Case law

Hackney v. Tower

260 Iowa 1101 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 11, 1967

The highway patrolmen established that the road was 26 feet wide. Defendant testified that he measured the road and *1104 found it to be 31 feet wide. … The minor occurrence which led him to so act does not qualify as an emergency because such an abrupt deceleration was not necessary.

Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education

368 N.W.2d 74 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 22, 1985

This means we can intercede only when commission is clearly shown to have acted unconstitutionally, in violation of statutory mandate, or absent substantial support in the record. Id. at 591-92 . … They must look to section 257.25, not section 299.1, to establish their right to exemption.

Kelly Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corporation

913 N.W.2d 235 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 8, 2018

previously noted the rationale for allowing the employer to choose medical care for the injured employee is because an injured employee might "select a doctor, because of personal relationship or acquaintance, who is not qualified … This highest possible showing requires a demonstration that the precedent is clearly erroneous. Id.

State of Iowa v. Travis Raymond Wayne West

924 N.W.2d 502 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 1, 2019

The qualifier “ordinarily” is noteworthy. … Based on a statutory provision stating that the chapter was not “a defense or affirmative defense to or immunity for a dealer from criminal prosecution pursuant to Iowa law,” we concluded that the legislature clearly authorized

Phipps v. IASD Health Services Corp.

558 N.W.2d 198 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 22, 1997

To qualify for gainsharing, an employee must not be on probation on December 31 and must have been employed for at least one year. … Under Iowa Code section 91A.2(7), Blue Cross did not “owe” Phipps the gainsharing payment because he was on probation on December 31, 1993, a violation of one of Blue Cross’s established criteria.

Courtney M. Kay-Decker, Director, Iowa Department of Revenue v. Iowa State Board of Tax Review and Cable One, Inc.

857 N.W.2d 216 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 19, 2014

This language is not qualified by a term such as “primarily.” See id. … It is well established that federal regulation of an activity does not generally preempt state taxation of companies operating in that area.

State v. Osborne

171 Iowa 678 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 4, 1915

and provides for an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination in its application and enforcement, contrary to the provisions of Sec. 30 of Art. 3 of the Constitution of the state of Iowa; (2) it provides privileges and immunities … If the law were ostensibly or in fact enacted for the benefit of cities and towns, it is possible that this objection might lose some of its force; but such is clearly not its purpose.

State Ex Rel. Palmer v. Cass County

522 N.W.2d 615 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 19, 1994

The State has the burden of proof of establishing V.H.’s legal settlement. State ex rel. Palmer v. Dubuque County, 473 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Iowa 1991); Hancock County, 443 N.W.2d at 691 . … Sections 222.60 and 222.72 clearly provide that the State must reimburse the County for all expenditures made by the County on behalf of V.H. AFFIRMED.

Olsen v. Lohman

234 Iowa 580 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 7, 1944

The appellant has not met the burden of establishing that the value of the lower story was in excess of $300. … The appellant failed to establish that the first story was not a part of the homestead. The court was clearly right in dismissing the garnishment of the rentals of this story. In Morgan & Hunter v.

State Of Iowa Vs. Keiaffa Nichole Green

Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 13, 2006

On July 27, 2003, Keiaffa Green was cited for driving ninety-two in a sixty-five mph zone, a “serious violation” qualifying her for a license suspension under Iowa Code section 321.210(1)(f). … This saving provision clearly contemplates that the notice had been “mailed by first class mail.” In the present case, there was no proof that the notice was in fact mailed.

State of Iowa v. Patrick Michael Dudley

856 N.W.2d 668 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 5, 2014

The district court stated it would allow the testimony so long as the State established the statements qualified under the excited utterance exception to hearsay. … When the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable, an abuse of discretion occurs. State v. Nelson, 791 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Iowa 2010).

State of Iowa, Ex Rel. Attorney General Brenna Bird v. Tiktok, Inc., Tiktok Ltd, Tiktok Pte. Ltd, Bytedance Ltd. and Bytedance, Inc.

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 23, 2026

The TikTok entities moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and immunity under section 230 of the Federal Communications Decency Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. … But in Bristol–Myers Squibb, the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were more clearly untethered to the forum because those plaintiffs did not purchase, use, or suffer injuries from the drug in California. Id. at 264.

Mier v. Phillips Fuel Co.

130 Iowa 570 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 19, 1906

inch, showing all *576 the area mined or excavated and on or before the 1st day of September of each year cause to be made a statement and plan of the progress of the working of the mine up to date, which progress shall be clearly … The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, *577 which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

Interstate Power Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America

603 N.W.2d 751 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 13, 2000

ruling of the district court on the policies in effect *754 for the years 1946 to 1961, Interstate asserts that the district court improperly focused on whether there had been a causative event during the policy period that qualified … The policy language clearly focuses on the cause of the damage rather than the damage itself and requires that the cause be of accidental origin. In Dico, Inc. v.

Bergantzel v. Mlynarik

619 N.W.2d 309 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 16, 2000

Thus, in the performance of his contract, [the adjuster] had to advise his client concerning the redress of a legal wrong, which advice he was not qualified to impart, because he does not possess the legal training exacted … Although the factors just discussed reveal some interest in enforcement, that interest is clearly outweighed by the factors militating against enforcement.

Central Bearings Co. v. Wolverine Insurance Company

179 N.W.2d 443 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 2, 1970

The rules of construction of insurance policies are well established. The insurance policy is a contract which must be construed as a whole. … No such document is immune from attack by use of various canons of interpretation.

Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Dwyer

542 N.W.2d 491 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 17, 1996

Whether an action constitutes a senatorial proceeding clearly requires a case-by-case analysis, and we do not believe it would be necessary or even feasible to establish a “bright line” definition of a senatorial rule of … A senatorial policy governing these actions therefore clearly constitutes a “rule of proceeding.”

Klein v. Chicago Central & Pacific Railroad

596 N.W.2d 58 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 3, 1999

the relaxed burden appropriate for FELA cases, there was, most assuredly, ample support in the record for jury findings that CC&P failed to furnish *61 Klein a working place that was reasonably safe, that the rail fork qualified … The trial court correctly held that CC&P’s March 5, 1997 notification was not *62 “as soon as practicable” and was clearly not within thirty days prior to trial.

Fogel v. Trustees of Iowa College

446 N.W.2d 451 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 20, 1989

On January 28, 1985, McConnell sent Fogel a letter informing him that he was discharged immediately because he was “unfit to work in a food service establishment.” … There it noted the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination (plaintiff in a protected age group, qualified for the job, discharged, replaced by a younger person) and concluded that a fact question remained concerning

Petersen v. Davenport Community School District

626 N.W.2d 99 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 21, 2001

The board shall either rescind its action or direct the county commissioner of elections to submit the question to the qualified electors of the school district at the next following regular school election or a special election … The distinction would be particularly inappropriate in the present case in which the board clearly sought to invalidate the petitions based on an absence of valid signatures as well as on the theory that the wording of the