Case law

Joseph v. LaPorte County

651 N.E.2d 1180 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 20, 1995

Thus, we conclude that setting speed limits does not so clearly implicate government policy that all such decisions are discretionary as a matter of law. See Peav-ler, supra, at 47. … Maintaining a warning sign is analogous to correctly posting an established speed limit; - both fuvolve a non-discretionary mandate to implement established policy. Both are clearly operational functions.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bathe

715 N.E.2d 954 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 3, 1999

The protection of a qualified privilege may be lost by the manner of its exercise, although belief in the truth of the charge exists.” Boone v. … We believe that there are certain situations in which a merchant’s actions clearly fall within the immunity granted by the statute.

Ind. State Hwy. Com'n v. Ind. Civ. Rights Com'n

424 N.E.2d 1024 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 13, 1981

Pape (1961), 365 U.S. 167 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 , which established the immunity of municipalities from § 1983. … The finding of a discriminatory practice was clearly based on facts that either appeared on the record or could reasonably be inferred from the record.

John Lane-El v. Michael Spears, in his official capacity of Chief of Police, and the Indianapolis Police Department

13 N.E.3d 859 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 9, 2014

In the APRA, the Legislature established the procedure for disputing a denial of access to public records. … The trial court concluded that Chief Spears was immune from suit under the ITCA, which is codified at INDIANA CODE §§ 34-13-3-0.1–34-13-3-25 (2006) and immunizes public employees against certain tort claims.

ESPN, Inc. and Paula Lavigne v. University of Notre Dame Security Police Dept., a Dept. of the University of Notre Dame du Lac

50 N.E.3d 385 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 15, 2016

Accordingly, judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly establish that the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed … [35] Correspondingly, we note that whereas the Police Department qualifies as a public agency under APRA because it is a law enforcement agency, the remainder of Notre Dame clearly does not qualify as

Dillon v. Chicago South Shore & North Bend Railway Co.

654 N.E.2d 1137 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 15, 1995

Further, it is the challenger's burden to show that the alleged constitutional defects are clearly apparent. Matter of Tina T. (1991), Ind., 579 N.E.2d 48, 56-57 (citation omitted). … permit other units to eventually qualify.

Veolia Water Indianapolis LLC, City of Indianapolis Dept. of Waterworks, and City of Indianapolis v. National Trust Ins. Co. and FCCI Ins. Co. a/s/o Ultra Steak, Inc. d/b/a Texas Roadhouse

Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 3, 2012

―The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing the immunity. … ―A judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there are no 8 genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly establish that the non-moving

Harrison v. Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC

929 N.E.2d 247 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 2010

Although the issue here is not, strictly speaking, one of sovereign immunity, we believe it is necessary to review the history of sovereign immunity in Indiana and the adoption of ITCA. 3 Sovereign immunity originated in … Despite the difficulty of defining what constituted a "proprietary function" for which a municipality could be held liable if it had been performed negligently, there were numerous cases clearly establishing that a municipality's

City of Seymour v. Onyx Paving Co.

541 N.E.2d 951 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 31, 1989

It is a well established and acknowledged rule that when we review a case in which a trial court has rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court’s judgment unless it is clearly … The trial court’s findings in this regard were not clearly erroneous.

Bedree v. DeGroote

799 N.E.2d 1167 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 9, 2003

Bedree's arguments, as presented in his appellate brief, are convoluted and confusing, and decidedly short of the standard established in the appellate rules. … Judicial immunity of the defendant is one. such ground.

Brademas v. St. Joseph County Commissioners

621 N.E.2d 1133 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 1993

Finally, Brademas claims the trial court erroneously determined Zap-pia was entitled to qualified immunity. … Because we hold the trial court properly found that Brademas did not meet the requirements of the public lawsuit statute, we need not address the issue of Zappia's qualified immunity.

Chandradat v. State, Indiana Department of Transportation

830 N.E.2d 904 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 2005

The State is not immune from negligence that results in the implementation part of a project. Greathouse, 616 N.E.2d at 866-67 . Here, the State did not qualify for discretionary function immunity under the TIPCA. IV. … Finding, as we do, that the placement of the signage does not qualify the State for discretionary function immunity, that the State owed the Chandradats a duty, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Ross v. Indiana State Board of Nursing

790 N.E.2d 110 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 13, 2003

To qualify as a “prevailing party,” the plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim which directly benefits him at the time of the judgment. Farrar v. … We turn, then, to the trial court’s finding that quasi-judicial immunity prevented an award of attorney’s fees.

Droscha v. Shepherd

931 N.E.2d 882 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 3, 2010

In determining whether a person is entitled to the benefit of judicial immunity, we use the functional approach established by the United States Supreme Court and look to the nature of the function performed, not the identity … Here, there is no dispute that the Association established the panel of arbitrators.

Neff v. State

832 N.E.2d 1006 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 15, 2005

Unless the defendant admits that he was on probation at the time he committed the offense in question, evidence must be presented establishing that fact. … Special Judge Steven Nation qualified and assumed jurisdiction of this case on March 25, 2003.

C.M.L. Ex Rel. Brabant v. Republic Services, Inc.

800 N.E.2d 200 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 16, 2003

In determining that he did not have such a right, the Court cited to the policy argument put forth in Hewlett, which stated: *204 It is well established that a minor child cannot sue his parent for a tort. … We also noted that "under extreme cireum-stances [parental] immunity may not exist, however, a failure to supervise ... would not be sufficient, in our opinion to qualify."

Whistle Stop Inn, Inc., and Louise Liford d/b/a Thirsty Turtle v. City of Indianapolis, Mayor Greg Ballard, Indianapolis City-County Council and Hoosier Park, LLC

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 24, 2015

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1407-MI-519 | June 24, 2015 Page 5 of 24  together to watch, and bet on, horseracing—was required to hold such a license by April 12, 2012, to qualify … A judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly establish that the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed

D.L. ex rel. D.L. v. Huck

978 N.E.2d 429 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 17, 2012

All of the actions complained of by the Family were only indirectly, at best, related to any court order or instruction, and were not sufficiently intertwined with the judicial process to qualify for quasi-judicial immunity … To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and that the injury is a result of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 339-40 .

Thomas Haggerty and Cathy Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, Anonymous Party 2, and Anonymous Party 3

998 N.E.2d 286 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 20, 2013

AP1 made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to its immunity; however, the Haggertys have not established the contrary. … AP2 and AP3 made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to their immunity; the Haggertys failed to establish the contrary.

Johnson v. State

721 N.E.2d 327 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 1999

Specifically, Johnson argues that the evidence does not establish that he had repeated or continuing contact with the victim nor does it establish that the victim felt terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened. … To qualify as fundamental error, an error must be a clear and substantial blatant violation of basic and elementary principles that renders the trial unfair to the defendant. Townsend v.