Case law

State Board of Funeral and Cemetery Service v. Settlers Life Insurance Company

5 N.E.3d 1170 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 14, 2014

The Pulaski County DFR determined that the assignment of the policy would not qualify as an excluded resource under Medicaid. … Taylor wrote that “[u]nder Wisconsin law, a Life Insurance Funded Burial Contract is valid only when, among other items, it is assigned to a ‘funeral director or operator of a funeral establishment’” and concluded that

Michael E. Ritchie, M.D. v. Community Howard Regional Health, Inc.

51 N.E.3d 1212 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 10, 2016

We will reverse the judgment only when it is clearly erroneous. Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. Id. … immunity for boards and their agents[.] … These actions by the General Assembly demonstrate the important public policy aimed at improving the quality of care within our hospitals

Goins v. Lott

435 N.E.2d 1002 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 26, 1982

However, the facts in Yellow Cab clearly indicated paternity and therefore the decedent was under a legal obligation to support the child. See also Copple v. … If a child seeking benefits through this category proved only acknowledgement he would not qualify. If a child proved only paternity he would not qualify.

John Doe 1 v. Indiana Department of Child Services

53 N.E.3d 613 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 26, 2016

While the disclosure of Doe’s identity clearly violated the statute, DCS argues that the statute does not confer a private right of action. … A special relationship was clearly established when Doe made the call to the DCS hotline and, after making his report, indicated his reluctance to give identifying information.

South Bend Community School Corp. v. Portage Township of St. Joseph County

520 N.E.2d 446 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 1988

(Emphasis added.) 9 Thus, we hold that under the 1985 version of the Book Fee Statute, a trustee has the authority to establish the procedures that must be followed by applicants in order for them to qualify for assistance … Section 2(a) does not expressly state that the trustee is to establish the procedures that must be followed by applicants in order to qualify for assistance. ("... [TJrustee shall adopt financial eligibility standards...

Steven R. Perry v. State of Indiana

13 N.E.3d 909 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 22, 2014

An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” … App. 2009) (holding that distinguishing between a person on pretrial detention and post-sentence home detention does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the Equal Privileges and Immunities

Randles v. Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund

860 N.E.2d 1212 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 6, 2007

Ballard is an expert qualified to give an opinion as to whether her patient was dead or alive. See Evid. … As a result, Seandre had a dependent when she died and did not qualify as a child under the CWDS. The trial court’s finding that Randies’s individual claim under the CWDS failed is not clearly erroneous. II.

Ashley L. Stapert v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 30, 2015

Under this rule, “a witness may be qualified as an expert by virtue of ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[,]’ . . . [a]nd only one characteristic is necessary to qualify as an expert.” Kubsch v. … “As such, a witness may qualify as an expert on the basis of practical experience alone.” Id.

Natalie Medley v. Bruce Lemmon, Julie Stout, Pam Ferguson, Stacey Milner, Sherry White, L.A. Vannatta, Mike Pavese, Virginia McCullough

994 N.E.2d 1177 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 17, 2013

Although Article 1, Section 23 does explicitly refer to acts of the General Assembly, our supreme court has clearly held that this provision governs “not only state statutes, but also the enactments and actions of county … She does, however, allege that the second offense for touching another inmate in the restroom was not sexual in nature, but that it was construed that way by prison staff so that it would qualify as a “sex offense” under

In Re the Adoption of S.Z., R.W. v. C.G. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 3, 2016

Factual findings “are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them [and] . . . a judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and … The trial court concluded: “The fact that Mother received disability income does not establish a willful failure to pay support[.]

Ray v. State

679 N.E.2d 1364 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 28, 1997

Similar to the constitutions of a majority of states, the Indiana Constitution makes all offenses bailable, with the qualified exception of capital crimes. … Although the prosecutor originally moved for an increase in the original $20,000 bond, the trial court’s order that he be held without bail pending trial clearly constituted a revocation of bail.

Sieb, Gdn. v. Miller

102 Ind. App. 389 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 2, 1936

“FOURTH: On the 15th day of December, 1917, Bertram Sieb qualified as trustee under the terms of the will of said Louis H. … “FIFTH: Upon qualifying as such executor and trustee the said Bertram Sieb took possession of all the assets, both real and personal, comprising the estate of said Louis H.

Beautygard Manufacturing Co. v. Geeslin

148 Ind. App. 340 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 27, 1971

Contrary to assertions advanced, we must assume that the Board would have nothing to gain by setting the assessed value of a taxpayer’s property unreasonably and excessively high so as to qualify the cause for removal to … a judicial question unless it clearly appears that the legislative classification is not based on substantial distinctions with reference to the subject-matter, or is manifestly unjust or unreasonable.”

Common Cause, Inc. v. State

691 N.E.2d 1358 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 10, 1998

The Court held that such actions were within the scope of the Rhode Island legislature’s legitimate legislative functions, and therefore were shielded by legislative immunity. … We discern no reason to reformulate what Judge Metz has so clearly and articulately stated. Accordingly, we adopt the quoted portions of his Findings and Conclusions.

Patterson v. Dykes

804 N.E.2d 849 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 2004

Clearly, the effect of a Pardon is retroactive; thus, from August 14, 2003, forward, Patterson is eligible to run for an elected office, because he no longer has a felony conviction in his criminal history. … Our supreme court explained this provision as follows: When the elective term ends and no qualified person has been elected and qualified to take over the duties of the office, the person holding the office at the end of

Epperly v. E. & P. Brake Bonding, Inc.

169 Ind. App. 224 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 24, 1976

. & P. on August 11, 1971, and qualified as such on August 17, 1971. Pfau, as Receiver, retained all of the corporate employees, including Epperly and Pucillo. … Other evidence established that Epperly had made arrangements for the formation of United during his tenure with E. & P.

Marriage of Dowden v. Allman

696 N.E.2d 456 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1998

In other words, we will not reverse the trial court unless the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. … We have held that for the pension to qualify as “property” under section (b)(2), “it is not important that the funds are eligible for immediate withdrawal.

Hoosier Outdoor Advertising Corp. v. RBL Management, Inc.

844 N.E.2d 157 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 21, 2006

Indiana Code Section 4-21.5-5-14 establishes the scope of judicial review of an administrative decision. Id. at 490 . … "Deemed abandoned" clearly indicates that the abandonment is required as a matter of law, regardless of a party's agreement, in keeping with section 8083-1(E) of the MCZO.

Brown v. Poulos

78 Ind. Dec. 869 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 1980

Clearly the Doney court considered the phrase in question as synonymous with agent. See also: Provident Trust Co. v. Darrough (1906), 168 Ind. 29 , 78 N.E. 1030 ; Day v. West (1978), Ind.App., 373 N.E.2d 935 . … There is nothing in the statute at hand to indicate that the Legislature intended to alter well-settled rules of agency by requiring that the agency be established by some written instrument.

King ex rel. Jacob v. Secretary

774 N.E.2d 1008 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 16, 2002

reverse the trial court’s dismissal of her complaint and remand. 1 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY King has severe mental and physical disabilities as a result of a childhood illness. 2 Because of these disabilities, King qualified … To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.