Case law

Rector v. State

256 Ind. 634 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 19, 1971

With his competency established by legislative enactment, however, (Acts of 1873, ch. 107, § 1, re-enacted by Acts of 1905, ch. 169, § 235, 1956 Repl. Burns Ind. … It follows logically that he, in his capacity as a witness should be accorded the same immunities as other witnesses, included among them that his character may be proven only by general *649 reputation, and not by specific

Gordy v. State

262 Ind. 275 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 1, 1974

The record does not disclose whether or not the Commissioner was ever formally qualified as a judge pro tempore or as a special judge, which the statute authorizes. … The Commissioner was acting as judge, a duty he clearly may assume under the statute if his appointment is procedurally correct.

Haak v. State

275 Ind. 415 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 10, 1981

Bixler established that his wife and Mrs. Pawloski are sisters. … We dispose of this case solely on the basis of Marsha Pawloski’s implied bias, and we therefore express no opinion as to whether her sister’s husband, Roger Bixler, was qualified to act as a juror in this case.

Garrison v. State

589 N.E.2d 1156 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 8, 1992

Given this finding, it clearly was no abuse of discretion to fail to interrogate the juror. We find no error here. … s comparison testimony because she was not qualified as an expert in graphology. In addition, he cites, inter alia, the case of Spencer v.

Humphries v. McAuley

205 Ind. 469 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 27, 1933

destruction of all the papers pertaining to, and of all the ballots at, the October election, 1876, in Clinton township, in that event, we think, that the appellant might have shown by the oral testimony of each of the qualified … So in the instant case, the contestor having the bur *481 den of proof, it was his duty to establish by legal evidence that he received the highest number of votes cast for sheriff, and until he established by evidence for

McFadden v. Ross

93 Ind. 134 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 16, 1883

McFadden was, on the 26th day of March, 1880, by the Shelby Circuit Court, appointed administrator of the estate of Joseph Nichols, deceased, and that he lawfully qualified as such administrator; that James R. … When, therefore, the cause was submitted upon petition and answer, no proof was necessary to establish the allegations.of the petition.

Barnett v. State

100 Ind. 171 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 29, 1885

If an instruction may be thus separated into fractional parts, so that one portion may not limit and qualify, or extend and explain another portion, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to form an instruction that will … In the fifth instruction requested by appellant, the court was asked to charge the jury, that if the evidence established *180 an old grudge, or hostile declarations, on the part of appellant against the deceased, the jury

Hays v. Morgan

87 Ind. 231 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1882

But when he in the affidavit qualifies the general charges of bias and prejudice, by alleging the reasons which induced him to make them, and the reasons were that the judge had made a ruling and rendered a decision against … It was *236 clearly irrelevant and immaterial, but we do not see bow it could harm or benefit either party.

Raess v. Doescher

883 N.E.2d 790 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 8, 2008

Namie had not talked to the defendant; "is not qualified to render an opinion;" and that, as a consultant, "he does not render diagnoses or opinion." Id. … The trial court clearly understood the grounds for these objections and its previous rulings on admissibility. The transcript of the sidebar that en- sued seems to me to demonstrate that the trial court understood Dr.

Jones v. Angell

95 Ind. 376 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 14, 1884

It clearly and distinctly informed the jury that to defeat a recovery, for the cause mentioned, there must be a failure of proof as to one or more material allegations in both paragraphs, not one, of the complaint. … There was evidence establishing, or strongly tending to establish, the fact alluded to in the instruction.

Bieghler v. State

481 N.E.2d 78 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 31, 1985

The evidence above clearly establishes that Appellant entered the Millers' trailer with an intent to kill the Millers. … Juror Seright clearly and irrevocably stated from the outset that he was against the death penalty and could not vote for it under any circumstances.

Young v. State

266 Ind. 557 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 21, 1977

It was, for the most part, unsupportive of a claim of insanity, although it did contain the following concluding statements: “Summarily, Benny clearly is able at this time to comprehend the nature of the charges against him … Both witnesses qualified as experts by reason of their educational backgrounds and extensive experience in the area of psychological testing; and their testimony constituted substantial evidence of probative value.

Simmons v. State

504 N.E.2d 575 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 2, 1987

The witnesses here were properly qualified psychiatric social workers, specifically trained in treatment of rape victims. … Clearly this was probative evidence qualifying the exhibit for admission.

Stamps v. State

515 N.E.2d 507 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 24, 1987

Defendant next contends that the trial court erroneously refused to permit other testimony which should have qualified for admission under the Patterson rule. We disagree. … He argues that the State failed to establish the relevancy of the photograph in light of his offer to stipulate to the cause of death and identity of the victim. In Brown v.

Jones v. State

260 Ind. 463 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 25, 1973

It is only when the location of the exhibit is clearly established that we need concern ourselves with "probabilities" as the majority states. … The testimony leaves us without any information as to where it was and the failure to clearly establish the location at all times is a per se failure to establish a sufficient chain of custody.

Vandalia Railroad v. LaFayette & Logansport Traction Co.

175 Ind. 391 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 28, 1911

Appellee’s demurrer to the sixth ground of exception was sustained, and final judgment was rendered confirming and establishing appellee’s right to construct, maintain and operate its railroad across the tracks and right … The substantial right is the right to take private property by compulsory proceedings, and the manner of acquiring the property is clearly under legislative control. 1 Lewis, Emi *396 nent Domain. (3d ed.) §378.

Ajabu v. State

693 N.E.2d 921 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 6, 1998

In requiring a showing that the defendant committed the murder by “intentionally” killing the victim, the General Assembly therefore clearly mandated a higher degree of mental culpability than that permitted in Tison . … Despite testifying under a grant of use immunity, when called to the witness stand Walls refused to answer any questions about the events surrounding the murders.

Shook Heavy & Environmental Construction Group v. City of Kokomo

632 N.E.2d 355 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 5, 1994

Allowing unsuccessful bidders to seek injunctive relief when statutory procedures are not adhered to clearly would further this goal. … Clearly an unsuccessful bidder has no common law cause of action against the party soliciting bids if another bidder is chosen.

Shields v. State

149 Ind. 395 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 3, 1897

Robinson by appellant shows clearly that he was examined, not only as to his knowledge of the facts of the case, but also as a medical expert, the State therefore was entitled to cross-examine him as such, not only concerning … It follows, therefore, under the established rule that the instructions are to be considered as a whole, that said instruction, when so considered, was not erroneous.

Bissell v. Wert

35 Ind. 54 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1871

It is well settled, both by authority and on principle, that the evidence offered was clearly inadmissible. The general rule is, that witnesses must speak to facts, and that mere opinions are not admissible. … It seems to be established law that in civil as well as in criminal cases, a party cannot be found guilty of a crime, unless upon proof which excludes all reasonable doubt.