Case law

Norman v. Dougan

201 Iowa 923 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 6, 1926

The trial court established the first claim in the sum of $400, with interest, as a claim of the third class, and established the second claim in the sum of $237, with interest, as a preferred claim against the estate. … Dougan died, and letters of administration issued to his wife, Clara, and she duly qualified as administratrix.

Allegre v. Iowa State Board of Regents

319 N.W.2d 206 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 19, 1982

The real holding of these cases, however is simply that conduct must come within the statutory definition in order to qualify as “agency action.” … Thus, the Board’s denial of Allegre’s claim is clearly agency action.

Husker News Co. v. South Ottumwa Savings Bank

482 N.W.2d 404 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 18, 1992

This is because a forger’s signature does not constitute an endorsement, a requirement to qualify as a holder in due course. … The banks also established that they acted in accordance with reasonable business procedures.

Merritt v. Peterson

208 Iowa 672 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 8, 1929

Accordingly, on June 6, 1922, he was appointed as such, and became duly qualified. Two sureties signed his bond. They were the defendants and appellants O. C. Knudsóñ and L. E. Larson. … Wherefore, it clearly appears that appellee was not entitled to the directed verdict. *677 II.

McCulloch's Estate v. Conrad

243 Iowa 449 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 4, 1952

The language of the will and codicil clearly and definitely establishes that it was the intention of the testator that his son, Milan E. … and in fee simple, but was a qualified, conditional and defeasible fee.'

Jenkins v. State Highway Commission

205 Iowa 523 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 6, 1928

This comparative study of the present statute in the light of pre-existing statute is clearly indicative of the purpose of the legislation. … Whether, and to what extent, Section 4560 has been qualified in its application by the enactment of Section 4607, we have no occasion to consider.

State v. Post

255 Iowa 573 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 16, 1963

There we carefully pointed out that when firmly fixed right to^ the services of counsel is exercised, it will not do to say that the accused is immune from compliance with the rules by which established procedure requires … Boyle, 230 Iowa 305, 308 , 297 N.W. 312 , as establishing the rule that “The facts established must exclude every rational hypothesis except the ultimate fact sought to be established, to- wit, that the defendant is guilty

Richards v. Iowa Department of Revenue & Finance

454 N.W.2d 573 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 18, 1990

Northcrest was allowed an exemption from property taxes because it qualified as a charitable institution. R.K. … a district court ruling sustaining a motion to dismiss, we view the allegations of the petition in the light most favorable to the petitioner, resolve doubts in his favor, and will uphold the ruling only if he could not establish

Star Equipment, Ltd. v. State of Iowa, Iowa Department of Transportation

843 N.W.2d 446 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 31, 2014

Because Universal Concrete qualified as a TSB, IDOT waived the requirement of a construction surety bond to guarantee the company’s performance on the contract. … We reject IDOT’s sovereign immunity argument because section 573.2, so interpreted, constitutes the state’s express consent to be sued. See Anthony v.

State v. Thornton

300 N.W.2d 94 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 14, 1981

Even though the arresting officer had no independent knowledge of the facts establishing probable cause, it argued, the arrest was nonetheless valid since the police chief had the information to establish probable cause, … While the defendant’s argument might have some basis in logic, and was accepted by the district court, it is clearly not the prevailing view. In United States v.

Lucas v. Ruden

220 Iowa 494 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 2, 1935

If appellee *504 had brought this action within a shorter time after qualifying as executor, the result would have been the payment of the claim. … If the appellee can establish his claim as a just claim against these appellants, he should be permitted to do so.

Michael Merrill and Karen Jo Frescoln v. Valley View Swine, LLC and JBS Live Pork, LLC f/k/a Cargill Pork, LLC

Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 27, 2020

The court did, however, reject Merrill and Frescoln’s argument that two-time voluntary dismissers did not qualify as having “a losing cause of action.” Id. … The court summed up her situation as follows:  8 Frescoln’s claims in this case are without substance of property ownership, and do not establish soundness in fact

State v. Rye

145 N.W.2d 608 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 16, 1966

As to the opinion and conclusion evidence in relation to company practices, the objections were clearly without merit. … The foundation established these two witnesses as regular employees of Wolf's, their duties included the very practices and procedures outlined by the witnesses and their testimony established the fact that they were familiar

State v. Cullison

173 N.W.2d 533 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 13, 1970

It is therefore apparent the pre-search reasonable or probable cause, essential to its validity, was not here present or established. VII. … Moreover, as to the pending stolen goods charge against Teeters, the search clearly went beyond any reasonable reach area.

First National Bank v. Flynn

117 Iowa 493 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 9, 1902

Thereafter, on the 9th of May, Flynn, who had been on the 5th of May duly qualified as trustee in bankruptcy of the defendant firm, filed a motion to set aside the default, and presented therewith his answer, taking issue … That the state court still had jurisdiction of the attached property, and the power to determine what disposition should be made of it, clearly appears; for, although the judgment on default was formally a final adjudication

Kelly Brodie, Dr. John Heffron, Katherine King, Dr. Michael Langenfeld, Katherine Rall and Jamie Shaw v. Jerry R. Foxhoven, Richard Shults, Jerry Rea, Mohammad Rehman, Glenwood Resource Center and Iowa Department of Human Services

Supreme Court of Iowa · May 23, 2025

[GRC] were being subjected to conditions that deprived them of their legal rights and of their rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.” … assault policy was a clearly defined public policy).

Second Injury Fund Of Iowa Vs. Jackie George

Supreme Court of Iowa · Aug 10, 2007

The legislature established the Fund in order to encourage the employment of disabled persons “by making the current employer responsible only for the disability the current employer causes.” Second Injury Fund v. … The record clearly establishes the May 1996 injury to George’s left leg was a scheduled injury. The doctor rated it as a scheduled injury and the employer paid it as a scheduled injury.

Andrew v. Sac County State Bank

205 Iowa 1248 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 14, 1928

Those precedents involve situations where there have been investments or other obvious’ transactions through “management” clearly within the purview of the quoted enactment. … Duty was to repay to him who had placed the money in the banking establishment.

In Re the Marriage of Nelson

570 N.W.2d 103 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 22, 1997

The value of farm commodities is best established when the commodity is sold. The value of farm commodities is therefore reflected in income, and income is used to establish child support. … That variation easily qualifies as more than the required ten percent. VII. We affirm the trial court’s order that Scott pay $500 toward Jane’s attorney fees at trial in district court.

Bogle v. Goldsworthy

202 Iowa 764 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 14, 1926

The testimony of Goldsworthy confirms the presumption, in a qualified way. He admits that he holds the title in trust for Halver-son, but claims a lien thereon for the payment of his debt. … It awarded judgment in his favor against Halverson,, and established the same as a first lien upon the property, and as in lieu of the mortgage. The relief thus granted was clearly proper.