Case law

Fort Wayne Community Schools and Jacalyn Butler v. Steffanie Haney, for next friend and minor daughter, M.H.

94 N.E.3d 325 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 5, 2018

And the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the violation of a clearly established right. Id. … immunity because there were clearly established doctrines at the time as to what actions a caseworker must take when conducting an investigation)

Earles v. Perkins

788 N.E.2d 1260 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 29, 2003

Qualified Immunity Government officials are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have … have believed the arrest to be lawful, in light of the clearly-established law and the information that the arresting officer possessed"). 9 The Appellants also assert that Earles and Jones are entitled to qualified immunity

Slay v. Marion County Sheriff's Department

603 N.E.2d 877 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 23, 1992

IV We next address the issue of qualified immunity. … Jones argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 6 In particular, he con *887 tends that the rights in question were not "clearly established" when the shooting occurred, in May of 1982. While Tennessee v.

Boris Mudd v. Jason Johnson (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 14, 2015

[19] Mudd’s claim against Johnson is best resolved through the doctrine of qualified immunity. … We cannot conclude that the specific alleged rights at issue were clearly established at the time of Johnson’s alleged misconduct, and as a result Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity from Mudd’s Section

Oshinski v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District

843 N.E.2d 536 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 22, 2006

And in the context of federal sovereign immunity-obviously the closest analogy to the present case-it is well established that waivers are not implied.... … Our supreme court's abolition of sovereign immunity in Campbell, coupled with ITCA, is a clear statement of Indiana's retention of only qualified immunity in tort actions, including FELA actions.

City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp.

126 N.E.3d 813 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 23, 2019

We conclude as follows: (1) the City’s lawsuit is not an unlawful attempt to regulate firearms; (2) the City has failed to establish that the Amendment is unconstitutional; (3) the Immunity Statute does … A qualified civil liability action does not include (iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or

Littleton v. State

954 N.E.2d 1070 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 6, 2011

Qualified Immunity We turn now to the dispositive question here, whether the events of February 18, 2010, come within the qualified immunity extended to Littleton as a teacher in loco parentis. … She claims that her acts were privileged because they come within the qualified immunity afforded to teachers under Indiana law.

Sharp v. Town of Highland

665 N.E.2d 610 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 17, 1996

The plain language clearly establishes immunity from liability for the death or injury to persons arising out of "[alll functions hereunder and all other activities relating to civil defense and disaster." … We will not construe an unambiguous statute for the purpose of limiting the clear grant of immunity. The unambiguous grant of immunity in I.C. 10-4-1-8 is not qualified by the language of I.C. 10-4-1-23.

Spier Ex Rel. Spier v. City of Plymouth

593 N.E.2d 1255 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 17, 1992

May the city establish that it is immune from liability upon a showing that an act of a third person was a proximate cause of Jeffrey’s injury without regard to whether an act of the city was also a proximate cause of the … Spiers do not challenge the adequacy of the statement to qualify as an affidavit.

Foster v. Pearcy

376 N.E.2d 1205 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 1978

Conversely, where the speaker can claim only a qualified privilege, further inquiry can be made after the establishment of the privilege to determine whether the speaker has abused his privilege: Once the existence of the … , while inferior officers would be limited to a qualified immunity.

Indiana Department of Financial Institutions v. Worthington Bancshares, Inc.

728 N.E.2d 899 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 23, 2000

; 4) establishment of reasonable executive compensation; 5) increase of total capital by one million dollars within ninety days; 6) establishment of specified capital ratios; 7) establishment of an operating budget; 8) charge-off … Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3. . • DFI is clearly immune under I.C. §§ 34-13-3-3(5) and (6). Thus, we need not address DFI’s claims of immunity under I.C. §§ 34-13-3-3(7) and (10).

Logestan v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance

626 N.E.2d 829 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 1993

Nor can we conclude that the statutory provisions and administrative rules enacted to regulate boiler inspections demonstrate “clearly the intention of the Legislature” to recognize special inspectors as instrumentalities … facts established through his testimony and the express disclaimer in Hartford’s policy.

Jasmine McNeil Ind. and on behalf of Ath'Dara McNeil Chyna Brown Imoni Brown v. Anonymous Hospital

Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 5, 2023

By its very terms, the immunity under subsection (a) is qualified by two exceptions. … The Court held that the Michigan statute “clearly and unambiguously provides immunity to persons who file a child abuse report in good faith.” Id.

City of East Chicago v. Litera

692 N.E.2d 898 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 1998

Immunity During trial and in the closing argument, East Chicago argued that it is immune from liability under Ind.Code 34-4-12.2. … Therefore, they clearly are covered by the definition of “person” for this statute. Ind.Code 34-4-12.2-1.

Hupp v. Hill

576 N.E.2d 1320 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 26, 1991

To defeat a claim of qualified immunity under § 1983, there must be a showing that the defendant violated a clearly established right: "in the light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be apparent." Anderson v. … Without an allegation of activity sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion, there can be no violation of clearly established rights. 8 .

Shallenberger v. Scoggins-Tomlinson, Inc.

439 N.E.2d 699 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 9, 1982

Sub-paragraph 3 alleged that Tomlinson knew his clients had not signed the statement and that others had forged.their signatures; Sub-paragraph 4 alleged that the Committee had abundant evidence before it clearly establishing … In his complaint, Shallenberger alleges that the Committee members “ ... had abundant evidence before them clearly establishing that Defendant Tom-linson had made a false statement in his grievance but chose to ignore said

National Engineering & Contracting Co. v. C & P Engineering & Manufacturing Co.

676 N.E.2d 372 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 12, 1997

Other cases said that these materials were work product but that the difficulty of duplicating them was a sufficient showing to overcome the qualified immunity. … DO THE PHOTOGRAPHS CONSTITUTE MENTAL IMPRESSIONS ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY?

LaPorte Civic Auditorium v. Ames

641 N.E.2d 1045 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 25, 1994

If Ames is correct, then LaPorte does not qualify for the immunity granted under I.C. 34-4-16.5-3@). Thus, we are forced to examine the meaning of the word thoroughfare as used in the statute. … Clearly the statute had to grant the Town of Chesterton immunity before it would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, the plain meaning of "thoroughfare" as used in L.C. 34-4-16.5-3(8) includes sidewalks.

Bubb v. State

434 N.E.2d 120 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 22, 1982

It is clearly no violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause to refuse immunity to defense witnesses. Id. … Unless the court finds that the issuance of the order would be clearly contrary to public interest, the witness shall comply with the order of the court.

Reed v. City of Evansville

956 N.E.2d 684 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 2011

Our supreme court has provided a helpful list of scenarios that illustrate when a political subdivision cannot claim immunity: [GJovemmental immunity is not clearly conferred to shield a government-employed lifeguard, otherwise … Likewise, when a governmental entity is otherwise liable as a joint tortfeasor, no governmental immunity is clearly extended on grounds that the other joint tortfeasor engaged in ‘the performance of a discretionary function