Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersind

1,680 results

1.02s

  • Andert v. Fuchs

    271 Ind. 627 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 25, 1979

    properly directed a verdict in favor of the host-driver defendant, upon evidence that he operated his automobile at a speed of from 50 to 60 miles per hour on a “blacktop” surfaced street in a “drizzling rain” and entered a clearly … Saucerman and other cases, was qualified in Clouse, etc. v.

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Vail v. Jones

    31 Ind. 467 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1869

    Y. 191 , under a similar statute to our own, that “a counter-claim, when established, must in some way qualify or must defeat the judgment to which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled.” … This provision (if needed for that purpose) clearly saves to defendants in equitable actions the right to set up any matter in the. answer in the nature of a cross-complaint which under the former practice could have been

    Cited 9 timesPublished
  • Board of Commissioners v. Millikan

    207 Ind. 142 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 4, 1934

    limited and qualified, and a claimant for a refund of taxes wrongfully assessed and wrongfully paid must bring himself within the 1919 statute as limited and qualified by the proviso. … Our conclusion is that the right to recover taxes wrongfully assessed is prescribed by the statute and that this right is exclusive, and before appellees are entitled to a judgment they must bring themselves clearly within

    Cited 18 timesPublished
  • GKN Co. v. Magness

    744 N.E.2d 397 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 13, 2001

    And in reviewing the trial court’s factual findings and judgment, we will reverse only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. … Factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence does not support them, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by the factual findings or conclusions of law. Id.

    Cited 219 timesPublished
  • In Re Savage Credit Co. v. Talcott

    213 Ind. 228 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 11, 1938

    Talcott, Jr., was the duly qualified trustee of Schuyler L. … While it did not directly discuss the point herein presented, it did cause it to clearly appear that the provision of the statute just referred to applied to criminal contempt only.

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Myers v. State

    839 N.E.2d 1146 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 21, 2005

    On the contrary, the exception was established because of the mobility of automobiles in gen- eral."). … The information known to police clearly related to the vehicle to be searched, and there were significant indicators that it contained contraband.

    Cited 115 timesPublished
  • Williams v. Citizens Gas Co.

    206 Ind. 448 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 22, 1933

    questioned that the legislative branch of government of the various states of the United States has the power to regulate the conduct of all enterprises which are affected with a public interest. 1 *453 This proposition was clearly … Citizens Gas Co. et al. supra, discloses a final adjudication of the existence and validity of a public charitable trust sought to be established in this suit.

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Speckman v. City of Indianapolis

    540 N.E.2d 1189 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 6, 1989

    In both instances the employer bargains for an immunity from legal process for an act already committed. Speckman's settlement agreement provides independent consideration by releasing the City from a tort claim. … Supreme Court has said: To have a property interest in a benefit [such as a job] a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.

    Cited 38 timesPublished
  • Jensen v. State

    905 N.E.2d 384 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 30, 2009

    Under this test the court must first determine whether the legislature meant the statute to establish civil proceedings. Id. … But the foregoing "disabilitlies]l or restraint[s]" applied to Jensen even before his offense qualified him as a sexually violent predator.

    Cited 61 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Blair v. Gettinger

    230 Ind. 588 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 15, 1952

    The appellees offered testimony designed to establish appellant’s incompetence to teach the first and second grades, but such evidence was rejected. … The appellant says the administrative school officials have the exclusive right and power to make assignment of teachers to particular grades and subjects, and since the appellant did have a license which clearly entitled

    Cited 8 timesPublished
  • Diego Morales v. John Rust

    Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 6, 2024

    The strength and vitality of “established parties,” Elrod v. … But these choices do not reflect an “inherent” characteristic cognizable under our Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Johnson v. Schloesser

    146 Ind. 509 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 6, 1896

    While the opinion in that case contains some remarks by the learned judge who delivered it, favorable to appellee’s contention, yet such remarks were clearly obiter Jdictum. … The construction contended for renders so much of the section as makes it a lien against bona fide purchasers nugatory and meaningless; or rather qualifies the provision that it is a lien for ten years after its rendition

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • Doe v. Methodist Hospital

    690 N.E.2d 681 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1997

    I base this disagreement upon four grounds: (1) the issue was not raised by the parties; (2) the tort of public disclosure of private facts is clearly established in Indiana jurisprudence; (3) the provisions of the Indiana … The tort of invasion of privacy by the public disclosure of private facts is clearly established in Indiana jurisprudence.

    Questioned in part by St. John v. Town of Ellettsville, 46 F. Supp. 2d 834 (1999)Cited 70 timesPublished
  • Simpson v. State ex rel. Eisler

    179 Ind. 196 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 26, 1912

    The office of a proviso in a statute generally is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or to restrain its generality. 36 Cyc. 1161; 26 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 678; United States v. … When made the amount of the fee stands as established and out of reach of the authority of the city as though the law itself had specifically required the particular sum which the city has fixed to be *204 exacted by cities

    Cited 11 timesPublished
  • Young v. State Ex Rel. School City of Gary

    230 Ind. 315 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 5, 1952

    It shall be the established policy of the State of Indiana to assist local school corporations in making it possible for every child within such local school corporations to have access to such minimum foundation program. … The Legislature clearly intended that the .new salary schedule should first apply to the 1951-1952 school year and this intention is clearly indicated by the express provision that the first distribution under the 1951 Appropriation

    Cited 2 timesPublished
  • WellPoint, Inc. (f/k/a Anthem, Inc.) and Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, AIG Europe (U.K.) limited, New Hampshire Insurance Co.

    Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 22, 2015

    To qualify for coverage, Anthem's entire liability need not arise solely out of its claims handling activities. … A court may refuse to enforce a contract, however, that (1) contravenes a stat- ute, (2) clearly tends to injure the public in some way, or (3) is otherwise contrary to the de- clared public policy of this State.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Lambert v. State

    516 N.E.2d 16 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 15, 1987

    In the present case, the evidence is clear that the assailant's words clearly constituted the threat of use of deadly force. His threat to kill the victim clearly falls within the statutory definition. … When the defense attempted to cross examine her, the State made a general objection which the court sustained, pointing out that she had not been qualified as a person with knowledge regarding the purposes and uses of the

    Modified by Lambert v. State, 1989 Ind. LEXIS 83 (1989)Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Brown v. State

    480 N.E.2d 938 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 30, 1985

    Sufficiency of the evidence with reference to Count I to qualify as bodily injury to the victim. … The evidence clearly showed here that the robbery victim received from Defendant's gun a bump, red marks and pain for two or three days.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Randall v. State

    455 N.E.2d 916 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 17, 1983

    It is clearly demonstrated that Appellant created the difficult situation by his own acts. … Testimony induced as a response to the grant of use immunity is testimony given by a witness that is of no benefit to him or his purposes and is required of him with immunity from its use against him at a later time.

    Cited 50 timesPublished
  • Parks v. State

    59 L.R.A. 190 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 7, 1902

    The privileges and immunities clause of this amendment has no application to the denial that is complained of here. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 , 21 L. Ed. 394 ; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377 , 14 Sup. … The amendment of 1899 provides that the law shall not apply “to ány physician or surgeon who is legally qualified to practice in the state or territory in which he resides, when in actual consultation with a legal practitioner

    Cited 69 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.