Case law

Tyler Dix, Jason Cattell, Jimmy McCann, and Julie Eller v. Casey's General Stores, Inc. and Casey's Marketing Company

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 25, 2021

Subsection 730.5(11) immunizes employers against causes of action separate from violations of section 730.5 based on drug or alcohol tests taken in good faith when the employer has “established a policy and initiated a … Casey’s does not argue sorting cigarette returns qualifies as safety- sensitive work.

Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa

357 N.W.2d 579 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 14, 1984

The board employed new management for Le-Mars and established and carried out procedures to separate LeMars from Iowa Mutual as directed by the court. … We reverse for abuse of discretion only when such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Glenn v.

Wilma Jean Kellogg v. City of Albia, Iowa

Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 9, 2018

Although the city had priority of location, clearly Kellogg did not purchase her property to institute this lawsuit. She has resided at the location since 2008. … Lippolt, 755 N.W.2d 514, 524-25 (Iowa 2008) (“To establish equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence . . .

Becker v. Iowa Department of Human Services

661 N.W.2d 125 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 7, 2003

The Iowa Administrative Code established guidelines for the subsidies. … To qualify for the subsidy, we believe, the adoption must be contiguous in function, i.e., without any intervening agency or individual, in order to qualify.

Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Insurance Associates, Ltd.

492 N.W.2d 675 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 25, 1992

To qualify under the definition, it is enough if an exclusion deprives coverage in a vital and substantial way. … We agree with the district court that the special facts here qualify for application of reasonable expectations on the second ground for the doctrine.

Board of Water Works Trustees of the City of Des Moines, Iowa v. Sac County Board of Supervisors, as Trustee of Drainage Districts 32, 42, 65, 79, 81, 83, 86, and Calhoun County Board of Supervisors and Sac County Board of Supervisors as Joint Trustees of Drainage Districts 2 and 51 and Buena Vista County Board of Supervisors and Sac County Board of Supervisors as Joint Trustees of Drainage Districts 19

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 27, 2017

According to DMWW, immunity was established decades before the environmental movement raised consciousness about protecting water quality. … And, if mandamus is available in an appropriate case, as our cases clearly establish, why would injunctive relief not be available in an appropriate case, as it was in Voogd?

State Ex Rel. Chwirka v. Audino

260 N.W.2d 279 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 23, 1977

the Gold Nugget was not a qualified organization operating pursuant to § 99B.7. (6) Whether the reputation of the Aven-tino Motor Inn, testified to as a part of the State’s case, was sufficient to establish, pri-ma facie … We next turn our attention to the question whether the evidence established Gold Nugget was an organization qualified to operate pursuant to § 99B.7.

Frederickson v. Heline

252 Iowa 92 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 15, 1960

It is in the light of these established principles that we must view the evidence as to plaintiff’s injuries and determine whether it clearly appears that the amount awarded is beyond that which can be fairly sustained by … passion and prejudice or is unconscionable or clearly not warranted by the evidence.”

State v. United States Express Co.

164 Iowa 112 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 17, 1914

Again, the statute in question is clearly declaratory or remedial (to supply defects or to abridge superfluities), as distinguished from a penal one. Freeland v. McCullough, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 422 ( 43 Am. Dec. 685 ). … The power over interstate commerce is too vital to the integrity of the nation to be qualified by any refinement of reasoning.

Hyler v. Garner

548 N.W.2d 864 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 22, 1996

The witness must be qualified to answer the particular question propounded. Wick, 485 N.W.2d at 648 . Whether a witness is sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert is within the court’s discretion. Tappe v. … He is sufficiently qualified in welding and mechanics to address the matters covered in his testimony.

State v. Hildreth

582 N.W.2d 167 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 29, 1998

This court has not yet addressed the issue of whether statements made to a social worker qualify under rule 803(4). … Rankin, 181 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Iowa 1970), we noted that “[a] person should not be able to escape punishment for such a disgusting crime because he has ■ chosen to take carnal knowledge of an infant too young to testify clearly

Reimers v. McElree

238 Iowa 791 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 29, 1947

The instant case is clearly a collateral attack upon the 1909 decree. … To warrant the setting aside of a judgment in a collateral proceeding for fraud, the evidence should clearly establish the fraud. Hulverson v. Hutchinson & Co., 39 Iowa 316 .

Lees v. Wetmore

58 Iowa 170 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 21, 1882

Fisk alone qualified as executor. The other person named as executor in the will declined to quality. 3. … These records, with other evidence, establishes there was indebtedness of the estate filed as claims in the court.

Pleasant Hill Independent School District v. Norris

250 Iowa 546 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 10, 1959

of the votes east by the qualified electors from their respective territories shall be required.” … Clearly they are “respective territories” and cannot be counted together. By judicial repeal the trial court expunged the two. above sections, both of which were at all times applicable to this ease.

City of Fairfield v. Shallenberger

135 Iowa 615 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 21, 1907

unconstitutional, being in violation of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that “ no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities … It is also a well-established rule that the statutes shall be so construed, if possible, as to give force and effect to all, and ^at they should be upheld unless they are clearly in conflict, or the later one unmistakably

Ganrud v. Smith

206 N.W.2d 311 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 28, 1973

It is not enough that a witness be generally qualified in a certain area, he must also be qualified to answer the particular question propounded. Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, Iowa, 176 N.W.2d 819, 824 ; Karr v. … Brown and Billings testify at great length establishing education, past experience and specific qualifications in the area of accident investigation and reconstruction.

Stuart v. Pilgrim

247 Iowa 709 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 10, 1956

Such an interpretation is clearly not within the language of the statute, and should not be read into it by a forced and unnatural construction. … The negligent third party deserves no immunity from damages as against a non-negligent bailor.”

Walker v. Howell

209 Iowa 823 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 24, 1929

Clearly, therefore, the corporation had a right to collect the collateral after it was placed with the trustees, and retain the proceeds thereof. … Thus the bondholder had a qualified ownership in the pledged property, and appellees could not destroy the same or, except as authorized by the deed, force an exchange thereof for something else.

McFarland v. Stewart

109 Iowa 561 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 26, 1899

Stewart was appointed sole executor, and qualified as such on June 30, 1896. … We are clearly of the opinion that the district court of Harrison county had no jurisdiction to grant any of the relief ashed. — Reversed.

Hawkeye Bank v. State

515 N.W.2d 348 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 20, 1994

Clearly, in the present case, the initial notice of suit in the name of “Estate of Jessica L. Smith” adequately conveyed to the State the nature of the claim being made. … The alleged lack of supervision of and accounting for the deceased minor child may not be established as conforming with a policy determination of superior authority.