Case law

Golden Years Homestead, Inc. v. Buckland

466 F. Supp. 2d 1059 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 11, 2006

There is no evidence to establish a genuine factual issue regarding the fact that Defendants conducted themselves according to federal and state regulations, CMS rules, and established principles of documentation. … Clearly, these claims cannot survive.

AgMax, Inc. v. Countrymark Cooperative, Inc.

795 F. Supp. 888 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · May 15, 1992

Countrymark is immune from liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act for conspiring with its members or monopolizing a given market unless such anticompetitive actions constitute predatory practices. … However, since the question is a close one, the court concludes that the immunity provided under the Clayton and Capper-Volstead Acts does not so clearly resolve AgMax’s claims as to leave AgMax with only a negligible likelihood

Bowersock v. Davol, Inc.

236 F. Supp. 3d 1074 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 23, 2017

To receive relief under Rule 59(e), the moving party “must clearly establish (1) that the court committed a manifest' error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of Judgment.” … The Court found *1091 that “Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to establish that Dr. Hyman is qualified to testify as to the cause of Georgia’s death and any such evidence to be proffered by Dr.

CREER v. OCHELTREE

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 17, 2021

Qualified Immunity The Court does not address Officer Richards' and Sergeant Ocheltree's qualified immunity argument because Mr. … The Court does not address Officer Dugger's qualified immunity argument because it reflects Officer Dugger's misunderstanding of Mr.

FRANKE v. GEICO CAUSALITY COMPANY

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 14, 2022

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ("Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages."). … All of Judge Felix's alleged conduct was clearly within the scope of judicial actions therefore he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity on the federal claims. As recognized by Mr.

Ansick v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc.

933 F. Supp. 773 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jul 26, 1996

In addition to these two arguments, Hillenbrand Industries also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it is immune from liability under the Indiana Recreational Use Statute, because it was not in possession … Rule 702 states: If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience

Wyman v. Larner

624 F. Supp. 240 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 3, 1985

Lamer’s Motion for Summary Judgment The standards governing a motion for summary judgment are well-established. … The case law clearly supports this Court’s finding that Indiana is Leah’s home state. Leah was born in Indiana and has continuously lived in the state since her birth.

Bibbs v. Newman

997 F. Supp. 1174 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 27, 1998

A prosecuting attorney in' Indiana clearly acts as a state official when prosecuting criminal cases. See Study v. United States, 782 F.Supp. 1293, 1297 (S.D.Ind.1991); see also Ind. … A political subdivision cannot invoke a state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

Fazekas v. Crain Consumer Group Div. of Crain Communications, Inc.

583 F. Supp. 110 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jan 19, 1984

It can now be stated that by virtue of these guarantees, grounded primarily in the first amendment, a qualified privilege exists for all media expression. … The “content, effect and significance” of allegedly illegal conduct on the part of a two-time national champion race driver is clearly a matter of general interest to the Showroom Stock participants and fans who were readers

DAVIS v. KRUEGER

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Nov 25, 2020

Rupska's qualified immunity defense. See Mucha v. Vill. of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1057–58 (7th Cir. 2011). C. … immunity.

Davis v. Ingersoll Johnson Steel Co.

628 F. Supp. 25 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Jun 28, 1985

If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises and the defendant then has the burden of articulating lawful reasons for the discharge. Id. at 1409 . … Not only is this direct evidence highly suggestive that age was a determining factor in the decision to terminate Davis, but Davis has otherwise clearly met his burden of proving age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas

Futrell v. Columbia Club, Inc.

338 F. Supp. 566 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Aug 2, 1971

Opinion Letter No. 767, December 6, 1967, holds squarely that a club does not qualify as a hotel, for want of compliance with this requirement. … Clearly, the club is a single functional unit of many related services. As such, it is a single establishment. With the critical definitions determined, it is possible to resolve the questions of coverage and exemption.

TAYLOR

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 19, 2026

Johnson assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of these claims on the merits and because they are shielded by qualified immunity. … Because the Court has determined that summary judgment is appropriate on all claims on the merits, it will not address Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

DAVIS v. KIRBY

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 27, 2022

immunity, and (4) Davis has in any event failed to address the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim beyond her response to the qualified immunity defense, and therefore has conceded her substantive Fourth Amendment arguments … immunity grounds.

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.

744 F. Supp. 2d 810 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Oct 5, 2010

immunity, there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. … The Court has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claim and concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a legally cognizable claim because no corporate liability exists under the ATS.

Jackson v. Service Engineering, Inc.

96 F. Supp. 2d 873 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 17, 2000

Standard for Summary Judgment The standard for summary judgment is well established. … The federal statute most clearly tailored to address the situation alleged by Jackson is the ERISA retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 , discussed above.

A.B. ex rel. Bell v. Franklin Township Community School Corp.

898 F. Supp. 2d 1067 · District Court, S.D. Indiana · Sep 28, 2012

The IHO’s Conclusion of Law # 15 was amended by the BSEA to provide: The evidence and testimony did establish clearly that a transition plan is necessary but did not establish what its components should be. … The IHO did not clearly err in determining that the School’s proposed placement met that standard.

HARVEY v. ARAMARK CORPORATION

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Mar 9, 2022

Harvey has not established a constitutional violation, the Court need not address the defendants’ qualified immunity defense. See Locke v. … Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing first prong of qualified immunity analysis requires determination of whether defendant violated a constitutional right). Additionally, Mr.

WILLIAMSON

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Dec 23, 2025

Instead, to receive the requested relief, the moving party “must clearly establish (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.” … State of Ind., 129 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is to spare judges from shrinking from doing their duty out of fear of being sued that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was devised.").

MORGAN

District Court, S.D. Indiana · Feb 10, 2026

Defendants argue that this allegation, even if true, fails to establish gross negligence, which requires more than ordinary negligence. (Dkt. 43 at 3). … This is the case except when the plaintiff alleges that the actions of the employee are "(1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated