Case law

Vander Linden v. Crews

231 N.W.2d 904 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 31, 1975

In the early stages of plaintiff’s action for malicious prosecution, defendant Crews moved for summary judgment on the grounds he was a public official and immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. … What showing must be made to establish malice in an action for malicious prosecution depends on the status of the defendant.

State v. Brewer

247 N.W.2d 205 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 17, 1976

untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. * * * [citing authority].’ ” In State v. … The witness Pennock who testified for the State under a grant of immunity previously had been convicted of manslaughter.

Parks v. City of Marshalltown

440 N.W.2d 377 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 17, 1989

It is not necessary for us to decide whether Parks’ claim qualifies. *379 If we were to apply the Pogge theory, Parks would face another principle. … Dep’t of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Iowa 1973) (state waives immunity in contract by entering it).

Valerie Bandstra, Anne Bandstra, Ryan Bandstra and Jason Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church

913 N.W.2d 19 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 1, 2018

The first concluded the elders individually were immune from suit under Iowa Code section 504.901, which grants immunity to “a director, officer, or member of a [nonprofit] corporation . . . for any action taken or failure … The Supreme Court has not granted churches broad immunity against being sued in civil courts.

State v. F. W. Fitch Co.

236 Iowa 208 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 6, 1945

Prior to 1927 Decatur county had a qualified interest in the bridge, if we may use that expression, growing out of its powers and duties of construction and maintenance. … W. 2d 527 , 528: “There is a distinction between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity from liability. The latter exists when the-sovereign is engaged in a governmental function.

Langheim v. Denison Fire Department Swimming Pool Ass'n

237 Iowa 386 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 8, 1946

Reference is also made to numerous exceptions established by courts in decisions, which, though nominally adhering to the doctrine of immunity, in fact deny that doctrine. … It follows that defendant is not immune from liability for negligence.

State Ex Rel. Cairy v. Iowa Co-Operative Ass'n

250 Iowa 839 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 10, 1959

Arbitrary discretion clearly would not be permitted nor is it contemplated. YI. … They 'announce well-established rules, but the applications are not too helpful with the problem presented. True, we did consider a similar question in the case of State ex rel. Hutt v.

Collister v. City of Council Bluffs

534 N.W.2d 453 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 19, 1995

Clearly, the purpose of these statutes is to give other motorists warning of a vehicle parked upon the roadway. … The city objected, claiming that its duty was “to maintain the roadway lighting at the level of service established by the City.”

Stanley Ex Rel. Stanley v. State

197 N.W.2d 599 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 11, 1972

The establishment of this plan * * * clearly required' the exercise of expert judgment.” … The provisions of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law quite clearly establish otherwise.

Smith v. City of Bayard

625 N.W.2d 736 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 25, 2001

Plaintiff urges that the city regulated dogs running at large by ordinance, thus establishing the special relationship required for liability under the Restatement rule. … We deem the city’s claim of statutory immunity to be meritorious irrespective of the duty issue.

Meier v. Sac and Fox Indian Tribe

476 N.W.2d 61 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Oct 16, 1991

First, the language of Public Law 280 and section 1.12 clearly confers narrow civil jurisdiction over individual Native Americans, and not the Tribe per se. … Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909-10 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1112, 1119-21 (1991) (rejecting state’s invitation to modify or abandon the long-established principle of tribal sovereign immunity

Lyle E. Schneider, Paul S. Kurtz And Shirley J. Kurtz, Gene J. Peters, Sterling Tops, Inc., Robert W. Bonorden And Deann M. Bonorden, Gerald W. Petersen, Richard R. Kane And Debra K. Kane, Mark A. Doepke And Michelle L. Doepke, Gloria M. Knapp Freilinger, Rudy Busch D/b/a Rudy's Sales And Service, Paul R. Beem And Stacie L. Beem, David J. Fink And Deb Fink, Davik's Auto Body/denver Oil Company, Randall-marta Bender D/b/a Bender Enterprises, Inc., Tommie Brettmann D/b/a Denver Mill, Byron D. Davis And Jane P.Davis, Davis Farm And Auto, Inc., William Buss D/b/a Denver Construction, Inc., And Mike Wooldrik, As Of The Estate Of Robert Wooldrik, Vs. State Of Iowa

789 N.W.2d 138 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 3, 2010

When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the summary judgment record could establish the following facts. … Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that the State established its immunity defense under section 669.14(8) against the “permanent devaluation” damage claims of plaintiffs who did not sell their properties

Oelwein Chemical Co. v. Baker

204 Iowa 66 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jul 1, 1927

also alleged that plaintiff falsely represented orally that, if the defendant would use the hog remedy as instructed in said printed instructions issued by plaintiff-company, said remedy would make the defendant’s hogs, immune … Henry Hell, a veterinarian, qualified to speak as an expert, testified: “Have had different stock foods called to my attention. Have relied upon experiment-station records, more than personal investigation.

Leckliter v. City of Des Moines

211 Iowa 251 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 18, 1930

By this means the state intends to establish and maintain peace, security, health, and the general welfare. … The change in Section 4863 did not remove the immunities applying to such vehicles in Iowa. III.

Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Mollman

488 N.W.2d 168 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 17, 1992

Nor do we think Mollman, as a private attorney, could qualify for this status. … Had he given the federal agents all they wanted, he could have obtained complete immunity for himself.

Bauman v. City of Waverly

164 N.W.2d 840 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Feb 11, 1969

This leaves for discussion the question of governmental immunity. … The distinction is clearly pointed out in Florey v. City of Burling *848 ton, supra, at page 323 of the Iowa Reports, 73 N.W.2d at page 773 : “The decision [Mardis v.

Andrew Lennette, Individually and on behalf of C.L., O.L. and S.L., Minor Children v. State of Iowa, Melody Siver, Amy Howell, and Valerie Lovaglia

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 10, 2022

, qualified immunity was available as to the constitutional claims because the DHS employees did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. … Although we decided the Minor case based on ITCA exceptions, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity, we do not reach those issues in the present case.

State v. Brown

397 N.W.2d 689 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 17, 1986

Hollins, on the other hand, focused his efforts wholly on establishing his noninvolvement in the murder. He made no attempt to incriminate Brown. … An unsupported assertion of retaliation without more simply will not establish a denial of the right to testify. See United States v.

Hoskinson v. City of Iowa City

621 N.W.2d 425 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jan 18, 2001

The failure to remove natural or unnatural accumulations of snow or ice, or to place sand, salt, or other abrasive material on a highway, road, or street, if *430 the state or municipality establishes that it has complied … Left for our consideration, then, is whether the walkway qualifies as a “highway.” 2. Is the walkway a highway? There is no applicable statutory definition of “highway.”

Hunter v. Board of Trustees

481 N.W.2d 510 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 20, 1992

“We find an abuse of discretion [only] when such discretion is exercised on grounds or for such reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Hubby v. State, 331 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 1983). … Necessity is clearly not required.