Case law

Estate of Latek v. Ronneau

960 N.E.2d 193 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 4, 2012

The Appellants further argue that Bozik’s assertion (under penalties of perjury) in the petition for probate of Latek’s Will is legally insufficient to establish that the signature on the will was Latek’s signature. … Appellants assert that if Bozik can be found to qualify under the statute, at best, he may qualify under subsection (a)(6) which provides for “any other qualified person.”

State v. Jones

819 N.E.2d 877 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 29, 2004

On June 7, 1999, the trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing, establishing the factual basis for the plea. … Butler subsequently challenged his habitual offender status in a post-conviction proceeding by contending that while the Indiana Code requires two prior substance convictions as class A misdemeanors or felonies *880 to qualify

Gomez v. Chua Medical Corp.

510 N.E.2d 191 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 14, 1987

Clearly, the covenants are enforceable in such circumstances. 5 Dr. … However, in Rao, supra, the Seventh Circuit did not expressly rely on the maxims of equity to deny enforcement of a restrictive covenant where a physician was terminated by his medical corporation employer to prevent him from qualifying

Coddington v. Turner, Rec.

85 Ind. App. 604 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 9, 1923

The facts as found by the coúrt are, in substance, as follows: When appellee Turner qualified as receiver, the canning company, being in possession of the property described in the petition,' turned the same over to the receiver … They are not attempting to establish á claim against the estate in the hands of the receiver, or asking for the enforcement of a lien against the property in the hands of the receiver.

Michael Damien Howell v. State of Indiana

97 N.E.3d 253 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 13, 2018

The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. … Specifically, Howell asserts that the actual evidence that established the substantial step for the attempted robbery charge is the same evidence that established that he performed an act that created a

Surfware, Inc. v. Allied Specialty Precision, Inc.

876 N.E.2d 1156 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 30, 2007

The rule does not create *1159 a priority among the subsections establishing preferred venue. … Joseph County would qualify as a county of preferred venue because the accident occurred in St. Joseph county due to the chattel being located there.

Hutchison v. Adomatis

125 Ind. App. 550 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 29, 1955

E. 2d 666 : “. . . each specification of error must be so specific and certain as to clearly indicate the particular ruling on which it is based . . .,” and “. . . in considering the sufficiency of such assignment of error … Here, again, they seem to have faltered in their reading of the record for the record discloses positive, direct, competent and undisputed evidence given by a duly qualified expert witness as to the reasonable value of the

Boykins v. State

470 N.E.2d 765 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Nov 20, 1984

R.P.C. 1 and that a petitioner could sue-cessfully seek post conviction relief in a particular case under Ind.R.P.C. 1, notwithstanding that he would fail to qualify for consideration on the merits under Ind.R.P.C. 2. … Armstrong, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349 , and its progeny clearly is misplaced. Travelers changed the quantum of proof required to establish punitive damages. It did not, however, alter the burden of proof.

D & T Sanitation, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

443 N.E.2d 1207 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 11, 1983

This amounts to oppressive conduct which clearly comes under the standard in Art Hill Ford, Inc., supra. There was the testimony of Mr. … Callender (1981), Ind., 423 N.E.2d 601 , Justice Hunter had established a standard of “cogent and convincing proof.” I do not see that “clear and convincing evidence” is much different.

Chapo v. Jefferson County Plan Commission

926 N.E.2d 504 · Indiana Court of Appeals · May 5, 2010

Thus, Chapo established the propriety of an award of attorney fees incurred when she was forced to defend against a frivolous and groundless claim. … In its Brief, Jefferson County claims that "the award of fees is punitive in nature and [Jefferson County] as a government entity is thus immune from such judgments."

Anthony Delarosa v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Jul 17, 2017

Cassada was granted “use immunity” to testify. … The trial court found that Delarosa qualified for sentences of life without parole (LWOP) for the murder counts, and imposed consecutive LWOP sentences.

Joshuah Rainbolt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 31, 2018

In fact, the burden is on the defendant to establish that a proffered mitigating factor is both significant and “clearly supported by the record,” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493, if he alleges that the … State, 769 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ind. 2002); (holding that age does not automatically qualify as a mitigator, despite youth); Spears v.

Roy C. Robinson v. State of Indiana

Indiana Court of Appeals · Feb 13, 2025

Because Robinson has failed to establish that duplicity in the charges against him warranted a unanimity instruction, he has failed to establish fundamental error.3 II. … Here, it is true that each offense clearly permits multiple punishments for multiple victims.

Hardebeck v. State

656 N.E.2d 486 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Oct 11, 1995

The English system was established in 1907. Appellate review of a sentence in England is essentially de novo. … Hardebeck claims that the trial court added two factors to the sentencing order which were not clearly articulated during the sentencing hearing.

Michael L. Clark v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · Sep 30, 2020

Hollandsworth testified that Clark clearly knew what she and J.B. were arguing about when he intervened because J.B. was loudly and repeatedly saying, “You owe me for laundry.” Tr. Vol. 1 at 179. … comment during rebuttal in any way confused or misled the jurors as to their role as factfinders regarding the self-defense claim, the comment was isolated and, when viewed in context, would hardly qualify

Southern Indiana Railway Co. v. Baker

37 Ind. App. 405 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 6, 1906

The complaint clearly states the cause of appellee’s injury, and that cause was the negligent collision of two of appellant’s trains going in opposite directions. … The evidence also establishes the fact that appellee was injured. 3.

In re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of N.L. (Minor Child), and J.F. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.)

Indiana Court of Appeals · May 11, 2018

All rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties and obligations, any rights to custody, parenting time or support, pertaining to the relationship are permanently terminated, including the need to … App. 2015), trans. denied.5 [29] Waiver notwithstanding, the evidence clearly established that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child’s care and treatment.

Sinclair Refining Co. v. McCullom

107 Ind. App. 356 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Jan 22, 1940

It clearly appears that these conversations were not held in the presence of appellant and that there was no showing that the other parties to the conversation were not available as witnesses, and there was obviously no element … It is evident that the sole purpose of eliciting the facts stated by the witness was to establish the fact that appellee was unable to secure employment or retain his employment with subsequent employers.

Allied Fidelity Insurance v. State

413 N.E.2d 963 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Dec 23, 1980

The act opened with a definitional section in which the General Assembly established the terminological foundation necessary to any comprehensive statutory enactment. … The portion of bond form enacted in 1905 was clearly intended to be used by both personal and corporate sureties. The 1927 addition to the form appears to have been designed for use by a personal surety.

Bunch v. State

964 N.E.2d 274 · Indiana Court of Appeals · Mar 21, 2012

We therefore hold the post-conviction court clearly erred in denying her petition for post-conviction relief on this claim. III. Brady Violation In Brady v. … The post-conviction court also clearly erred in determining Bunch was not entitled to a new trial on the basis of a Brady violation by the State.