Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
4,284 results
1.06s
Allen County Council v. Stellhorn
729 N.E.2d 608 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 13, 2000
Pursuant to the statute, if a qualified county elected to impose the tax, the county treasurer was required to establish a “coliseum expansion fund” and to deposit all funds received from the tax in that fund upon receipt … The issue clearly depends upon the necessary impact of the 1986 amendments to the Allen County Food and Beverage Tax statute. *612 We find two principles are controlling.
Cited 1 timesPublished670 N.E.2d 1299 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 21, 1996
Therefore, Lacey has failed to establish the second prong of his claim and the assertion of ineffective counsel must fail. … It is well established that a trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of photographic evidence. Butler v.
Cited 9 timesPublished910 N.E.2d 780 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 15, 2009
We will not reverse the trial court's findings and judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. … Baird claims that the "FDCPA governs the actions of ASA in this matter and ... the facts established at trial clearly support only one conclusion, that ASA violated the provisions of that Act." Appellant's Br. p. 7.
Cited 14 timesPublishedCounty of Lake and the Lake County Plan Commission v. Alan J. Pahl and Roderick Pahl
28 N.E.3d 1092 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 2015
From the enactment of the 1957 Zoning Ordinance through June 13, 1995, the Property was zoned A-1, which established its classification as an agricultural zone. … Consequently, the Appellants maintain that the trial court’s findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous.
Cited 15 timesPublished79 Ind. App. 683 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 7, 1920
The word “when” denotes time, and the expression “when established” fixes the time as after establishment. … The expression “when maintained” carries with it the idea of continuing the particular name or names after they are established. Clearly this condition is not precedent to the vesting of the estate.
Cited 14 timesPublishedBrian Vukadinovich v. Kallie Lolkema and Donald Webb (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 27, 2020
He argues that the evidence clearly established Lolkema’s fault and liability. … However, Lolkema’s attorney’s address is not clearly visible on the copies of the qualified settlement offer included in the record.
Cited 0 timesPublished723 N.E.2d 916 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 7, 2000
There could be no valid claim here that Harris was immune from prosecution because his person was the fruit of an illegal arrest.... … Before I can place you under arrest I must offer you a breath test for intoxication to be given by a qualified chemical test operator.
Vacated in part by Timmons v. State, 2000 Ind. App. LEXIS 1464 (2000)Cited 8 timesPublishedRauch v. Board of Commissioners
72 Ind. App. 412 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 29, 1919
‘A later law which is merely a re-enactment of a former does not repeal an intermediate act which has qualified or limited the first one, but such intermediate act will be deemed to remain in force, and to qualify or modify … Again quoting from Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, §254, we have, as a well-established principle of law, that: “A new statute which affirmatively grants a larger jurisdiction or power, or right, repeals any
Cited 1 timesPublishedBailey N. Blueher v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 2017
During the hearing, the trial court received a report that Blueher did not qualify for community placement. … We therefore will only reverse if the trial court decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.
Cited 0 timesPublishedIn Re: The Petition for Expungement of Conviction Records of: B.S. v. State of Indiana
95 N.E.3d 177 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 5, 2018
The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. … And when faced with an ambiguous statute, other well-established rules of statutory construction are applicable.
Cited 3 timesPublishedJ.S. Sweet Co. v. White County Bridge Commission
714 N.E.2d 219 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 1999
by case law, qualify as a federal public work. … However, the trial court’s finding on this issue controls unless clearly erroneous. See Darlage, 576 N.E.2d at 1307 .
Cited 20 timesPublishedMichael Hays and Caryn Hays v. Amanda Hockett
94 N.E.3d 300 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 25, 2018
[24] Neither Indiana nor Oklahoma qualify as a home state for B.H. under the UCCJA. … Moreover, when Mother and Father returned to Indiana in February 2015, the family established a primary residence.
Cited 4 timesPublishedNowicki v. Cannon Steel Erection Co.
711 N.E.2d 536 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 17, 1999
In light of the extent of Custom's control of Battreall's work at the Custom job site, we cannot say the trial court finding that Custom established Battreall's work boundaries was clearly erroneous. … , would clearly support a contrary conclusion.
Abrogated on other grounds by GKN Co. v. Magness, 2001 Ind. LEXIS 218 (2001)Cited 12 timesPublishedHines Ex Rel. Hines v. Caston School Corp.
651 N.E.2d 330 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 8, 1995
As well said by Judge Cooley, 'The right to one's person may be said to be the right of complete immunity: to be let alone.! [Union Pacific Railway Company v. … We note that the Hineses stipulated at trial that they do not seek to establish that Jimmy's wearing of an earring is protected speech under the First Amendment.
Cited 8 timesPublishedFlaherty & Collins, Inc. v. BBR-Vision I, L.P., and New Castle Realty, LLC
990 N.E.2d 958 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 10, 2013
BBR designated sixty-eight of Autumn Oaks’ seventy-two apartments as qualified low-income units, thereby qualifying the units for low-income tax credits pursuant to Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Section 1 … The partnership and management agreements establish that the parties clearly intended to benefit NCR and that the duty imposed on F&C was in favor of NCR.
Cited 14 timesPublished450 N.E.2d 109 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 21, 1983
Other contradictions in Gligor's testimony pointed out by Fadell likewise fail to establish any perjury. Fadell is not entitled to reversal on this basis. *115 IL. … The title "Waiver of Immunity" might, by some stretch of the imagination, have misled jurors.
Cited 21 timesPublishedIndiana Department of State Revenue v. Sohio Petroleum Co.
170 Ind. App. 123 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 27, 1976
Whether the trial court’s finding that the taxpayers overpaid the Department by $51,864.96' and its judgment in that amount were clearly erroneous. … And the Department lacks statutory authority to establish rules that add or detract from the Act.
Overruled on other grounds by Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Harrison Steel Castings Co., 75 Ind. Dec. 171 (1980)Cited 9 timesPublishedMcKinney v. Public Service Co. of Indiana
597 N.E.2d 1001 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 26, 1992
Additionally, to establish a joint venture, there must be a pecuniary attribute in the common purpose of the trip. Lafayette, 440 N.E.2d 759 . … Obviously, neither of these statutes clothe PSI with immunity under the present cir cumstances.
Cited 34 timesPublished985 N.E.2d 35 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 19, 2013
Rather, immunity from suit under § 1983 is “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it,” Imbler v. … An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
Cited 26 timesPublished573 N.E.2d 463 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 17, 1991
Obviously, his background, experience, and conduct do not clearly indicate a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. … We will not burden this opinion with a discussion of the "recognized exceptions" in which cases on collateral review qualify for the retrospective application of federal appellate decisions.
Cited 1 timesPublished
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