Case law

L.M. Zeller, Individually, and D/B/A Zeller Elevator Company, LEO Mark Zeller, Louis M. Zeller III, Andrew M. Boeglin, and Matthew Boeglin v. Indiana Fire Prevention (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 9, 2016

A plain reading of the statue [sic] through the use of the past tense phrase “have been,” clearly requires that the approval for the training should come before it can be qualified for CE. … Words must be given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning, unless a contrary purpose is clearly shown by the statute. Id.

Near East Side Community Organization v. Hair

555 N.E.2d 1324 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 1990

Wood, supra, we noted that a qualified privilege is lost if the defendant does not *1331 believe what he says, or if the defendant is reckless because no reason or policy "can be found for conferring immunity upon the foolish … The First Amendment does not offer absolute immunity for libelous and damaging falsehoods. McDonald v.

Sieb, Gdn. v. Miller

102 Ind. App. 389 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 2, 1936

“FOURTH: On the 15th day of December, 1917, Bertram Sieb qualified as trustee under the terms of the will of said Louis H. … “FIFTH: Upon qualifying as such executor and trustee the said Bertram Sieb took possession of all the assets, both real and personal, comprising the estate of said Louis H.

South Bend Community School Corp. v. Portage Township of St. Joseph County

520 N.E.2d 446 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 1988

(Emphasis added.) 9 Thus, we hold that under the 1985 version of the Book Fee Statute, a trustee has the authority to establish the procedures that must be followed by applicants in order for them to qualify for assistance … Section 2(a) does not expressly state that the trustee is to establish the procedures that must be followed by applicants in order to qualify for assistance. ("... [TJrustee shall adopt financial eligibility standards...

Ashley L. Stapert v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 30, 2015

Under this rule, “a witness may be qualified as an expert by virtue of ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[,]’ . . . [a]nd only one characteristic is necessary to qualify as an expert.” Kubsch v. … “As such, a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of practical experience alone.” Id.

Marriage of Dowden v. Allman

696 N.E.2d 456 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1998

In other words, we will not reverse the trial court unless the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. … We have held that for the pension to qualify as “property” under section (b)(2), “it is not important that the funds are eligible for immediate withdrawal.

Brown v. Poulos

78 Ind. Dec. 869 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 1980

Clearly the Doney court considered the phrase in question as synonymous with agent. See also: Provident Trust Co. v. Darrough (1906), 168 Ind. 29 , 78 N.E. 1030 ; Day v. West (1978), Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 935 . … There is nothing in the statute at hand to indicate that the Legislature intended to alter well-settled rules of agency by requiring that the agency be established by some written instrument.

Donaldson v. Indianapolis Public Transportation Corp.

632 N.E.2d 1167 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 26, 1994

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a witness offered as an expert was not qualified to testify. 2. … While the offer was sufficient to establish the relevancy of Mott's testimony, it was not sufficient to establish the materiality thereof,.

Lafary v. Kindred

862 N.E.2d 686 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 2007

The Lafarys could overcome the presumption in favor of the Kindreds by establishing the Kindreds’ unfitness or acquiescence or by demonstrating that a strong emotional bond had formed between J.K. and the Lafarys, but the … We conclude that the trial court’s termination of the guardianship is not clearly erroneous.

Lamar Allen Colley v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 7, 2015

Garrett’s statements to Officer Tyler therefore qualified as excited utterances. … To rebut that presumption, the defendant “must establish from the judge’s conduct actual bias or prejudice that places the defendant in jeopardy.” Id. at 823.

Patterson v. Dykes

804 N.E.2d 849 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 2004

Clearly, the effect of a Pardon is retroactive; thus, from August 14, 2003, forward, Patterson is eligible to run for an elected office, because he no longer has a felony conviction in his criminal history. … Our supreme court explained this provision as follows: When the elective term ends and no qualified person has been elected and qualified to take over the duties of the office, the person holding the office at the end of

Eley v. Benedict

113 Ind. App. 202 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 9, 1943

In applying the rule, the courts have used various qualifying terms, such as “reasonable evidence,” “competent evidence” and “legal evidence.” … If it be conceded (which I do not do) that Morgan was not the agent of the appellants, then under the facts clearly established by the record Morgan’s relation with appellants was that of contractor.

Quincy D. Sullivan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 21, 2017

To constitute fundamental error, the error must be a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process and present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm such that a fair … State, 748 N.E.2d 381, 390 (Ind. 2001) (holding that defendant cannot exercise State’s right to grant use immunity); Eaton v.

Nasser v. State

646 N.E.2d 673 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 7, 1995

The record clearly reveals that Nasser lodged objections based upon inadequate foundation. … The attestation letter clearly incorporates the two officer lists, and the second officer list is clearly a continuation of the first.

A.J.R. v. State of Indiana

3 N.E.3d 1000 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 23, 2014

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. … It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a witness is qualified to give an opinion.

Knox County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. PSI Energy, Inc.

663 N.E.2d 182 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 21, 1996

The Commission clearly delinest-ed PSI's role and limitations in servicing the mine. … Clearly under the authority of U.S.

KTP Ex Rel. ASP v. Atchison

848 N.E.2d 280 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 24, 2006

s birth and subsequent hospitalization. [4] On October 9, 2003, the State filed a petition to establish paternity. … On November 1, 2004, in an order establishing paternity and child support, the court found that Atchison admitted paternity and established Atchison as the biological father of K.T.P.

Williams v. Tharp

934 N.E.2d 1203 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 2010

The supreme court determined that Williams and Kelsey had failed to establish a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Tharp knew that his *1206 statements were false and thus abused the qualified privilege. … The trial court did not err in finding a qualified privilege established as a matter of law, thereby precluding the plaintiffs' claim for defamation.

William M. Belcher v. Catherine Kroczek, D.D.S.

13 N.E.3d 448 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 9, 2014

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them. Coffman v. Olson & Co., P.C., 872 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ind. Ct. … We therefore conclude that they are not chattels.3 Goodwill, however, may qualify as chattel. There are two types of goodwill: enterprise goodwill and professional goodwill.

R.D. v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development

941 N.E.2d 1063 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 16, 2010

Thereafter, the Trade Act was established to provide trade readjustment allowance benefits to qualified workers who had lost their jobs due to foreign competition. … RD. is clearly a gifted, self-trained graphic artist. See Appellant's App. pp. 55-67.