Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
4,284 results
1.21s
476 N.E.2d 533 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 18, 1985
Scruby, establishes that he was not a patient within the meaning of the Act. We do not agree. Rather, we determine that Waugh was a patient of Dr. … Bo-naventura on Detterline’s behalf, Detter-line qualified as a “patient” of Dr. Bona-ventura as the term is defined in 16-9.5-1 — 1(c).
Cited 3 timesPublished511 N.E.2d 1074 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 17, 1987
Therefore, in reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we must first discern whether the City’s motion for summary judgment showed the undisputed material facts establish a defense to Weber’s claim. … attend flea market, the First District held any decision by the state police whether to patrol the area of the flea market or to provide traffic control, was a decision on whether to enforce the law, a discretionary act clearly
Cited 6 timesPublished697 N.E.2d 490 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 24, 1998
Instead, she maintains that qualified privilege applies. … Because Van Eaton has failed to designate material which could establish that Fink abused her qualified privilege, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Fink. Affirmed.
Cited 34 timesPublished182 Ind. App. 5 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 29, 1979
An expert can be “qualified” by evidence of formal training or practical experience. Culley v. State (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 486 . … There, in a waiver hearing, the defendant clearly waived her right to object to the admission of the results of a polygraph test.
Cited 6 timesPublishedHochstedler v. St. Joseph County Solid Waste Management District
770 N.E.2d 910 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 28, 2002
In reviewing an alleged violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, our supreme court has established a two-part test. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994). … Because Resolution 5-97 is constitutional, the small claims court's judgment is not clearly erroneous. IIL.
Cited 19 timesPublished526 N.E.2d 732 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 2, 1988
The appellant is correct that a party seeking to prove fraud must establish a right to rely. Plymale, at 761. … Rather, subsection (13) provides that a government entity will be immune from liability for misrepresentation only where the misrepresentation was unintentional; conversely, no immunity will apply to any intentional misrepresentation
Cited 25 timesPublishedJug's Catering, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Unemployment Insurance Board
714 N.E.2d 207 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jun 29, 1999
It does not grant perpetual immunity. Id. … may be subject to unemployment tax liability must comply; it is merely an option afforded to those who do qualify.”
Cited 6 timesPublishedSmithson v. HOWARD REGIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM
933 N.E.2d 1 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Aug 2, 2010
"If the evidence permits conflicting reasonable inferences as to material facts, the governmental unit has failed to establish its immunity." Bules v. Marshall County, 920 N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind.2010). … The Smithsons have failed to establish prejudice from Howard Regional's omission to plead governmental immunity in its answer. 3 . All dates refer to 2005. 4 . Measurements are in inches and degrees Fahrenheit. 5 .
Cited 4 timesPublished94 N.E.3d 712 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 14, 2018
“The party seeking immunity has the burden of establishing that its conduct falls within one of the exceptions provided by the ITCA.” Id. … The General Assembly’s comprehensive statutory scheme regarding school bus transportation clearly differentiates between “employment contracts” and “transportation contracts.”
Cited 5 timesPublished808 N.E.2d 154 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 13, 2004
Equal Privileges and Immunities Kelver first asserts that I.C. § 9-19-10-2, along with the supporting statutory definitions, violates the equal privileges and immunities clause of the Indiana Constitution and the equal protection … In addition, this "preferential treatment" is equally available to anyone who owns a motor vehicle that qualifies as a truck and chooses to register and plate the vehicle as a truck. See Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80 .
Cited 2 timesPublished867 N.E.2d 262 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 31, 2007
The court in Abney restated the well-settled rule established in Micinski v. … An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Matshazi v.
Cited 14 timesPublishedMichael Whittaker v. State of Indiana
33 N.E.3d 1063 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 20, 2015
[10] Five years after establishing the two-step analysis in Collins, our Supreme Court again dealt with Section 23 in Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999). … [11] Similarly, we need not discuss whether Indiana Code section 1-1-5.5-21 passes the first prong of the Collins analysis because it clearly fails on the second prong.
Cited 3 timesPublishedIndiana Court of Appeals · Sep 18, 2020
has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. … We conclude that the Schons have failed to establish that the trial court erred in finding that the Coliseum is a governmental entity immune from liability under Section 34-13-3-3(10) of the ITCA.
Cited 0 timesPublishedAmerican Bldgs. Co. v. Kokomo Grain Co., Inc.
506 N.E.2d 56 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 13, 1987
This future reference to the trial clearly limits application of this provision to experts retained for the purposes of the pending litigation. … As stated in 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024; "In order to come within the qualified immunity from discovery created by Rule 26(b)(8) three tests must be satisfied. The material must be: "1.
Cited 22 timesPublished899 N.E.2d 35 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 2008
I am not convinced that Detective Cole’s statement qualified as an implied promise, or for that matter, a direct promise, or that it clearly rendered McGhee’s confession involuntary such that the trial court’s finding of … Given the nature of the statement at issue, in my view the trial court was fully justified in concluding that it did not constitute a direct promise of immunity or leniency.
Cited 6 timesPublishedLake County Trust Co. v. Advisory Plan Commission
883 N.E.2d 124 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 20, 2008
Findings will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. Yanoff, 688 N.E.2d at 1262 . “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Id. … A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.
Cited 4 timesPublishedState Ex Rel. Ross v. Anderson
31 Ind. App. 34 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Apr 22, 1903
the privileges and immunities must be regarded as agreeing and obligating themselves to conform to the conditions and limitations expressed or fairly implied. … They must be reasonable, and “must not interfere with the vested and substantial rights of the stockholders ; and they must not be contrary to public policy or the established law of the land.”
Cited 16 timesPublishedLake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson
671 N.E.2d 429 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 16, 1996
The movant bears the burden of establishing the propriety of summary judgment, and all facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Ramon, supra. I. … Thus, Swanson clearly appreciated the difference between official and personal capacity lawsuits.
Cited 42 timesPublished656 N.E.2d 540 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 24, 1995
He did not establish whether the applicants may or may not have been one of a group of many qualified applicants, and generally failed to establish any evidence supporting a theory of disparate impact on the part of Dana … Evidence was presented establishing that Dana hired at least as many qualified disabled applicants as it did not hire qualified disabled applicants.
Cited 1 timesPublishedIndiana Court of Appeals · Dec 30, 2014
In the School’s amended answer, the School denied both claims, and asserted as affirmative defenses that Hewitt failed to mitigate his damages and that the Board Members were entitled to qualified immunity. … Further, because the School’s affirmative defense of qualified immunity requires factual determinations regarding whether or to what extent Hewitt was denied these procedural safeguards, we do not reach that issue at this
Cited 0 timesPublished
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