Case law

Cindy Brothers, As Personal Representative of the Estate of Kristopher Stately, Alicia Arnold and Tiffany Arnold v. Lake Holiday Enterprises, Inc. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 22, 2015

Indiana Recreational Use Statute [14] Lake Holiday claims that it is immune from suit under the Indiana Recreational Use Statute. … However, the IRUS “does not create an immunity as to the premises owner’s own actions or failure to act.” 649 N.E.2d at 1030.

Richmond State Hospital v. Brattain

935 N.E.2d 212 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 8, 2010

Here, a record as to the SPD's legal position on the pay disparity had already been established. … Here, the nonmer-it Employees rely on the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Ledbetter v. Hunter

652 N.E.2d 543 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 30, 1995

Before a statute will be declared repugnant to the Constitutions its fatal constitutional defects must be clearly apparent." Johnson v. St. … "[The malpractice statute of limitations is clearly rationally related to its goal of relieving the malpractice insurance crisis.

Jason Tye Myers v. Nalin Desai (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 2016

[23] Review of the record clearly establishes that acts complained of by Myers were exercises of judicial authority and that the named judges and justices had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction … [25] Again, review of the record clearly establishes that the acts complained of by Myers were acts within the general scope of authority granted to prosecuting Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum

Downing v. City of Columbus

505 N.E.2d 841 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 31, 1987

Whether the trial court erred and acted contrary to law in ruling that the actions of the City of Columbus, Indiana were valid and protected by the statutory immunity of the Indiana Tort Claims Act. 4. … Clearly, more than municipal interests are involved in the establishment of a state militia, and the state statutes would control over municipal provisions.

Pierce v. Bank One-Franklin, NA

618 N.E.2d 16 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 28, 1993

The nonmov-ing party may rest upon his pleadings until the moving party establishes that no genuine factual issue exists. … In the present case, we find Bauer's communication to Epple is entitled to a qualified privilege.

Elliott v. Roach

78 Ind. Dec. 50 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 28, 1980

Rose, (1846) 8 Blackf. 155, 157 , to the limits and purpose of the qualified privilege. … The evidence clearly established not only that the Board received and retained the defamatory letter, but also at least suggested the Board maintained a “file” on such letter and that the letter was thought to be relevant

Todd Rokita v. Board of School Commissioners for the City of Indianapolis

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 16, 2025

And, significantly, those cases were decided several decades before the Indiana Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity and the General Assembly enacted the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) and the Home Rule Act, the stated … Moreover, the Board has failed to establish that these unquantified expenses are anything more than “mere preliminary work,” which does not establish a vested right.

Anita J. Woodson v. Rhonda Randall as Personal Representative of the estate of Joanne F. Roache

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 27, 2026

A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if the trial court “relie[d] on an incorrect legal … [22] For these reasons, the trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that Woodson was required to “present [] evidence to clearly and unequivocally rebut the presumption of fraud and/or unconscionable

Advantage Home Health Care, Inc. v. Indiana State Department of Health

792 N.E.2d 914 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 6, 2003

In essence, Advantage urged that the Statement of Deficiencies qualified as orders under the AOPA. … This very much affects the rights, duties, privileges, and immunities of the health care agency.

J.L. v. State

789 N.E.2d 961 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 28, 2003

Foundational requirements to admissibility often require factual determinations by the trial court, and these findings are entitled to the same deference on appeal as any other factual finding, whether that is described as a clearly … Rule 808(6) permits the foundational requirements to be established by a "custodian or another qualified witness."

State v. Prater

922 N.E.2d 746 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 12, 2010

The words "with the intent" in Seetion 35-48-4-14.5(c) clearly refer to the "person who possesses" the chemical. … Neither does our interpretation "immunize[ ] the go-between." See Appellant's Brief at 6.

Thomas N. Eckerle v. Katz & Korin, P.C. and Michael W. Hile

81 N.E.3d 272 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 9, 2017

The context of that statement clearly reveals that, included in the “monkeyshines,” which occurred concerning Newland, were the actions “of the professionals who appeared in this … [16] Regarding immunity because of absolute privilege, the trial court found and concluded: 18.

Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc.

175 Ind. App. 548 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 27, 1978

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE: THE INDIANA STANDARD Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. and defendant reporters argue that, notwithstanding the possible defamatory' nature of the articles, they are nevertheless protected by a qualified constitutional … It is well-established under the landmark case of New York Times v.

DeMoss Rexall Drugs v. Dobson

540 N.E.2d 655 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 10, 1989

Clearly, by urging the position of those courts which have protected all documents routinely prepared by an insurer in the process of evaluating a claim, DeMoss is seeking immunity from discovery without qualification, broader … Even if the trial court accepted these affirmations as true, this evidence does not alter the character of the statements as a tool in the initial investigation of the claim or establish that the statements were intended

Laurie Gardner v. Anonymous Physician

Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 9, 2023

that fellow employee from liability, but the immunization is because of the type of accident involved, not because of a direct objective to immunize particular persons…. … Clearly, forcing the wrongdoer to bear the cost of his wrong, rather than the industry, will have a salutary effect in that it will operate as an incentive for careful conduct.

Amoco Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Labor

726 N.E.2d 869 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 18, 2000

trial court may grant relief upon finding that the agency’s action is: 1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity … Therefore, we find the purpose and practice of the investigation team’s formation and investigation to be sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to establish the admissibility of the interview summaries as hearsay.

Warrick Hospital, Inc. v. Wallace

435 N.E.2d 263 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 17, 1982

If true, such a death is clearly “caused by the wrongful act or omission of another” and within the purview of IC 34-1 — 1—2. … The affidavit by the secretary was clearly defective because it was not based upon personal knowledge.

Perdue v. Murphy

915 N.E.2d 498 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 27, 2009

In deference to the trial court's proximity to the issues, we will reverse a judgment only when it is shown to be clearly erroneous. Id. … A judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the findings. Id.

Boyd v. State

175 Ind. App. 181 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 21, 1977

The marked tendency when we do so is to negate the proper authority of the jury to determine facts by drawing reasonable inferences from other facts already established. … We recognize that within this area arise instances where the facts admit to opposing inferences, and it cannot be said by a reviewing authority that either inference is clearly unreasonable.