Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
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Kartman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
247 F.R.D. 561 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 21, 2007
The burden is on the party asserting the doctrine to establish these elements. Bartlett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 206 F.R.D. 623, 628 (S.D.Ind.2002). … As noted above, the party asserting the work product doctrine must establish all of its elements on a doeument-by-document basis. Bartlett, 206 F.R.D. at 628 .
Cited 3 timesPublishedUnited States Fire Insurance v. Barker Car Rental
944 F. Supp. 739 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Oct 4, 1996
An estate was established on behalf of Alkhuaini in Brown County, Indiana for purposes solely related to this litigation. Stipulations ¶ 3. … Barker’s principal place of business is Illinois, thus, clearly, it is authorized to do business there.
Reversed on other grounds by U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Barker Car Rental, 132 F.3d 1153 (1997)Cited 5 timesPublishedBuquer v. City of Indianapolis
797 F. Supp. 2d 905 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 24, 2011
action seeking injunctive relief has been established. 2. … Thus, the balance of harms weighs clearly in Plaintiffs’ favor. V. Public Interest Plaintiffs have also established that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest.
Cited 7 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · Apr 9, 2020
“It is well established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 2010). … Univ., 777 F.3d 996, 976 (7th Cir. 2015) (establishing a prime facie showing under the ADA or RA is nearly identical).
Cited 0 timesUnknownHughes v. Life Insurance Co. of North America
112 F. Supp. 2d 780 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 5, 2000
A comparison between the policy’s language and Herzberger’s “safe harbor” language clearly supports this conclusion. … It is certainly not clear that "Jackie” was any more medically qualified than Hackett-Wade, Smith, or Stief to evaluate Hughes' condition.
Cited 2 timesPublishedEckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
890 F. Supp. 1391 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 5, 1995
Although Emrick clearly implies that such a balancing is necessary, it also offers no specifics. … But seniority rights are firmly established in federal labor law and policy, and, as TWA v.
Cited 18 timesPublishedHeckler & Koch, Inc. v. German Sport Guns GmbH
71 F. Supp. 3d 866 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 24, 2014
Even assuming that Cooper had the requisite firsthand knowledge to convert her statement into admissible evidence, we decline to accept Plaintiffs’ newly-proffered and clearly self-serving theory when it cuts so clearly against … Panel Mart, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 97 (Ind.Ct.App.1982), the Indiana Court of Appeals read a preliminary recital as “clearly establishing] the intention of the parties” and as “erasing] the ambiguity” which clouded the body of
Cited 11 timesPublished460 F. Supp. 2d 902 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 7, 2006
If the words of a statute have established common-law or criminal-law meanings, then courts will presume that Congress intended the words to have those established meanings absent clear evidence to the contrary. … These well-established rules of statutory construction are strictly applied when interpreting criminal statutes.
Cited 6 timesPublishedProgressive Casualty Insurance v. K.S. ex rel. George-Jarrard
731 F. Supp. 2d 829 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 2, 2010
Progressive argues that Luallen’s actions of “mooning” qualified as a criminal act for the purposes of the insurance policy. Section 35-45^4-1.5 of the Indiana Code does *836 make public nudity a crime. … Therefore, undisputed facts establish that Luallen did commit the crime of “public nudity,” even though he was never charged or convicted of that offense.
Cited 2 timesPublishedUnited States ex rel. Conroy v. Select Medical Corp.
211 F. Supp. 3d 1132 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 30, 2016
Ctr., 568 U.S. 145 , 133 S.Ct. 817, 824 , 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013), but the removal of a jurisdictional term for not-clearly-jurisdictional language effects a different meaning. … See Logan, 455 U.S. at 432 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 (“[T]he State remains free to create substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication—or to eliminate its statutorily created causes of action altogether .... ”).
Cited 8 timesPublishedVASQUEZ v. BAYLOR TRUCKING INC.
District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 29, 2022
A default judgment establishes the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff on the cause of action alleged in the complaint. Wehrs v. Wells, 688 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir. 2012). … Though Vasquez clearly disagrees with Selby's decision, he cannot pursue claims against her directly. Accordingly, Selby's Motion to Dismiss is granted. C.
Cited 0 timesUnknownIndependent Distributors Cooperative USA v. Advanced Insurance Brokerage of America, Inc.
264 F. Supp. 2d 796 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · May 29, 2003
IDC alleges that AIA’s recommended design, in which the Plan qualified as an MEWA, constituted a breach of contract. … The 1996 Agreement also established AIA as the third-party administrator of the Plan.
Cited 1 timesPublishedMetropolitan School Dist. of Martinsville v. Buskirk
950 F. Supp. 899 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 6, 1997
decision and, therefore, clearly was an aggrieved party for purposes of section 1415(e)(2). … The School District has failed to establish that it is an aggrieved party under section 1415(e)(2).
Cited 0 timesPublishedDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 20, 2022
. § 1983 for monetary damages; (4) the State of Indiana is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (4) Ms. Crum is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. … Crum's qualified immunity defense. iI. Conclusion As detailed above, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 108] is GRANTED.
Cited 0 timesUnknownDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 22, 2019
“For a delay in treatment to qualify as deliberate indifference, we must weigh the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing treatment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). … To certify a class, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that he will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Cited 0 timesUnknownCISLO v. BANTRY GROUP CORPORATION
District Court, S.D. Indiana · Nov 2, 2020
Additionally, he asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Cislo has responded in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and Mr. Osburn has filed a reply. For the reasons explained below, Mr. … He also contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the doctrine of qualified immunity. A.
Cited 0 timesUnknownReber v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance
93 F. Supp. 2d 995 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 29, 2000
The court first held that the insurance plan qualifies as a “plan, fund, or program,” as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1). … Clearly, the Law Firm went to this effort in order to facilitate its employees’ obtaining disability coverage.
Cited 7 timesPublishedPlanned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health
984 F. Supp. 2d 912 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Nov 26, 2013
Physical plant specifications have been established for abortion clinics. 410 I.A.C. 26-17-2. … The Court also concludes that PPINK has established irreparable harm.
Cited 7 timesPublished103 F. Supp. 2d 1091 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Nov 4, 1999
Several weeks later, CNA hired two white people for the customer service manager positions who were allegedly less qualified than Hardin. See id. ¶¶ 16, 19. … While this may be a plausible way to establish a uniform federal statute of limita-lions, it seems clearly to hit wide of the mark.
Cited 2 timesPublished799 F. Supp. 2d 910 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 1, 2011
As an administrative agency, it is presumed to be qualified by knowledge and experience to perform this function. … The Court agrees with Defendants that such a claim is clearly a new theory.
Cited 4 timesPublished
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