Case law

Strahan v. Coxe

939 F. Supp. 963 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 24, 1996

Defendants do not raise the more fundamental objection that notice to NMFS in Silver Spring may not qualify as notice to the Secretary of Commerce under 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g)(2)(i). … A plaintiff does not have to qualify as an expert witness in order to have a cognizable interest under Article III. 25 2.

Buchanan v. Massachusetts Department of Correction

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 23, 2024

The request included a personal statement, stating in relevant part that “[b]eing forced, pressured, intimidated or coerced to ingest or receive any substance into my body that clearly violates my conscience, or my personal … The FDA approved the COVID- 19 vaccine for immunization to prevent a communicable disease. (Opp. Ex. B at 12).

Simmons v. Galvin

652 F. Supp. 2d 83 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 30, 2007

The unqualified prohibition established by § 2(a) is intentionally broad. … The Supreme Court has held, for example, that Congress lacked the power under § 5 to abrogate state sovereign immunity to suit for discrimination on the basis of disability, age, and religion.

United States v. Gallucci

54 F. Supp. 964 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 21, 1944

It has been clearly established, however, that acts and declarations subsequent to the relevant time are available to support a finding as to allegiance (Baumgartner v. … United States, supra, 320 U.S. at page 122, 63 S.Ct. at page 1335 Until the higher authority explicitly qualifies Johannessen v.

Carillo v. DuBois

23 F. Supp. 2d 103 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 10, 1998

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived by a person, acting under color of law, of a right, immunity, or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. … Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099 ("In many cases, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both.

Piccone v. Bartels

40 F. Supp. 3d 198 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 25, 2014

Massachusetts law implements these principles by “immunizing] statements of opinion based on fully disclosed nondefamatory facts.” … Indeed, it was Carbone, not Bartels, who characterized plaintiffs’ behavior, based on Bartels’s depictions,'As not “too social” and “clearly unprofessional.”

Bourguignon v. MacDonald

667 F. Supp. 2d 175 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 30, 2009

Reno, 233 F.3d 688 (1st Cir.2000), clearly established the rule in the First Circuit that, in the case of an alien seeking habeas relief, the proper respondent will usually be “his immediate custodian, that is, the individual … Rather Petitioner's underlying argument is that he cannot be deported because he qualifies for, and is entitled to, a deferral of removal under the CAT. See generally, 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 .

Lee v. Alves

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 25, 2024

A state court’s decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably … For purposes of habeas review, “[t]he Strickland standard qualifies as clearly established federal law.” Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

Roche v. Town of Wareham

24 F. Supp. 2d 146 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 29, 1998

Plaintiffs degree in criminal justice and her prior law enforcement experience appear to have qualified her for the position of SPO, particularly in light of Police Chief Joyce’s comments to her that she was well qualified … International Bhd. of Painters, 933 F.Supp. 560, 564 (S.D.W.Va.1996) (remand appropriate where “[a]fter the dismissal of Plaintiffs federal claim, state law clearly predominates in this action”) SO ORDERED. 1 .

Tierney v. Town of Framingham

District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 13, 2018

Therefore, this case clearly meets the three-part Younger test, and the Court will abstain from interfering with any ongoing state criminal proceeding. D. … Under the circumstances, such a conclusory and skeletal claim, not grounded in any established legal framework, is not sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Hogan v. Harris

501 F. Supp. 1129 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 21, 1980

The medically needy include those whose income is too high to qualify them for AFDC or SSI, but too low to pay necessary medical expenses. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C). … Fourth, when Congress intended to alter statutory “comparability” requirements, it clearly expressed that intent.

Gifford v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts

District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 7, 2025

Clearly, then, the first two factors of the scope-of-employment test are satisfied as to both officers. … “It is well-established that ‘only those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his rights can be held liable.’” Velez-Rivera v.

Saltzman v. Town of Hanson

935 F. Supp. 2d 328 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 31, 2013

Massachusetts courts recognize that “an at will employee has a cause of action for wrongful termination only if the termination violates a clearly established public policy.” King v. … Accordingly, it is not necessary to address the additional arguments posed by Fingías and Smith based on Fingías’ qualified immunity and Smith’s lack of participation. - B.

Little Souls, Inc. v. Petits

789 F. Supp. 56 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 19, 1992

Once actual copying is established, “the court must determine whether the copying is sufficiently substantial to constitute ‘unlawful appropriation’ (‘illicit copying’).” … As actual copying of certain features of plaintiff’s dolls has been established, the real question is whether defendant’s copying constituted unlawful appropriation.

Doe v. Mercer

31 F. Supp. 2d 208 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 18, 1998

Dubose, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 667 , 531 N.E.2d 600 (1988), implies that the relationship between a host and an invited guest might give rise to a duty to protect, but only in the most qualified of circumstances. … In the absence of a situation showing that a danger should have been anticipated, or customs which clearly impose a duty of protection or a preferred form of response, hosts should not be charged, at the risk of liability

Walker v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

82 F. Supp. 3d 524 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 30, 2014

In the phrase “all work submitted” from the Handbook, “submit” takes the object “work,” clearly in its transitive form and matching the “to give to someone for consideration or approval” definition. … Under the proper meaning of the term “submit,” there is no question that turning in a draft of an article for editing by JOLT would qualify as a “submission,” whether or not the draft was the author’s “final” draft.

Cape Ann Investors LLC v. Lepone

296 F. Supp. 2d 4 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 15, 2003

The Act defines a unitary entity as one “not established for the purpose of participating in the action.” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(D). … This language clearly alleges that Merrill Lynch’s conduct caused Performance Plan to purchase covered securities and [] retain them.

Taylor v. Janigan

212 F. Supp. 794 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 31, 1962

. *796 Janigan was well-qualified by reason of his background and experience to assume the duties of manager of Besco. … Defendant also says that as a question of fact plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof in this regard and have not established either that there was a material change in the business of Besco on or shortly

Beyene v. Astrue

739 F. Supp. 2d 77 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 24, 2010

A hearing officer, as a lay person, generally is not qualified to interpret raw medical data to determine a claimant’s RFC. Manso-Pizarro, 76 F.3d at 17 . … The hearing officer was not properly qualified to make this determination about Beyene’s RFC without the aid of an expert. See Roberts v.

Massachusetts Federation of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Massachusetts

791 F. Supp. 899 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 30, 1992

With respect to the second prong, a showing of a “but for” relationship between the injury and allegedly unlawful conduct clearly establishes that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct. … In a recent opinion, this Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds.