovereign immunity, the FTCA is strictly construed. Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir.2003). … The court held this news coverage clearly sufficient to establish that David Wheeler was on notice of his claims before May 11, 1999. Id.

Massachusetts Ex Rel. Department of Public Welfare v. United States Department of Health & Human Services

727 F. Supp. 35 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 11, 1989

The government has not established its claim of privilege with respect to these documents. … The privilege of nondisclosure not being established, this document must be revealed in its entirety. C.

ITT Electro-Optical Products Division of ITT Corp. v. Electronic Technology Corp.

161 F.R.D. 228 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 20, 1995

Finally, K & M asserts that its production system and facility meet government requirements to be a qualified military supplier and that its facility is designated as secure. … If proof of relevancy or need is not established, discovery should be denied.

Grace v. Perception Technology Corp.

128 F.R.D. 165 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 16, 1989

Typicality is established by showing that the putative plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market. Tolan v. Computervision, 696 F.Supp. 771, 778 (D.Mass.1988). … This Court is convinced that plaintiffs’ counsel will vigorously prosecute this action and are qualified to do so.

Jackson v. Truck Drivers' Union Local 42 Health & Welfare Fund

933 F. Supp. 1124 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 7, 1996

Read to its logical endpoint, the argument would hold that fiduciaries whose breach renders a plan insolvent and thus cause it to terminate immunize themselves from ERISA liability. … Any balance “which cannot be so applied” may be transferred to another qualified trust which “as in the opinion of the trustees” will “best effectuate” the purposes of the Trust.

J.S.H v. Newton

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 1, 2023

Prior to 2017-2018, there was no consistent or established standard of diagnosis. (Id. at ¶ 12). … It is an objective test: “whether the institution’s response, evaluated in light of the known circumstances, is so deficient to be clearly unreasonable.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch.

Christensen v. Kingston School Committee

360 F. Supp. 2d 212 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 8, 2005

Further, the courts in Downing and Smith have established that even a principal with both good cause protection and “serving under contract does not have a constitutionally protected property right in his employment.” … Devlin, 833 F.Supp. at 78 (noting, in a matter involving a claim of wrongful discharge, that a termination “that is contrived to despoil an employee of earned commissions or similar compensation due for past services will qualify

Perry v. Treseler

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 15, 2020

The parole board shall establish procedures relative to the collection and waiver of such fees by regulation. … Section 368, which requires the parole board to assess a parole supervision fee upon every person who is granted parole unless the parolee qualifies for a waiver, authorizes the parole board to make the payment of the fee

Pace v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 15, 2019

Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] warden’s general responsibility for supervising a prison is insufficient to establish personal liability.”). … To qualify for 11 appointment of counsel, exceptional circumstances must exist such that the denial of counsel will result in fundamental unfairness

Durant v. Chater

906 F. Supp. 706 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 24, 1995

to her diagnosed ailments, the medical evidence did not demonstrate the presence of physical conditions, or a combination of physical conditions, or even a combination of physical and mental conditions, which would have qualified … The Administrative Law Judge here neither considered the effects of the mental impairments alluded to by the psychologist, nor determined clearly the effect of those impairments.

United States v. Wilkinson

646 F. Supp. 2d 194 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 20, 2009

Schwartz’s testimony does not credibly establish that Wilkinson suffers from psychopathy. … Schwartz’s conflicting position far less than clearly and convincingly correct.

Howard M. Kahalas, PC v. Schiller

164 F. Supp. 3d 241 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 18, 2016

Plaintiff concludes that Defendant clearly made disparaging comments such that John Tuscano would tell Plaintiff that Defendant was not impressed. (internal quotation marks omitted). … Whether a particular set of acts is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact but “the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a [Chapter] 93A violation is a question of law.” Arthur D. Little, Inc. v.

Bates v. Commander, First Coast Guard District

297 F. Supp. 193 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 7, 1969

Petitioner had the burden of establishing that he was conscientiously opposed as a matter of religious training and belief to participation in war of any kind. … It does include a belief which occupies in the life of the objector the same place as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of an objector clearly qualified for exemption on the ground of conventional religious beliefs

Devlin v. WSi Corp.

833 F. Supp. 69 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 28, 1993

The individual and corporate defendants allege that Devlin cannot point to any clearly defined or well established legal right on which his wrongful discharge claim may rest. … “A discharge that is contrived to despoil an employee of earned commissions or similar compensation due for past services will qualify under Fortune." Tenedios v. Wm.

Bache v. Town of Boxborough

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 9, 2022

And the complaint does not otherwise allege facts that establish any threats, intimidation, or coercion. … That is clearly a discretionary function. See Duarte, 405 Mass. at 50. Furthermore, nothing in the complaint states or even suggests that Gath acted in bad faith, or with malice or corruption.

United States v. Zolot

968 F. Supp. 2d 411 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2013

Caplan is not qualified to determine the cause of death. The contention that only a forensic pathologist or medical examiner is qualified to determine the ultimate cause of death is unpersuasive. … Articles on the subject of pain management note that the “norms of drug taking and the epidemiology of aberrant drug-taking behavior have not been clearly established.

Troconis v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.

160 F. Supp. 2d 150 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 31, 2001

First, a claim *155 so qualifies if it alleges conduct that arguably constitutes a breach of a duty that arises pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. See United Steelworkers v. … Second, a claim so qualifies if its resolution arguably hinges upon an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.

Caperci v. Rite Aid Corp.

43 F. Supp. 2d 83 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 4, 1999

I will discuss each argument in turn, recognizing that, in each instance, the burden is on Rite Aid to establish its entitlement to the exemption. 1. … This premise is clearly false, however, at least, as here, where no claim is made that the employer is utilizing sham employment practices for the sole purpose of evading the regulations.