Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
4,284 results
2.52s
978 N.E.2d 429 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 17, 2012
All of the actions complained of by the Family were only indirectly, at best, related to any court order or instruction, and were not sufficiently intertwined with the judicial process to qualify for quasi-judicial immunity … To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and that the injury is a result of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 339-40 .
Cited 10 timesPublished721 N.E.2d 327 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 1999
Specifically, Johnson argues that the evidence does not establish that he had repeated or continuing contact with the victim nor does it establish that the victim felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened. … To qualify as fundamental error, an error must be a clear and substantial blatant violation of basic and elementary principles that renders the trial unfair to the defendant. Townsend v.
Cited 32 timesPublished422 N.E.2d 714 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1981
The Court further finds that the action of the Election Board was not contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity. … When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest....
Cited 7 timesPublished858 N.E.2d 1017 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 27, 2006
Absolute privilege or immunity in the judicial setting is well-established in Indiana law. See, eg., H.B. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 300 , 302 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. denied. … Qualified privilege or immunity also is well-established in Indiana law. Ind. Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 479 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied.
Cited 1 timesPublishedMolly Ann Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Board
Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 14, 2020
The Defendants asserted two kinds of immunity: absolute quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity. … is that qualified immunity, not quasi-judicial immunity, applies.” Id. at 36.
Cited 0 timesPublished656 N.E.2d 1145 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 17, 1995
Essentially, Hutchi-son is attempting to claim immunities under the Act without establishing that he was in fact an employee of Centin. … Therefore, having failed to establish the existence of the requisite employer-employee relationship, Hutchison is not entitled to immunity under the Act's fellow-employee exemption and Williams is not relegated to the Act
Cited 23 timesPublishedTerre Haute Regional Hospital, Inc. v. Basden
524 N.E.2d 1306 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 1988
This section clearly and unambiguously prohibits the disclosure of the determinations of, and communications to a peer review committee, subject to specified exceptions. … Basden has not established a prima fa-cie showing of fraud. No misrepresentation of fact by THRH or its peer review committee has been shown to exist.
Cited 21 timesPublished471 N.E.2d 14 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 26, 1984
, Wilbur alleged that her husband's death was caused by the State's negligence in the: (1) design of the road; (2) failure to install guardrails or median barriers; (8) failure to post warning signs, and; (4) failure to establish … Clearly the trial court had the power to enter such an order. The only remaining question, therefore, is what impact the trial court's order had on the issue of statutory immunity.
Cited 10 timesPublishedBoard of Com'rs of Delaware County v. Briggs
167 Ind. App. 96 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 3, 1975
We believe that this is a reference to the generally established requirements for personal governmental immunity protection. … The issue was clearly before the jury, and the instruction was properly given.
Cited 68 timesPublishedPenny v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development
852 N.E.2d 954 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 18, 2006
We noted the statement made to the Employment Security Department was, by statute, protected by a qualified privilege. Id. at 1175 (citing Ind.Code § 22-4-17-9). We affirmed summary judgment for How-met. … To be eligible for unemployment benefits an individual must establish wage credits in a specified amount during a specified period, Ind.Code § 22-4-14-5; the amount of wage credits determines the weekly benefit.
Cited 12 timesPublishedWinona Memorial Foundation of Indianapolis v. Lomax
465 N.E.2d 731 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 25, 1984
On that date, Winona was qualified as a health care provider within the meaning of the Medical Malpractice Act, IND.CODE 16-9.5-2-1. … the legislature intended to overrule the established law.
Cited 40 timesPublishedLeo MacHine & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.
936 N.E.2d 855 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 12, 2010
The governmental entity seeking to establish immunity bears the burden of proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made by the conscious balancing of risk and benefits. Id. … However, based on the established case law, it is clear that the timing of the decision to use Anderson's excavator does not solely determine its immunity status; rather, the nature of the specific decision is equally important
Cited 7 timesPublishedLinden v. Health Care 2000, Inc.
809 N.E.2d 929 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 11, 2004
Denial of Appellants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In their original brief, Appellants contend that Appellees have failed to establish that they are entitled to immunity under the Act and that therefore we "should … It is not enough for Appellants to argue that Appel-lees are not entitled to immunity under the Act and are therefore not entitled to summary judgment; Appellants must also establish as a matter of law with respect to each
Cited 1 timesPublishedJohn Crouch v. State of Indiana, Britni Saunders
Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 30, 2020
We cannot say that this statute clearly evinces or unequivocally expresses the legislature’s intention to waive the State’s sovereign immunity under these circumstances. … evince” or “unequivocally express” its intention to waive State immunity for whistleblower claims). 4 [22] Even assuming the legislature expressed such an intent or that the State or Saunders qualifies
Cited 0 timesPublishedCity of South Bend v. Dollahan
918 N.E.2d 343 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 15, 2009
The trial court's findings will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, ie. when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Id. … Under Indiana's common law, Dollahan was required to establish three elements to recover on a theory of negli-genee: (1) a duty on the part of City to conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship
Cited 18 timesPublished725 N.E.2d 150 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 2000
Once Tilley qualified for Social Security Disability benefits and retired under her Public Employees Retirement Fund (PERF) plan, she no longer qualified to receive a percentage of her former salary through her disability … Code tit. 31, r. 3-1-12 on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.
Cited 3 timesPublishedCity of New Haven v. Reichhart
729 N.E.2d 600 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 8, 2000
Attackable “wastage” in the sense hereinabove used would also occur where the annexation was clearly or patently illegal. … There, the Court ruled that petitioners enjoy only a qualified immunity under the right of petition where they express "libelous and damaging falsehoods in petitions to Government officials.”
Cited 2 timesPublishedMendenhall v. City of Indianapolis
717 N.E.2d 1218 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 12, 1999
This is clearly not applicable to the case before us. … However, the federal court clearly and necessarily determined in resolving Men-denhall’s civil rights claim that Goldsmith was acting as an agent of the State.
Cited 37 timesPublishedVandam Estate v. Mid-America Sound
25 N.E.3d 165 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 14, 2015
A reviewing court should nullify a statute on constitutional grounds only where such result is clearly rational and necessary. Id. 1. Open Courts Ind. Const. art. … The State’s consent to be sued, as represented by the ITCA, therefore is not uniformly applied and available to all qualified claimants, as required by Collins. McCall is distinguishable.
Cited 3 timesPublishedHuffman v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management
788 N.E.2d 505 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 19, 2003
clearly suggested that intent. *509 3 Because the legislature already has defined who qualifies for administrative review, it was error for the OEA to read into the phrase "aggrieved or adversely affected" a common law standing … or adversely affected" person merely by establishing that she is a citizen of the State of Indiana.
Cited 1 timesPublished
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