Case law

Patterson v. State

958 N.E.2d 478 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 17, 2011

One such exception was established in Terry v. … For all of these reasons, we conclude that the State sufficiently established that Officer Dotson was qualified to recognize the odor of burnt marijuana.

Wisniewski v. Bennett

693 N.E.2d 1341 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 16, 1998

This is a summary judgment action involving the ability of a claimant to gain access to the Patient’s Compensation Fund (Fund) established by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. … In that case the literal terms of the settlement document clearly showed that the claimant entered a written agreement with a non-qualified heath care provider.

Richard Prancik, b/n/f, Renee Prancik v. Oak Hill United School Corporation

997 N.E.2d 401 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 31, 2013

Under these circumstances, the court held that “school personnel here clearly exercised ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of the children under their authority.” … The majority of the opinion addressed whether the school enjoyed immunity from the student’s claims under the Indiana Torts Claim Act, with the court holding that it did not. Id. at 484.

Indianapolis Downs, LLC v. INDIANA HORSE RACING COM'N

827 N.E.2d 162 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 13, 2005

In such a situation, we give the trial court's factual findings and judgment deference, and we will reverse only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. … in this case, Indiana Downs is contesting an order because the IHRC's action not only has retrospective application, but also it is directed specifically at Indiana Downs and Hoosier Parks as the only two entities that qualified

Kelly Scott Thomas v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 19, 2012

Here, when Orue testified, her immunity agreement with the State was disclosed to the jury. … When asked if she had any reason to think she would receive anything other than immunity in exchange for testifying, she replied that she did not.

Stone v. Daviess County Division of Children & Family Services

656 N.E.2d 824 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 17, 1995

We will not set aside the findings and judgment of the trial court unless clearly erroneous. … s deposition testimony renders .the trial court's judgment clearly erroneous. Therefore, we find no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. SHARPNACK, C.J., and BARTEAU, J., concur. .

Weston v. Buckley

677 N.E.2d 1089 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 19, 1997

Whether the trial court erred in determining that Buckley’s paintless dent removal process qualified as a trade secret. II. … Prior to establishing the business, Buckley invested a substantial amount of time and effort in investigating the various PDR processes and franchise opportunities.

Indiana Department of Transportation v. Howard

879 N.E.2d 1119 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 28, 2008

INDOT then filed a petition for rehearing in which it clearly states the basis on which it invokes this court’s jurisdiction. 1 We grant the petition for rehearing, vacate our earlier decision, and consider the merits of … Clay County filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging governmental immunity. The trial court granted Clay County’s motion, and Shand Mining appealed.

In the Matter of: J.D. and J.G., Children in Need of Services, J.G. (Father) and K.M. (Mother) v. Ind. Dept. of Child Services, and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 28, 2015

Mother had failed to take J.G. to scheduled medical appointments, J.G.’s immunizations were not current, and she had a flat spot on her head, a possible indicator of abuse. … We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the [juvenile] court was clearly erroneous. Id.

Bd. of Commissioners v. Midwest Associates, Inc.

144 Ind. App. 264 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 1, 1969

This similarity is established by the case of Bucher v. Young (1928), 94 Ind. App. 586 , 158 N. … We still have the problem which is the immunity from state taxation of property in which the United States holds legal title.

Kirby v. Ashland Oil, Inc.

463 N.E.2d 1127 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 29, 1984

Viewed in its component parts, Indiana Code section 82-5-11-8 provides for three qualifying uses. … The Act clearly envisions an active use of mineral interests by the owner. Thus, a mere lease of an owner's interest to another party fails to achieve this purpose.

El v. Beard

795 N.E.2d 462 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 10, 2003

Qualified Tuition Program (QTP), http://www.irs.gov/iform-spubs/page/0,,id=104280,00.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2003). … Such programs are "set up to allow you to either prepay, or contribute to *464 an account established for paying, a student's qualified higher education expenses at an eligible educational institution." Id. 2 .

In Re the Wardship of B. C.

433 N.E.2d 19 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 16, 1982

When a child is removed from its family and the parent-child relationship is terminated, “all rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, and obligations (including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support … therefore, L.C. argues that the finding was not supported by sufficient evidence of probative value. 4 When reviewing a case in which the judge has rendered findings of fact, we will not set aside the judgment unless it is clearly

Cheryl L. Underwood v. Thomas Bunger, in his capacity as the Personal Representative of The Estate of Kenneth K. Kinney Judith M. Fulford and Sheree Demming

52 N.E.3d 829 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 23, 2016

Our Supreme Court determined that the phrase “in joint tenancy” clearly overcame the presumption in favor of tenancies by the entirety and gave the spouses a joint tenancy in the property. Id. … Ramer, 896 N.E.2d at 569 (the phrase “as joint tenants” sufficient to establish joint tenancy among four couples rather than two estates by the entireties).

Powers v. Gastineau

568 N.E.2d 1020 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 25, 1991

Consequently, plaintiff overcame the qualified privilege, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. … Clearly, defendant's efforts went beyond what was necessary; however, any malice on defendant's part resulted from overzea-lousness or other noniniquitous human failing and was not so obdurate as to require punishment for

Brett Carney v. Fernando Patino, Jr.

114 N.E.3d 20 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 31, 2018

Carney claims that on that date, he encountered Patino and his father at the Residence, and that he observed two pickup trucks in the driveway loaded with various fixtures that had clearly been taken out of … [25] Carney essentially suggests that his abuse of the qualified privilege could not be established absent direct testimony from him admitting that his statements to law enforcement were in fact motivated

Title Search Co., Inc. v. 1st Source Bank

765 N.E.2d 167 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 20, 2002

The case before us is, however, clearly distinguishable from Borgman. In Borg-man, the plaintiffs brought proceedings supplemental in an Indiana court based upon a judgment rendered by a federal court. … We also note that Title Search has not established that it was in any way damaged by the Bank's actions.

Steven A. Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish Community, Inc., a/k/a Congregation Beth Shalom, Paul Eisenberg, Judith Rose, Sarah Wasserman, Lynne Foster Shifriss, and Roberta "Didi" Kerler

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 17, 2013

Code §§ 31-33-6 grants civil immunity to any individual who makes a report of child abuse and does not restrict immunity to those who make a report to DCS. … Accordingly, Beth Shalom established, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Guinn v. Light

536 N.E.2d 546 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 10, 1989

Clearly, the panel has the implied authority and duty to make that determination because it bears directly upon the question of whether the panel has jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter at hand. … A patients' compensation fund is established to cover any shortfall between the liability of the provider(s) and the maximum limit. IC 16-9.5-2-2.

Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. Midwest Steel Division of National Steel Corp.

450 N.E.2d 130 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 1983

The use of the word 'specific' rather clearly implies something different from a general provision and the use of the word 'provision' implies something less than the subsection. … However, if the Commission has the power of reinstatement, it may order an employer to offer employment to the employee, thus establishing a cut-off time for back pay.