Case law

Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc.

290 N.W.2d 348 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 19, 1980

Preut notified Blacksmith by letter on December 2, 1977, that he was disqualified from driving a truck pursuant to federal regulations which state that a qualified driver must have “no established medical history or clinical … His admission to Lutheran Hospital is well documented and clearly describes a patient with thrombophlebitis of the left leg.

State v. Allen

565 N.W.2d 333 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 18, 1997

The similarities between the two situations were relevant to establishing such factors as motive, intent, opportunity, and plan. See Iowa R. Evid. 404(b). … He argues that the transcript did not qualify as the best evidence, see Iowa R.

Midwest Automotive III, LLC v. Iowa Department of Transportation

646 N.W.2d 417 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 12, 2002

We think these amendments clearly shifted the focus of section 322A.11(2). … Rather, as the ALJ’s decision clearly reflects, the agency concluded the CSI scores submitted by Midwest Auto considered in the context of Jaguar Cars’ market experience established the requisite substantial detriment.

Laura Belin, Bleeding Heartland LLC, Clark Kauffman, Iowa Capital Dispatch, Randy Evans, and Iowa Freedom of Information Council v. Governor Kim Reynolds, Michael Boal, Pat Garrett, Alex Murphy, and Office of The Governor of the State of Iowa

Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 14, 2023

The third element can be established either through an express refusal or through an implicit refusal. Extensive delay may—on its own—establish an implicit refusal. … To be clear, the Governor has not claimed general immunity from the requirements of chapter 22.

American Legion, Hanford Post 5 v. Cedar Rapids Board of Review

646 N.W.2d 433 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 12, 2002

Pertinently, section 441.37 establishes an avenue for a taxpayer to protest an assessment. It states: 1. … This practice was clearly the result *440 of the assessor’s judgment, however misguided that judgment might have been.

John Allen Christensen and Lila Christensen v. Iowa Department of Revenue

Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 19, 2020

Rather, the issue was “simply whether a retail establishment can be considered a ‘manufacturer’ under” the definition provided by the Iowa legislature. Id. … Special activities paragraph (7) essentially allows a taxpayer to use the general test paragraphs of rule 701—40.38(1)(c) to establish material participation in a rental activity related to a real property business, carving

Mitchellville Community Center, Inc. v. Vos

679 N.W.2d 31 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Apr 7, 2004

If any member of this class who deemed himself qualified might begin suit, the trustee would frequently be subjected to unreasonable and vexatious litigation .... … The trustees clearly informed MCCI that it could reapply for a grant despite its initial inability to meet the requirements imposed by the trustees.

Harsha v. State Savings Bank

346 N.W.2d 791 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Mar 14, 1984

Here the well-qualified expert carefully explained to the jury the nature and source of the facts he relied on in formulating his opinion. … Kinney Co., 258 Iowa 658, 663 , 140 N.W.2d 129, 130 (1966) (“the intention of the party charged to waive his right must clearly appear”).

State of Iowa v. Jacob A. Boothby

Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 11, 2020

The State failed to lay a sufficient foundation to establish that this narrative page of exhibit 10 falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. … Until 2017, the only requirements for use of lay opinion testimony under our rules of evidence were that the opinion be “[r]ationally based on the witness’s perception” and “[h]elpful to clearly understanding the witness

Rohlf v. Kasemeier

140 Iowa 182 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Nov 18, 1908

Used in connection with the term “merchandise,” and qualified as it is in the latter part of the section by the words “manufactured, mined, produced, or sold,” it is *188 manifest that the statute was not intended to, and … to combine for the purpose of securing higher wages is. recognized as lawful at common law, a statute enacted to prohibit pools and trusts should not be held to apply to combinations to fix the wages for labor, unless it clearly

Bailey v. Lancaster

470 N.W.2d 351 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 15, 1991

The standards in Franks were established in the context of a suppression hearing. … The following definitions apply in these rules unless the context clearly signifies a different meaning. 1.

Martinson Manufacturing Co. v. Seery

351 N.W.2d 772 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 13, 1984

Both parties produced well-qualified tax experts, attorneys whose opinions supported totally different interpretations of this section. … Qualified tax experts at trial agreed that for this purpose the fair market value of assets, as opposed to book value, could be utilized. .

State of Iowa v. Jacob A. Boothby

Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 11, 2020

The State failed to lay a sufficient foundation to establish that this narrative page of exhibit 10 falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule. … Until 2017, the only requirements for use of lay opinion testimony under our rules of evidence were that the opinion be “[r]ationally based on the witness’s perception” and “[h]elpful to clearly understanding the witness

Madrid Home for the Aging v. Iowa Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Services

557 N.W.2d 507 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Dec 18, 1996

Following a review of their policy, DHS agreed to establish new rates, effective February 1, 1994. It planned to “rebase” its rates by establishing a new base year, using more current costs. … For example, in cases involving interpretation of statutes that affect an agency’s work, we defer to the agency’s expertise unless the suggested interpretation is clearly erroneous. Wiebenga v.

David L. Taft Jr. v. Iowa District Court for Linn County

879 N.W.2d 634 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 27, 2016

The court noted that even Taft’s expert appeared to equivocate on whether he should be discharged or moved to the transitional release program and did not clearly address Taft’s antisocial personality disorder. … At argument, Taft agreed he would not qualify under the statute for the transitional release program even if he were not required to meet the challenged criteria.

Board of Dental Examiners v. Hufford

461 N.W.2d 194 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 19, 1990

Huf-ford failed to establish mercury toxicity. He made no attempt to refer the patient to qualified medical personnel for suitable testing to determine toxicity or allergy to mercury. … The complete inadequacy of these tests as a basis for a diagnosis of mercury toxicity was clearly established by both the testimony and exhibits.

State v. Shelton

64 Iowa 333 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Sep 18, 1884

The indictment before us charges very clearly that each of these elements of the crime was present in the killing of William Swanson. … One of the shots struck Swanson, but which one it was is not clearly shown. Defendant procured the revolver with which the shooting was done, after the first quarrel.

Iowa State Dept. of Health v. Hertko

282 N.W.2d 744 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Aug 29, 1979

HSA is an Iowa non-profit corporation established pursuant to United States Public Law 93-641 (42 U.S.C. § 300l). … Polk County clearly qualifies as a political subdivision of the State of Iowa, which has access to the courts. "Each county is a body corporate for civil and political purposes, may sue and be sued. . . ."

Hurst v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co.

49 Iowa 76 · Supreme Court of Iowa · Jun 14, 1878

Such proof would clearly be irrelevant and incompetent. … It does not appear that Allen was qualified to testify as an expert. Under the doctrine of State v. Geddis, 42 Iowa, 264, and State v.

In Re Rinaldo Revocable Trust

696 N.W.2d 41 · Supreme Court of Iowa · May 6, 2005

The abatement provisions in section 633.449 are qualified by the words “unless the will of the decedent, or other trust instrument, provides expressly to the con *46 trary.” … Clearly, the provisions in 26 U.S.C. § 2205 are not intended to be applied as general rules of abatement that supplant state law.