Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • White v. Spaulding

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 24, 2020

    Whether the Complaint States a Claim Under the Eighth Amendment Next, defendants contend that the complaint should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. … The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public employees “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Aronson v. Internal Revenue Service

    767 F. Supp. 378 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 24, 1991

    It is well established that § 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”), 26 U.S.C. § 6103 , generally qualifies as a statute within the scope of Exemption 3. See Church of Scientology v. … However, “Part B of Exemption 3 requires only that a statute either establish particular criteria or refer to particular types of matters.” Id. at 839 . Subsection (m)(l) clearly does the latter.

    Modified by Robert A. Aronson v. Internal Revenue Service, Robert A. Aronson v. Internal Revenue Service, 973 F.2d 962 (1992)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Caola v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

    59 F. Supp. 2d 166 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 20, 1999

    The Delta Plan The Delta Plan, a non-contributory employee welfare benefit plan established and *168 maintained pursuant to Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., provides for … reasonable, courts have given due consideration to a number of factors, inter alia, 1) whether the interpretation renders any language in the plan “meaningless or internally inconsistent”, 2) whether the interpretation is “clearly

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Carr v. Carr

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 31, 2023

    Section 1983 establishes liability for any “person” acting under the color of state law who deprives any United States citizen of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. … Neither the state nor any of its agencies have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case and their immunity has not been abrogated by Congress.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Hall v. Capeless

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 20, 2021

    Finally, Defendants argue that they would be entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 12. … There is no legal basis for doing so and, to the extent, that Hall is referencing qualified immunity, the Court’s dismissal is on other grounds and did not reach this issue.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Cotter v. City of Boston

    73 F. Supp. 2d 62 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 20, 1999

    MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD Taking all facts and inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the White Officers, this Court must grant a motion to dismiss “if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff … Under the basic merit principles, such justifications are hardly “satisfactory” and Hart-nett was required to disapprove and establish satisfactory qualifications and specifications.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Burns

    513 F. Supp. 280 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 8, 1981

    The determinations of the Office of Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance that the insured’s parents abandoned him and thus do not qualify as “parents” has not been challenged here, nor does it appear from the evidence that it … In the case at bar, although there is no specifically applicable federal statute involved, there clearly is an articulated federal policy which may well be thwarted by allowing abandoning parents to share in the distribution

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Sokol v. University Hospital, Inc.

    402 F. Supp. 1029 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 14, 1975

    The underlying facts concerning the operation of the Hospital have been established by the pleadings, by stipulation and by affidavits. … Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S:Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) in which it was held that policemen, who were clearly agents of the state, may not escape liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , because they act in violation of state laws

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Mangianfico v. Stanton

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 20, 2019

    Under the well-established doctrine of judicial immunity, “a judge is immune from a suit for money damages” as long as the relevant actions were “taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” and were not “taken in the complete … When extended to other officials, the immunity is called quasi-judicial immunity, and it “provides absolute immunity for those who perform tasks that are inextricably intertwined with the judicial function,” Nystedt v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Taing v. Chertoff

    526 F. Supp. 2d 177 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 12, 2007

    The complaint contains three counts which are not very clearly presented. … I.N.A. section 204 (“Section 204”) establishes the procedure for granting immigrant status.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Shipley Co., Inc. v. Clark

    728 F. Supp. 818 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 16, 1990

    Defendants’ visits and reports to Shipley in Massachusetts, and the mailing of the employment contracts, qualify as “transacting business” for purposes of § 3(a). … Because defendants are clearly violating the no-compete covenants, Shipley has established a likelihood of success on the merits.

    Cited 49 timesPublished
  • Willowood of Great Barrington, Inc. v. Sebelius

    638 F. Supp. 2d 98 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 28, 2009

    Therefore, pursuant to Medicare policy, the test results were not used by the ordering physician in such a way as to qualify for reimbursement.... … The orders established patient-specific sliding scales. (A.R. at 38, 151.)

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Alexander v. Brigham & Women's Physicians Organization, Inc.

    467 F. Supp. 2d 136 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 26, 2006

    Rather, it clearly states that to merit top hat status a plan must: (1) be unfunded; (2) be maintained primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation; and (3) such deferred compensation must be for “a select … plan contributions), offset for qualified plan and employer 403(b) contributions from any source.

    Cited 10 timesPublished
  • Feeney v. Com. of Mass.

    451 F. Supp. 143 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 3, 1978

    Rather, we found the preference formula to be a deliberate, conscious attempt on the part of the state to aid one clearly identifiable group of its citizens, those who qualify as veterans, ... at the absolute and permanent … disadvantage of another clearly identifiable group, Massachusetts women.

    Reversed by Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Cardillo, Jr. v. Town of Stockbridge

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 9, 2021

    Qualified immunity shields government officials whose conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. … Qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Solis-Alarcón v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Community-Suffolk, Inc. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad

    475 F. Supp. 443 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 30, 1979

    Clearly therefore, although Congress chose to harmonize the geographical boundaries of the United States districts with state borders it need not have done so. … Thus, for purposes of establishing jurisdiction pursuant to the Massachusetts Long Arm Statute, the activities of connecting carriers within Massachusetts are not attributable to the defendant and plaintiff must establish

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Finigan v. Burwell

    189 F. Supp. 3d 201 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 19, 2016

    To treat her diabetes, Finigan’s physician “established a blood glucose testing regimen requiring the use of a [CGMS,]” Id. at 0062 . … The sole issue with regard to Finigan’s appeal is whether her CGMS supplies qualify as “durable medical equipment.”

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Gray v. Patriot Bank (In re Newbury Cafe, Inc.)

    80 B.R. 259 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 21, 1987

    United States, 789 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir.1986). 1 The Fourth Circuit found that the language of section 506(b) established a distinction between interest and the other claims that could be made by an oversecured creditor: The … Though Congress could have more clearly separated the interest clause from the agreement clause, we think that the natural meaning of its chosen words is to permit postpetition interest on noncon-sensual oversecured claims

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Alvarez v. Worcester

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 2, 2022

    Nonetheless, McKiernan is entitled to qualified immunity. … Qualified immunity protects public officials from personal liability for constitutional violations when the constitutional right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Gilk v.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Al-Abbas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

    52 F. Supp. 3d 288 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 30, 2014

    Durand treated her for chronic fatigue and immune deficiency syndrome. In February 2010, Al-Abbas reported increased symptoms, much worse than those she had experienced prior to this period. … On April 17, 2012, the Social Security Administration approved Al-Abbas’s claim for disability benefits, establishing a disability date of February 27, 2010. H.

    Cited 11 timesPublished

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