Case law

Rory Kerwood v. Elkhart County Sheriff's Department

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 10, 2024

In response, Kerwood argued the statements “clearly imply Kerwood engaged in criminal activity which is false.” Id. at 146. … The Sheriff’s Department argued it had immunity under Ind. Code § 34-13-3- 3(a)(7).

Department of Financial Institutions v. Mega Net Services

833 N.E.2d 477 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 2005

If I qualify. MN: It's 40. *s * *s *t * * MN: Every two weeks. PI's Ex. 83. … establish such statutory violations.

Methodist Hospital of Indiana, Inc. v. Ray

551 N.E.2d 463 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 14, 1990

Rather, Lomax filed an affidavit of her own that showed she was unattended by any of Winona's employees at the time of her fall, ie., she clearly was not receiving care or treatment at that time. … This suggests an intent that the panel confine itself to matters of malpractice, where members of the medical profession are naturally qualified as experts.

Angus Toney v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 9, 2012

Because the plain language of the statute provides that physical pain is sufficient to establish bodily injury, and because the evidence clearly shows that the victim experienced physical pain, we affirm. … In contrast to this requirement for “extreme pain,” there is no similar qualifying language with regard to bodily injury. All that is required is physical pain.

Jester v. State

163 Ind. App. 24 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 16, 1975

His appeal questions the sufficiency of the evidence to establish either intent to rape or his sanity. … Yuhn, a qualified psychiatrist appointed by the court to examine Jester, testified that in his opinion Jester was sane and met the requirements for legal sanity adopted in Hill v.

Robin Eugene Montgomery v. State of Indiana

22 N.E.3d 768 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 11, 2014

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or it misinterprets the law. Id. … Accordingly, the main purpose of the NPLEx records is not to establish or prove some fact at trial.

Northern Elec. Co., Inc. v. Torma

819 N.E.2d 417 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 13, 2004

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inference from the evidence to support them, and the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by the findings and the conclusions … In order to qualify as a trade secret, the data compilation must be shown to have been the "subject of efforts that were reasonable under the cireumstances to maintain its secrecy."

Sharpsville Community Ambulance, Inc. v. Cynthia Gilbert and Randall Gilbert

47 N.E.3d 1265 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 23, 2015

The relevant discussion in Ayres concerns whether a volunteer fire department qualified as a governmental entity under the ITCA. … [17] Next, GHCS argued that because it operated pursuant to government control, it qualified as a political subdivision.

Head v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management

626 N.E.2d 518 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 22, 1993

Clearly, Head has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court. III. … An expert may be qualified by practical experience as well as by formal training and whether he is qualified as an expert is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Willis v.

Archer v. Ostemeier

56 Ind. App. 385 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 2, 1914

In the first part of the instruction the court does assume certain facts as proven, but all the facts so assumed were either agreed upon or established by undisputed evidence. … After so qualifying he stated in substance that such a wagon as the one used by appellant when appellee’s horse was struck, could be turned across the street without skidding by driving slowly, or if driving at a rapid rate

Jamar Minor v. State of Indiana

36 N.E.3d 1065 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 10, 2015

Under the circumstances, Williams’s purported statement to Dulin does not qualify as a present sense impression. … Based upon the evidence presented, we cannot say that Minor has established such prejudice.

Klinger v. CAYLOR

148 Ind. App. 508 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 25, 1971

Plaintiff’s affidavit fails to establish a justiciable issue and is therefore inadequate to establish a genuine issue for trial against defendants’ motion; therefore defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be granted … Rusher (appellee) clearly establishes that the operation performed consisted of procedures in which no abdominal surgery was performed and plaintiff’s bowel was not cut or packed in any manner, and further, the doctor pointed

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

804 N.E.2d 289 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 9, 2004

This is clearly an intolerable result. Id. at 334 (emphasis supplied). … CAC's ability to raise issues not raised below was clearly established by that case. *296 NIPSCO acknowledges this holding, but argues that the holding is impacted by the subsequent adoption of Indiana Appellate Rule 5(C)

County Board of Review v. Free Methodist Publishing House

145 Ind. App. 463 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 16, 1969

The central question involved in this appeal is whether appellee-Free Methodist Publishing House is qualified to receive a property tax exemption pursuant to Acts 1919, ch. 59, § 5, p. 198, as amended at the time pertinent … While the test remains somewhat subjective, it clearly will reject an exemption for a subsidiary which cannot establish that its operation is directly subservient to the religious purposes of its parent.

Bledsoe v. Fleming

712 N.E.2d 1067 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 21, 1999

Trial Rule 12(C) is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly entitle the moving party to judgment. Wildman v. National Fire and Marine Ins. … The law of res judicata is well-established in Indiana. It operates to preclude litigation regarding matters which have already been litigated.

Everette v. Everette

841 N.E.2d 210 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 27, 2006

Wife has established prima facie error in this regard, and the trial court is ordered to remedy this mistake upon remand. … By distributing the residence to Husband, the trial court clearly distributed to Husband the equity in the marital residence.

Horn v. State

176 Ind. App. 527 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 31, 1978

The trial judge properly overruled Horn’s objections as our review of the transcript shows the remarks to have been clearly harmless. … As to the insufficient foundation contention, Horn argues that the police officer who tested the knife for blood was not qualified as an expert.

State Board of Funeral and Cemetery Service v. Settlers Life Insurance Company

5 N.E.3d 1170 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 14, 2014

The Pulaski County DFR determined that the assignment of the policy would not qualify as an excluded resource under Medicaid. … Taylor wrote that “[u]nder Wisconsin law, a Life Insurance Funded Burial Contract is valid only when, among other items, it is assigned to a ‘funeral director or operator of a funeral establishment’” and concluded that

Common Cause, Inc. v. State

691 N.E.2d 1358 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 10, 1998

The Court held that such actions were within the scope of the Rhode Island legislature’s legitimate legislative functions, and therefore were shielded by legislative immunity. … We discern no reason to reformulate what Judge Metz has so clearly and articulately stated. Accordingly, we adopt the quoted portions of his Findings and Conclusions.

In Re the Adoption of S.Z., R.W. v. C.G. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 3, 2016

Factual findings “are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them [and] . . . a judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and … The trial court concluded: “The fact that Mother received disability income does not establish a willful failure to pay support[.]