Case law

Wells Dairy, Inc. v. American Industrial Refrigeration, Inc.

690 N.W.2d 38 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 10, 2004

But the converse of this is that even though litigation is already in prospect, there is no work product immunity for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather than for purposes of litigation.” 816 F.2d … , the document was clearly prepared for business purposes, not in anticipation of litigation.

The Sherwin-williams Company Vs. Iowa Department Of Revenue

789 N.W.2d 417 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 8, 2010

The term “manufacturing establishments” was not defined in the tax statutes. … Clearly, the Oklahoma court’s decisions in McDonald’s Corp. and Dairy Queen of Oklahoma, Inc. are readily distinguishable given the clearly expressed legislative intent that the exemption only be given to businesses primarily

Megee v. Barnes

160 N.W.2d 815 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 5, 1968

be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed, and should not be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of its prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to effect this object is clearly … Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, section 91, pages 301-304: “It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations, resting upon grounds of public policy, that the sovereign cannot be sued in

State v. Sunclades

305 N.W.2d 491 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 15, 1981

We assume the legislature was familiar with the existing state of the law, and if it sought to remedy a specific evil it would have clearly so indicated. See Peffers v. … The federal courts have also held that a defendant must establish actual and substantial prejudice resulting from prein-dictment delay, see United States v.

Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines

138 Iowa 730 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 7, 1908

In some of the cases, provisions for the establishment of a school system are given great weight but in none has an act of the Legislature modifying the qual *739 ifications of an elector at an election of an officer been … That the statute grants an immunity which is not accorded the male voters is apparent, and our only inquiry is whether this is done on the same terms; that is, *741 whether the classification is reasonable.

American Eyecare v. Department of Human Services

770 N.W.2d 832 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 17, 2009

“Substantial evidence ” means the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment … However-, the statute does not clearly give DHS the authority to interpret its rules and regulations. See State v. Pub.

Huendling v. Jensen

168 N.W.2d 745 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 10, 1969

“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine … The evidence here so clearly exposes defendant’s improper motives that the doctrine of judicial immunity seems unfair.

Hollingsworth v. Midwest Serum Co.

183 Iowa 280 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 14, 1917

They then take an immune hog and weigh it, and then pump 5 c. c. per pound of weight into the veins of the immune hog. That makes what we call a hyper-immune hog. … As first testified to, the statement of Juckniess was not an admission that there had been no test, but clearly implied that there had been one.

Frink v. Clark

226 Iowa 1012 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 2, 1939

The rule is well established in this state, appears to be sound and in accordance with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions. We see no occasion to depart from it. … As above pointed out, the statute is clearly broad enough to include within its terms the controversy presented by this appeal. The record herein coincides with the provisions of the statute in every detail.

Petition of Bisenius

573 N.W.2d 258 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 21, 1998

David Bisenius was clearly obligated by the court’s order to pay support past the age of 18 so long as [the children] qualified pursuant to section 598.1. … Had the 1989 modification order been entered before any of the children had attained the age of eighteen, it may have been possible to interpret the amount of support established thereunder as not applying to children qualifying

Ette Ex Rel. Ette v. Linn-Mar Community School District

656 N.W.2d 62 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 7, 2003

Thada, 243 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Iowa 1976) (“Exemplary damages are not allowed unless actual damages have been established.”) … To qualify as outrageous, the conduct must be “so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds *71 of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Vinson v.

David P. Garr Jr. and Julie A. Garr v. City of Ottumwa, Iowa

846 N.W.2d 865 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 2, 2014

The renumbered sections corresponding to those under which the City sought immunity are section 670.4(1)(c), (h), and (j). … App. 1999) (holding expert testimony necessary to establish dam caused flooding).

Florey v. City of Burlington

247 Iowa 316 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 13, 1955

Another statute, Code section 389.1, gives cities “power to establish, lay off, open, widen, straighten, narrow, vacate, extend, improve, and repair streets, * * * public grounds, parks and play grounds * * Its statutory … He says: “It is clearly visible to the eye, it is a well-beaten path.” On cross-examination he refers to it as a “sort of a connecting path leading from the top down to a lower grade.”

Terrace Hill Society Foundation v. Terrace Hill Commission and Kristin Hurd, in her official capacity as Chairperson of the Terrace Hill Commission

Supreme Court of Iowa · May 3, 2024

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, THSF’s counsel specified that the voluntary legal relationship between THSF and the Commission was “clearly” or “essentially” a “common law bailment.” … “Once a bailment is established, the law imposes specific duties upon bailees to care for the bailor’s property while it is in their possession.” Id. at 730.

State v. Boggs

741 N.W.2d 492 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 16, 2007

United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 224 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1957), the Supreme Court qualified the Ball principle. … Second, the judicially crafted double jeopardy exception has been qualified in those cases involving the retrial of a greater offense, as with the statutory exception.

McGuire v. City of Cedar Rapids

189 N.W.2d 592 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 9, 1971

immunity would apply to sewer projects. … We then added that the principle of liability also applied to a public restroom established under statutory authority.

In Re Knouse's Will

121 N.W.2d 151 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 9, 1963

In case of a failure of the named trustee in a charitable trust to qualify, the courts have power to appoint a successor. … This she attempts to do by pointing to the language which prescribes a method for the appointment of a substitute trustee if the first named does not qualify.

Terrace Hill Society Foundation v. Terrace Hill Commission and Kristin Hurd, in her official capacity as Chairperson of the Terrace Hill Commission

Supreme Court of Iowa · May 3, 2024

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, THSF’s counsel specified that the voluntary legal relationship between THSF and the Commission was “clearly” or “essentially” a “common law bailment.” … “Once a bailment is established, the law imposes specific duties upon bailees to care for the bailor’s property while it is in their possession.” Id. at 730.

Barreca v. Nickolas

683 N.W.2d 111 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 16, 2004

Instances abound where the individual must surrender his personal rights and suffer loss for the benefit of the common welfare.”). 2 A qualified privilege is a defeasible immunity from liability; that is, a qualified privilege … Because the plaintiffs cannot show the requisite quantum of emotional distress to establish a prima facie case, we need not decide whether they can prove outrageousness. IV.

Willis v. Consolidated Independent School District

210 Iowa 391 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 21, 1929

The court held that none of the three parties named were qualified electors, for the reason that they were nonresidents of the district. Hartman was, we think, clearly a nonresident of the district. … Both their testimony and the circumstances, show quite clearly and satisfactorily that they are residents of the district. By this we do not mean to say that the testimony is all one way. It is not.