Case law

Friendship Haven, Inc. v. Webster County Board of Review

542 N.W.2d 837 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 17, 1996

We conclude that Friendship Haven’s evidence clearly failed to establish the first of these propositions. … In that case, we expressed the view that the actual-use test for establishing an exemption is a much less demanding requirement for those religious, educational, and charitable organizations who clearly qualify as such without

Wright v. Iowa Department of Corrections

747 N.W.2d 213 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 11, 2008

It is undisputed that “statutory rape” under Iowa Code section 698.1 (1975) qualifies as a “relevant offense” under section 692A.2A. … This definition clearly makes section 692A.2A applicable to Wright since he is a person convicted of statutory rape — a criminal offense against a minor.

Judy v. Beckwith

137 Iowa 24 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 15, 1908

Bearing upon the first phase of this question, counsel for appellee say that shares of stock are in only a very limited and qualified sense to be classified as personal Property, and are rather merely written evidence of … This distinction between capital stock and shares of stock is too thoroughly established to justify prolonged discussion.

Sweeney v. City of Bettendorf

762 N.W.2d 873 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 13, 2009

In reaching this determination, we cited with approval an annotation stating that “broad exculpatory provisions” would rarely immunize a defendant for acts of affirmative negligence. … Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183 , 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ct.App.1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v.

State v. Hartwick

228 Iowa 245 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 5, 1940

Objection is also made that the word “certain” means established, not to be doubted; assured, etc. … We think the instruction was clearly applicable and duly authorized, not only by the Code but by our decisions. VI.

Conkel v. Civil Service Commission

444 N.W.2d 92 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 31, 1989

Section 400.11 provides in relevant part that [t]he commission shall ... certify to the city council a list of the names of the ten persons who qualify ... or such number as may have qualified if less than ten ... for the … As section 400.11 clearly states, it comes into play only when no preferred list or certified eligible list has been compiled or when that list has been exhausted.

First National Bank in Creston v. Smith

331 N.W.2d 120 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 16, 1983

Because the commence *123 ment of work by the contractor under agreement with the owners clearly antedates the bank’s mortgage, the rights of the plaintiff bank can rise no higher than those of the owners. … Based upon these transactions, we conclude that the counterclaim qualifies as a valid supplemental pleading under Rule 90, Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hospers v. Watts

209 Iowa 1193 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 18, 1930

Hospers, was, at the time of the commencement of the original action, the qualified and acting receiver for the Bank of Paullina. … The indicia of ownership were clearly in E. L. Watts, and the bank had no occasion to know, and did not know, that George W.

Dennis L. Smith v. Iowa State University of Science and Technology, State of Iowa

885 N.W.2d 620 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 23, 2016

We will reverse a court’s discretionary ruling only when the court rests its ruling on grounds that are clearly unreasonable or untenable. … A defendant should not be immunized “against paying for the attorney’s fees that the plaintiff reasonably incurred in remedying” the violation for which attorney fees were recoverable. See Fox v.

Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co.

533 N.W.2d 226 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 24, 1995

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that she did not establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination. … The trial court concluded that the plaintiff clearly met the first and third elements of her case, and neither party disputes those conclusions.

Younker v. Susong

173 Iowa 663 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 22, 1916

The municipal court act in question should not be held unconstitutional unless it is “ clearly, plainly and palpably” so. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa 312 ; State v. … It is the duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained.

Whitmore v. Bowman

4 Greene 148 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 15, 1853

But in no case should a witness be permitted to express an opinion as evidence, where the jury ,to whom the facts are submitted, are supposed to be equally well qualified to form an opinion. … These authorities clearly indicate that the legal course to foe pursued in such cases, is to lay before the jury such facts as are relevant to the issue, and from these facts let the jury draw their own conclusions. 3.

Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines

644 N.W.2d 339 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 31, 2002

The plaintiff does not challenge the City’s authority to build parks; clearly, parks improve the welfare and comfort of city residents. … The plaintiffs third equal protection challenge — the immunity of commercial devélopment from the parks fee — suffers the same fate.

Miller v. Boone County Hospital

394 N.W.2d 776 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 15, 1986

Governmental immunity. The origins and underlying purposes of notice requirements are rooted in governmental immunity, and may be viewed as a partial substitute for it. W. Prosser & W. … That test has perhaps most clearly been articulated by our court in City of Waterloo v.

Iowa Service Co. v. City of Villisca

203 Iowa 610 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 5, 1927

There is no power plant established in said *611 city. … The relation between the two chapters is clearly indicated by Section 6264.

Dolphin Residential Cooperative, Inc. v. Iowa City Board of Review

863 N.W.2d 644 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 15, 2015

Chapter 499A clearly distinguishes between organizers, directors, and members, establishing different roles for each. … The legislature also clearly demonstrated its ability to differentiate between these participants and established different rights and duties for each distinct class.

Dunn v. McGovern

116 Iowa 663 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 29, 1902

The pleadings upon both sides are patched with repeated amendments adding to, taking from, qualifying, or withdrawing allegations earlier made with a freedom which suggests that the exigencies of the case have served as a … It is a recognized principle of the law of specific performance that, to grant such relief, the contract to be enforced must be clearly established, and the terms and conditions *666 thereof made free from doubt.

C & J Vantage Leasing Co., Assignor to Frontier Leasing Corp., Assignee v. Thomas Wolfe D/B/A Lake Macbride Golf Course and Thomas Wolfe, Individually

795 N.W.2d 65 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 4, 2011

A transaction must first qualify as a lease before it can qualify as a finance lease. U.C.C. § 2A-103, cmt. … Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 167 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 1969) (stating the elements necessary to establish equitable estoppel).

Adair Benevolent Society v. State, Insurance Division of the State of Iowa

489 N.W.2d 1 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 22, 1992

We recognized the enhanced fine as punitive which brought it clearly within “the rule prohibiting ex post facto enhancement of fines.” Kaster, 469 N.W.2d at 674 . … Because it can no longer qualify as a licensed benevolent society in Iowa, it must choose another statutory route of incorporation to stay in business here. See, e.g., Iowa Code ch. 508.

Whisler Ex Rel. Deater v. Estes

216 Iowa 491 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 20, 1933

Morgan provided in her will for the establishment of a trust'fund in the amount of $9,000. … The details of this arrangement are not clearly shown by the record. On August 12,. 1924, Milton Estes received from L. D. Morgan, $1,269.78,' which represented fees of L. D.