Case law

Davison v. Williams

251 Ind. 448 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 4, 1968

So while this legislative minimum is conclusive criminally it need not be conclusive of liability or immunity in a civil case because a reasonable man might do more or less in the circumstances. … Its application would .clearly allow proof of excuse or justification in statutory negligence cases without pleading those matters specially.

Boyle v. State

105 Ind. 469 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 4, 1886

There is an essential difference between a statement denying a thing and one admitting the existence of a thing and qualifying its character. … Again, the instruction is to be considered in connection with those previously given, and they very clearly informed the jury that to constitute murder in the second degree the shooting must have been purposely and maliciously

Drummond v. State

467 N.E.2d 742 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 6, 1984

Worak-Scholz, who had been granted use immunity, was the State's sole eyewitness. … Appellant's expression of his intention to kill his codefendant is clearly probative on the question of motive.

Hamer v. Eberhart

216 Ind. 79 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 4, 1939

The number of the qualified remonstrators being less in number than the petitioners, the council adopted a resolution authorizing the bonds issued. … The findings of the court established the foregoing facts, and are not questioned in any manner. A motion for a new trial was not filed.

McIlhinny v. McIlhinny

24 L.R.A. 489 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 18, 1894

the deed the appellee took possession of the premises conveyed; that the defendant, John Merrill, is the John Merrill mentioned in the deed; that John Payne is now, and was before the beginning of the suit, the legal and qualified … It has long been established law that when used in a will the word “issue” may be a word of purchase or it may be a word of limitation, depending on the testator's intention as^ expressed in the context.

Greater Hammond Community Services, Inc. v. Mutka

735 N.E.2d 780 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 21, 2000

GHCS points to certain facts it believes qualify it for treatment as a governmental entity under this test. We examine these under the standard on appeal for summary judgment. … In World Productions, the Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether the Capital Improvement Board was a governmental entity immune from claims for punitive damages.

State Ex Rel. Indiana Department of Conservation v. Barber

246 Ind. 30 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 17, 1964

The testimony of the Department’s witnesses, all of whom were specially qualified in their field, reflected anything but capriciousness or arbitrariness in the Department’s determination to appropriate appellees’ land for … Other reasons for including the seventy-two acres belonging to appellees herein were clearly stated and based upon facts which were not challenged or refuted.

Woodruff v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration

964 N.E.2d 784 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 20, 2012

New Horizon, on the other hand, claims that the rules governing Medicaid administrative appeals apply only to qualified Medicaid providers; a status it no longer held. (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) … We presume, therefore, “that the legislature intended to change the law unless it clearly appears that the amendment was passed in order to express the original intent more clearly.” Id.; see also Ind.

Gallup v. Schmidt

154 Ind. 196 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 16, 1900

Gallup, a resident of the state of New Hampshire, the principal and residuary legatee, was qualified as executor in January, 1894, and March 5, 1894, filed an inventory showing a personal estate of $492,628.26. … The fact that there had been an omission to list all of his property for taxation, we think, was well established, beyond peradventure.

GREATER HAMMOND COMMUNITY SERV., INC. v. Mutka

735 N.E.2d 780 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 21, 2000

GHCS points to certain facts it believes qualify it for treatment as a governmental entity under this test. We examine these under the standard on appeal for summary judgment. … In World Productions, the Court of Appeals was called upon to decide whether the Capital Improvement Board was a governmental entity immune from claims for punitive damages.

United States Cement Co. v. Cooper

172 Ind. 599 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 28, 1909

If the general purpose of the legislation clearly appears from a study of all the parts, that purpose cannot be defeated or limited by the doctrine we are considering. Webber v. … The term “all” qualifies each class or genus of things here specified, and we necessarily must imply that nothing remains of either class ejnsdem generis for the general words of the phrase to embrace.

Keifer v. State

204 Ind. 454 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 23, 1933

It appears that upon direct examination the witness, a physician and surgeon, after qualifying as an expert upon the subject of the reaction of the muscles at the time of the death of a person as a result of gun shot wounds … was assumed as established and the witness was asked what preliminary facts, in his opinion as an expert, must have existed to establish the fact assumed.

Nave v. Flack

90 Ind. 205 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1883

It is contended that the word “accident” qualifies the instruction and makes it correctly express the law. We do not think so. … Knowledge is always an important matter for consideration, but it does not always establish contributory negligence.

Tinder v. Tinder

131 Ind. 381 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 21, 1892

The restrictive words in the deed before us are unquestionably clearer and stronger than was the qualifying word “ present ” in the deed construed in the case to which we have referred. … This was clearly not only the intention of the grantor, but it is the obvious meaning of the language.” In the case of Tharp v. Yarbrough, 79 Ga. 382 ( 11 Am. St.

Powers v. State

696 N.E.2d 865 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 8, 1998

To establish sudden heat, the defendant must show “sufficient provocation to engender ... passion.” Johnson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ind.1988). … Kyran’s crying did not constitute the provocation necessary to qualify defendant’s actions as “sudden heat.” See Patterson v.

Indiana Department of Revenue v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

969 N.E.2d 596 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 21, 2012

This Court extends cautious deference to decisions within the special expertise of the Tax Court, and we do not reverse unless the ruling is clearly erroneous. Id. … The Department insists that UPS is not subject to the premiums tax because it did not comply with the various provisions of the statute, see supra n. 4, and thus does not qualify for an exemption.

Bradley A. Estabrook v. Mazak Corporation

Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 2, 2020

inapplicable exception, Estabrook asks that we interpret the statute to include a further exception for a product that undergoes enough transformation—whether due to repair, refurbishment, or reconstruction—that it no longer qualifies … The other key provision is Subsection 34-20-3-2(f), which further establishes that Section 1 is a “repose period”—meaning that it does not extend a plaintiff’s time to sue but limits it.

Indiana State Highway Commission v. Curtis

704 N.E.2d 1015 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 18, 1998

These will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). The findings are clearly erroneous only when a review of the record leaves the appellate court firmly convinced a mistake has been made. … The Highway Commission was replaced by the Indiana Department of Transportation which was established in 1990. See Pub.L. No. 112— 1989, § 5, 1989 Acts 1140-47.

Randy Stahl v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 24, 1998

Because the circumstances under which this affidavit was given do not establish sufficient indicia of truthfulness, it does not qualify under the 803(15) exception to the hearsay rule. … If believed, this statement definitively establishes that the money was stolen.

Laporte Carriage Co. v. Sullender

165 Ind. 290 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 6, 1905

Section 7087b, supra, declares that “Uo child under fourteen years of age shall be employed in any manufacturing or mercantile establishment,” etc. … question is of such a character that it can not be properly guarded, can not be said to be a matter of defense to be proved by appellant; for, as previously said, a party who relies upon a statute must bring himself fully and clearly