Case law

Bairstow v. Sullivan (In Re Sullivan)

198 B.R. 417 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 23, 1996

Therefore, the established law regarding vicarious liability does not aid the Debtor. 3. Did the Plaintiffs have the burden of proof as to special question 2(B)? … The jury’s answer to special question 2(B) does, therefore, qualify for purposes of issue preclusion. III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is granted.

Zacharakis v. Melo (In re Melo)

558 B.R. 521 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 20, 2016

Samia, his spouse, also frequently failed to answer questions directly or clearly. … with attributes giving rise to, in substance, a trust with a clearly defined trust res.

Jackson v. Rushmore Loan Management Services

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 2, 2020

Rushmore submitted unrebutted factual material establishing that Capital One had completed its disposition of Ms. … Jackson clearly ignores the plain language of the statute: “a creditor shall not cause publication of notice of aforeclosure sale. . .

Fisher v. Smith (In Re Medico Associates, Inc.)

23 B.R. 295 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jul 18, 1980

On that issue the April 3,1973 letter clearly states the manner by which the rate is to be calculated: The New York City Department of Social Services agrees to pay at the rate of $26.75 per day until such time as the State … This program is administered through a supervisory mechanism providing, in part, direct payments to qualified providers of health care services under a state-formulated plan in compliance with federal guidelines.

Baldiga v. Moog, Inc. (In re Comprehensive Power, Inc.)

578 B.R. 14 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 8, 2017

The term “commercially reasonable” is not specifically defined by the UCC and has been held to mean “that a qualifying disposition must be made in the good faith attempt to dispose of the collateral to the parties’ ‘mutual … While the Trustee may ultimately fall short of establishing that Moog’s conduct was within “ ‘the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness’ or was ‘immoral or unethical, oppressive

In Re Calore Exp. Co., Inc.

199 B.R. 424 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 21, 1996

A creditor asserting a right of set-off has the burden of establishing its entitlement to setoff. In other words, it must establish that “the debt and claim ... [are] ... mutual — that something is owed by both sides.” … Clearly, it allowed plaintiff to rely to its detriment on the information provided in its original proof of claim that no offset existed.

Fidler v. Central Cooperative Bank (In Re Fidler)

210 B.R. 411 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 30, 1997

Generally speaking, professional education is not a prerequisite to qualify as an expert witness. One can qualify as an expert witness based upon practical experience as well. Southern Cement Co. v. … Both TILA and CCCDA require that creditors make truth-in-lending disclosures “clearly and conspicuously.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 ; 209 C.M.R. § 32.17.

In re Darden

474 B.R. 1 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · May 25, 2012

A contract is ambiguous if a genuine doubt appears as to its meaning, that is, if, after applying established rules of interpretation, the written instrument remains rea *11 sonably susceptible to at least two reasonable … As explained above, a plan will qualify for confirmation only if the Debtor proposes it in good faith.

In re Lee

472 B.R. 156 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 4, 2012

A “Qualified Raymond Lee Family Member” is defined as “any of the spouse, descendants, heirs, legatees or devisees of Raymond C. … Lee that are qualified for employment by Oasis Development Enterprises, Inc. in a managerial capacity equivalent to that of a managing director.”

Grossman v. Garabedian (In re Garabedian)

520 B.R. 326 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Oct 7, 2014

Accordingly, the Debtor did not clearly set forth in either his testimony or his Schedules how much money he was paying business creditors and business lenders and how much he contributed to household expenses. … Although the Debtor in responses to the Trustee’s Requests for Admissions, denied or improperly qualified his answers to the Trustee’s Requests, the Trustee through the Debtor’s admissions at trial established that the Debtor

In re Dickey

517 B.R. 5 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Aug 28, 2014

If, however, I conclude that the Debtor has not been the uninterrupted title holder of the Property since 2005, she argues that she clearly possessed an interest in the Property at the time of the NEPCO Lien and Ridgewood … Generally speaking, “[property that is properly exempted under § 522 is immunized against liability for prebankruptcy debts.” 88 As recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Law v.

Baker v. Friedman (In Re Friedman)

298 B.R. 487 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Sep 11, 2003

With respect to Frain’s conduct, it stated that his superior knowledge of day-to-day operations was insufficient in itself to establish a position of ascendancy. … The Supreme Court as well as Massachusetts common law clearly evince an intent that partners act as trustees for the benefit of each other with respect to the trust res which consists of the partnership assets.

In Re Erving Industries, Inc.

432 B.R. 354 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 7, 2010

And electricity is clearly identifiable, because it is measured by the meter upon delivery. … Hendel, Does electricity qualify for an administrative expense claim? Query: Can you buy a can of it at Costco?, 51 Bankr.Ct.

Ginger Sirikanjanachai

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jan 3, 2020

The present motion does not clearly identify (i) the property in question, (ii)  the judicial lien that allegedly impairs it, and (iii) the exemption under which she contends that she could  claim the property as exempt.  … Original Motion on several grounds, among them (i)  that “[t]he Debtor’s assertion that this $55,000 was somehow derived from the sale of her residence at  23 Ridgewood Crossing in Hingham (as it would have to be, in order to qualify

North Shore Bank, a Co-Operative Bank v. Bona

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Nov 6, 2019

In Count II, the Bank states that the Debtor misrepresented the status of his unsecured debts and engaged in “other conduct” in order to qualify for a loan with the intent to deceive the Bank. … ing] to his duties of protecting the business as a going concern and protecting the assets of [the debtor] to maximize their value for the benefit of creditors” were protected by litigation privilege and quasi-judicial immunity

Geriatric Facilities of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Georges

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 22, 2021

Georges never qualified for Medicaid, Pleasant Bay’s claim was based on full private-pay rates. In July of 2016, Mr. Georges and Pleasant Bay settled the litigation with Mr. … An express trust requires “an explicit declaration of trust, a clearly defined trust res, and an intent to create a trust relationship,” while a technical trust comes from statute or common law.

In Re P.J. Keating Co.

180 B.R. 18 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Apr 12, 1995

The additional legal fees owed but not paid clearly qualify under this language because the legal services were rendered in the same litigation spawning the initial claim, which had included only sums actually paid out for … That the $150,000 equalled Robert’s salary does not establish the payment was severance pay. The settlement agreement, moreover, provided for no flat payment whatsoever to John J.

In Re Bank of New England Corp.

134 B.R. 450 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Dec 9, 1991

It should be noted at the outset that these rules may be subject to exceptions in clearly demonstrated special circumstances. … The effort now is “to balance a spirit of economy on the one hand with fees sufficiently close to market rates to attract qualified counsel on the other.” Boston & Maine Corp. v.

Hermosilla v. Hermosilla (In Re Hermosilla)

450 B.R. 276 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Jun 1, 2011

The Memorandum failed to even acknowledge the admissions as established facts, instead discussing them as unsupported allegations. … Fortunately, I qualified for MassHealth (also known as Medicaid), and continued to be qualified for free health care until February, 2011. All of this resulted in a substantial loss of income in 2010.

Trenwick America Reinsurance Corp. v. Swasey (In re Swasey)

488 B.R. 22 · United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts · Feb 14, 2013

A knowing state of mind in connection with a claim of unfair insurance claim settlement exists at least where an insurance company forces an insured to litigate clearly valid claims. … A “knowing breach of contract” could also qualify.