Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
3,145 results
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Voss v. State, Iowa Department of Transportation
553 N.W.2d 878 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 18, 1996
The Department of Transportation sought dismissal on the additional ground it was immune from liability under the Act. See Iowa Code § 669.16 . … In Pearson , we held a plaintiffs appointment as administrator of her husband’s estate did not relate back to the date she filed her wrongful death action to retroactively establish her capacity to bring the wrongful death
Cited 59 timesPublished695 N.W.2d 9 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 8, 2005
Channon’s pleadings clearly establish that the operative facts which she alleges give rise to her claims under the ICRA are the same as those upon which she relies as giving rise to her [tort] claim. … Smidt’s pleadings clearly establish that the operative facts which she alleges give rise to her claims under the ICRA are the same as those forming the basis for her proposed wrongful discharge claim.
Cited 89 timesPublishedState v. Public Employment Relations Board
744 N.W.2d 357 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 8, 2008
The ALJ stated there was no evidence in the record that would establish the willfulness of the State’s violation of section 20.9. … Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 671 N.W.2d 501, 509 (Iowa 2003) (holding state agency’s general regulatory authority over health care facilities did not qualify as a legislative delegation of discretion to elaborate on the
Cited 21 timesPublishedState v. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co.
168 Iowa 1 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 12, 1914
Section 4999-a31 established standards of more than twenty articles. The essential subject was food standards. … From these documents, it appears that there is a difference of opinion as to the advisability of- establishing a standard for ice cream, or if it is established, the per cent, of butter fat the product should contain.
Cited 27 timesPublishedHeessel v. Creston National Bank
205 Iowa 508 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 6, 1928
So, after the seizure of the motor vehicle by the officer under the writ, appellant caused to be served upon the “sheriff” notice of its qualified ownership of said chattel, and demand for the release thereof. … If appellee wished to avail himself of a general execution on his judgment, that was his privilege; but clearly, he could not, through that pretense, create a basis for the operation of his preference under this law.
Cited 3 timesPublished210 Iowa 829 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 16, 1930
This being true, the burden is upon the appellants to establish want of consideration. … The contract was clearly established by competent testimony, and no tenable objection relative to the foregoing matters can be maintained by the appellants. *838 The appellants offered to prove that McNider was a man of large
Cited 6 timesPublishedCity of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald, Inc.
297 N.W.2d 523 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 15, 1980
In so holding, we do not reject Dubuque’s argument that disclosure of such applications may deter qualified persons holding responsible positions from applying. … This should have alerted knowledgeable, qualified persons the hiring pro *528 cedures would probably not be secret.
Cited 26 timesPublished205 Iowa 74 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 17, 1928
Clearly, the township is not a governmental employer, upon whom the compensation act is made obligatory. Section 1362, Code of 1924. … As an official, he qualifies by taking oath of office required of all civil officers, and he must furnish bond. Section 4811.
Cited 4 timesPublished199 Iowa 1232 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 18, 1924
. * * * No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of … ’ ” We will assume, at this point, that the petition was in proper form, and signed 'by the requisite number of qualified electors of Marshall County.
Cited 24 timesPublishedRyan Koster v. Harvest Bible Chapel–Quad Cities d/b/a Harvest Bible Chapel–Davenport and Garth Glenn
Supreme Court of Iowa · May 21, 2021
One is Iowa Code section 622.10(1) (2017), which clearly does not apply here because the conversations occurred in a group setting. … These specific facts, which are not challenged by Ryan, are sufficient to establish that a qualified privilege applies. Glenn was communicating with staff and members on a matter of common interest.
Cited 0 timesPublishedBrooks Ex Rel. Brooks v. Engel
207 N.W.2d 110 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 25, 1973
Mortician Jenks was clearly authorized and directed by the county coroner to draw this blood specimen. Plaintiff authorized an autopsy. … The real issue, from a foundation standpoint, is whether Jenks was a qualified person to take a careful sampling of blood.
Cited 18 timesPublishedCity of Des Moines v. Iowa Telephone Co.
181 Iowa 1282 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 5, 1917
Telegraphs AND TELEPHONES : establishment, maintenance, etc.: free legislative grant: power of municipality to collect rental. I. … It is clearly a revenue measure, and there seems to be no express legislative power for such an ordinance.
Cited 12 timesPublished236 Iowa 863 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 16, 1945
The Court: You raised two questions, that it is not the proper measure of damages, and the witness not showing himself qualified or is he not qualified to state? Mr. … Parrish: He is not qualified to state from his own statement as to what the value of the truck was. The Court: I think the witness may answer. Overruled.
Cited 10 timesPublished167 Iowa 436 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 25, 1914
The qualifying words in the statute cited, “unless a contrary intent is expressed,” would seem therefore to leave place in the law of the state for a joint tenancy, with its characteristic incident of survivorship, if the … intent of the parties to the instrument to create it is clearly indicated by the language employed.
Cited 30 timesPublished208 Iowa 672 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 8, 1929
Accordingly, on June 6, 1922, he was appointed as such, and became duly qualified. Two sureties signed his bond. They were the defendants and appellants O. C. Knudsóñ and L. E. Larson. … Wherefore, it clearly appears that appellee was not entitled to the directed verdict. *677 II.
Cited 3 timesPublishedHy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission
453 N.W.2d 512 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 24, 1990
An employee establishes a prima facie case by showing that (1) the employee belonged to a protected group, (2) the employee made application and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) the … Blood’s business education and experience clearly qualified her for the job.
Cited 65 timesPublishedJenkins v. State Highway Commission
205 Iowa 523 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 6, 1928
This comparative study of the present statute in the light of pre-existing statute is clearly indicative of the purpose of the legislation. … Whether, and to what extent, Section 4560 has been qualified in its application by the enactment of Section 4607, we have no occasion to consider.
Cited 6 timesPublishedAllegre v. Iowa State Board of Regents
319 N.W.2d 206 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 19, 1982
The real holding of these cases, however is simply that conduct must come within the statutory definition in order to qualify as “agency action.” … Thus, the Board’s denial of Allegre’s claim is clearly agency action.
Cited 10 timesPublishedFrank v. Iowa Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division
386 N.W.2d 86 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 16, 1986
extent clearly unreasonable.” … Section ' 321.210 authorizes the department to establish rules for license suspension if the operator is found to be a habitual violator, and provides only three exclusions for violations of statutory or municipal ordinances
Cited 23 timesPublishedIowa AG Construction Co. v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review
723 N.W.2d 167 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 15, 2006
resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance. … Windows and cooling and ventilation systems qualify as “property which, under normal conditions, becomes a part of realty.” Id. r. 701— 19.10(2)(c).
Cited 17 timesPublished
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