Case law

Brutsche v. Coon Rapids

223 Iowa 487 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 6, 1937

A majority of the duly qualified electors voted in favor of constructing a municipal light and power plant. … Such a statute clearly required competitive bidding.”

State v. Henderson

268 N.W.2d 173 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 28, 1978

No deception was involved, as the evidence clearly showed this was the experiment gun, not the missing original weapon. … Defendant’s other objection is that the two instructions shift the burden of proof to him, but we believe the instructions to be immune to this attack. State v. Tice, 257 Iowa 84 , 130 N.W.2d 678 ; State v.

Roten v. Tesdell

195 Iowa 1329 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 13, 1923

not to say that a contract which bears upon its face the evidence of undue advantage over the client will be held any more sacred in the hands of a lawyer than when sought to be enforced by any other person, and, when it clearly … If a party should be allowed immunity under such circumstances, he would be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, and reap a benefit from his fraud.”

State Of Iowa Vs. Richard Leroy Parker

Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 8, 2008

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. … In this case, the conviction was clearly based on overwhelming evidence of Parker’s guilt.

Knostman & Peterson Furniture Co. v. City of Davenport

99 Iowa 589 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 26, 1896

We now add, that the later cases tend strongly to establish, and may, we think, be said to establish, and in our judgment, rightly to establish, that a city may be liable on the ground of negligence in respect of public sewers … Indeed, defendant’s duty and liability, as announced in the sixth instruction, was in no manner qualified or limited.

Board of Supervisors of Cerro Gordo County v. Miller

170 N.W.2d 358 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 5, 1969

And for present purposes the counties of this state qualify as municipal corporations. See Wapello County v. Ward, 257 Iowa 1231, 1234-1236 , 136 N.W.2d 249 . … We have also constantly held a classification or regulation of the use of property within the municipality will not be held arbitrary unless clearly so, and that when the issue as to whether it was an unreasonable or unequal

Aalbers v. Iowa Department of Job Service

431 N.W.2d 330 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 23, 1988

Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 , 79 S.Ct. 773, 778 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 782 (1959) (“When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations … Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-20 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-39 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 408-412 (1982) (“good-faith” immunity of governmental officials in civil rights damages actions judged by strictly objective test); Bellwood Gen

Browning v. Gosnell

91 Iowa 448 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 26, 1894

It was clearly indicated in Irions v. Manufacturing Co., 61 Iowa, 406 , 16 N. W. Rep. 349 , that :such a showing would be a sufficient averment of unavoidable casualty or misfortune. … Taking these instructions together, it seems clear that the last one should be treated as limiting or qualifying the seventh instruction, and in this view they are not objectionable.

Scanlon v. Scanlon

154 Iowa 748 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 6, 1912

On December 6, 1901, the will was duly admitted to probate, and Edward Scanlon was appointed and qualified as executor. … It is enough to repeat that we think the alleged service of notice has been fairly established.

State v. Beckwith

242 Iowa 228 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 6, 1951

Clearly, no prejudice resulted to the defendant, even if error were present in the -trial court’s ruling on the challenge to this juror for cause. … The juror Thelma *233 Stimson was in our opinion sufficiently, if not abundantly, qualified upon her voir dire. It remains to consider the record with reference to Harry Moon and Clyde L. Border.

City of Des Moines v. Public Employment Relations Board

264 N.W.2d 324 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 22, 1978

a few establish a non-supervisory status. … But the judgment required to supervise and motivate rank- and-file paramilitary personnel clearly would qualify as “independent judgment,” as would the judgment required in those situations where written procedures fail to

State of Iowa v. Edna Jean Wilson

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 14, 2022

And, finally, the officers proceeded to enter the apartment to arrest Wilson, clearly without her consent. … Further, we overruled our prior cases regarding common law immunity for resisting unlawful arrests. Id. at 610–11.

Switzer v. Pratt

237 Iowa 788 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 29, 1946

The qualifying words in the statute cited, ‘unless a contrary intent is expressed,’ would seem therefore to leave place in the law of the state for a joint tenancy, with its characteristic incident of survivorship, if the … intent of the parties to the instrument to create it is clearly indicated by the language employed.

Glenn v. Chambers

242 Iowa 760 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 5, 1951

.” - • A war veteran is “otherwise qualified” under 365.10 if his name is on the certified list regardless of its position there. … Jur., Public Officers, section 384, page 166, where reasons for the rule are clearly stated. *771 It is generally held that payment of salary to a de facto incumbent must be in good faith in order to constitute a defense

Bates v. Evans

226 Iowa 438 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 7, 1939

The Davenport Bank and Trust Company is a qualified and acting trustee in the Carson trust, appointed by the Johnson county district court, and is entitled to all said trust property. … This is not a case of a suit against a receiver appointed by one court to establish a liability against its insolvent in another court nor of a claim filed against the receiver in the receivership.

Educational Film Exchanges of Iowa, Inc. v. Hansen

221 Iowa 1153 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 7, 1936

Section 10654 of the Code of Iowa 1931, establishes the municipal court as a court of record. … R. 1465, this court said: ‘ ‘ The Minnesota court clearly had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion to quash the summons, and, in doing so, must necessarily determine whether appellant was, or was not, immune from the service

American United Life Insurance v. Fischer

234 Iowa 460 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 16, 1943

Its receiver collected said premiums for 1938 and 1939 and later turned them over to plaintiff (an Indiana corporation, qualified to transact business in Iowa) under a contract we shall later refer to. … With this major premise established appellant proceeds to its minor premise: the continued existence of previously written policies, after the company ceases to write new business in the state, and the continued collection

State of Iowa v. Spaulding

313 N.W.2d 878 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 23, 1981

Other like sexual crimes with other persons do not qualify for this purpose. … Because the common scheme exception is clearly inapplicable to the evidence of defendant’s sexual activity with the victim’s sister, and because defendant’s trial involved no issue as to motive, intent, mistake or identity

Maasdam v. Estate of Maasdam

237 Iowa 877 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 17, 1946

The will was probated and the son, Fred Dennison Maasdam, nominated as executor in the will, was appointed and qualified as such. He filed an inventory naming the widow and the beneficiaries under the will. … The point, therefore, is clearly ruled in the Run-nells case, and we need not repeat the discussion contained in our opinion therein.”

National Surety Corporation, an Illinois Corporation v. Westlake Investments, LLC, an Iowa Limited Liability Company

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 10, 2016

The mere fact that parties disagree as to the meaning of terms in an insurance policy does not establish the policy is ambiguous. Id. … However, Westlake established this defective work product resulted from defective work performed by the insureds’ subcontractors, not the insureds themselves.