Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

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  • Shadduck v. Rodolakis

    221 B.R. 573 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 12, 1998

    At the time of the filing of Shadduck’s bankruptcy petition, this property was an ERISA-qualified plan and, therefore, excluded. … Id. 17 This Court must defer to this finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if the record lacks substantial evidence to support it.

    Cited 30 timesPublished
  • Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court

    536 F. Supp. 647 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 13, 1982

    The corpus of writing on this case already includes two scholarly opinions by justices of the S.J.C. which clearly present the opposing arguments, Lydon v. … But we do not believe that that rule, coupled with the fact that a state chooses not to provide for review of a bench trial verdict, immunizes the state from federal constitutional promises.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • New York Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County

    623 F. Supp. 1435 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 4, 1985

    These statutes confer authority on the Commission to perform functions necessary to the establishment and operation of the Airport. … The conduct of airport operators, as proprietors, is not immune to challenge under the supremacy clause, as defendants contend.

    Cited 20 timesPublished
  • Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 31, 2025

    Mangino, 873 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2017) (refusing to review fact-based challenge to multi-factor qualified immunity ruling on interlocutory appeal).4 Because “[t]he party seeking the interlocutory … appeal must establish all three elements,” PR Recovery & Dev.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • Curran v. City of Boston

    777 F. Supp. 116 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 14, 1991

    any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities … The fifth amendment clearly provides for a cause of action against officials of the federal government. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

    Cited 23 timesPublished
  • Deterra v. America West Airlines, Inc.

    226 F. Supp. 2d 298 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 4, 2002

    Defendant does contend that, even if Congress intended that a qualified handicapped person could bring suit in the federal courts for compensatory damages, Congress did not intend that a qualified handicapped person could … That is clearly not this case, since, in this case, plaintiff does not even allege, much less says that he will show, that the failure of a CRO to be present at the time of the incident was on account of the fact that the

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Potvin v. Speedway LLC

    264 F. Supp. 3d 337 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 8, 2017

    The undisputed material facts establish that Speedway exercised reasonable care in the circumstances. A view of the PLBs establishes that they were clearly visible. (See PI. Ex. 6 at 11-15). … Frederickson makes no attempt to explain why the area surrounding gasoline pumps qualifies as "a means of egress.” .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States v. Knott

    106 F. Supp. 2d 174 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 27, 2000

    Third, waivers of sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed and the award of legal fees is such a waiver. See Gardner at 1297 n. 24. … RMC has not shown that the three attorneys it retained were “qualified” in some “specialized sense” or that they had some “specialized skill needful for the litigation in question” as required to be reimbursed at a higher

    Reversed on other grounds by United States v. Knott, 256 F.3d 20 (2001)Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Massachusetts Financial Services, Inc. v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.

    411 F. Supp. 411 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 26, 1976

    This legislation established S.I. … Since that business clearly falls within the exception of sub-paragraph (i), M.F.S. contends it cannot be considered a member of S.I.P.C.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Petitti v. Massachusetts Department of Mental Health

    859 F. Supp. 33 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 12, 1993

    Second, the MDE’s determination that plaintiff legally qualified for unemployment benefits is irrelevant because the document provides no factual proof as to plaintiffs job performance. … Moreover, it is well established that engaging in a protected activity does not provide immunity for subsequent unsatisfactory performance and misconduct. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 828 .

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • In re McIsaac

    19 B.R. 391 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 12, 1982

    The Mclsaacs’ success in these lawsuits is clearly speculative. … Finally, the testimony of the Mcls-aacs and the documentary evidence filed with the court clearly establish that, at the time the creditors petitions were filed, neither of the alleged bankrupts had sufficient assets to satisfy

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Federal Deposit Insurance v. Source One Mortgage Services Corp.

    844 F. Supp. 40 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 28, 1994

    For example, in bankruptcy law cases, the courts have clearly recognized that a creditor may recoup offsetting prepetition obligations owed under a contract without being accused of a preference. 13 Similarly, in this case … by regulation to be a qualified financial contract for the purposes of this paragraph.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e)(8)(D)(i).

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • United States v. Elm Spring Farm, Inc.

    38 F. Supp. 508 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · May 1, 1941

    The very purpose of the passage of the Capper-Volstead Act was to guarantee cooperative associations immunity from prosecution under Federal antitrust laws. … This opinion is not intended to indicate, because of her prior designation as a handler, that Etta Giles could not qualify under the Act as a producer.

    Modified on other grounds by Elm Spring Farm, Inc. v. United States, 127 F.2d 920 (1942)Cited 8 timesPublished
  • CHAPMAN EX REL. EST. OF CHAPMAN v. Bernard's Inc.

    167 F. Supp. 2d 406 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 20, 2001

    Product Identity Bernard’s contends that summary judgment is appropriate because Chapman cannot establish that it distributed the subject daybed. … Poydar’s resume qualifies him as an expert on the engineering of daybeds, cribs, baby furniture or even furniture in general.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Administration v. Commonwealth

    358 F. Supp. 953 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Mar 30, 1973

    Settled state practice . . . can establish what is state law. The equal protection clause did not write an empty formalism into the Constitution. … In the case at bar, neither the duty owed nor its breach is easy to identify or determine much less may relief be granted using manageable judicial standards. 7 *960 V The Eleventh Amendment clearly bars the action against

    Cited 5 timesPublished
  • In re Raytheon Securities Litigation

    218 F.R.D. 354 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 25, 2003

    Dec.23, 1993) (holding that party asserting the privilege has the burden of establishing non-waiver of the privilege). B. … Under this approach, “[i]f the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document is not to assist in pending or impending litigation, then a finding that the document enjoys work product immunity is not mandated

    Cited 13 timesPublished
  • Unitt v. Bennett

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 3, 2020

    This may well ultimately lead to summary judgment in defendants’ favor, but in 6 Defendants also make a passing reference to an entitlement to qualified immunity. … request for a grant of qualified immunity are denied without prejudice. A scheduling order will follow.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown
  • In re Gentile

    483 B.R. 50 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 28, 2012

    While by no means clearly articulated, the creditors’ § 727 argument hints at the intention to invoke Bankruptcy Code § 522(g) as a basis for denying the debtors’ exemption claim. … Massachusetts is not an opt-out state. .Elderly or disabled homeowners are each entitled to a maximum $500,000 exemption and thus, for example, elderly spouses holding property as tenants by the entirety would qualify for

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Motzkin v. Trustees of Boston University

    938 F. Supp. 983 · District Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 5, 1996

    Car-parts clearly rejects this argument. … This claim is clearly without merit.

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • Mannai Home LLC v. City of Fall River, Massachusetts

    District Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 5, 2019

    Qualified Immunity Defendants contend that Biszko is entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). … Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity will be denied. E.

    Cited 0 timesUnknown

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