Case law

Lemmon v. Harris

949 N.E.2d 803 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 28, 2011

Under this test, we first determine whether the Legislature meant the Act to establish civil proceedings. Id. If instead its intention was to impose punishment, then the inquiry ends. Id. … And, legislative intent cannot clearly be discerned from the location of the statutes within the Code.

City of Aurora v. West

22 Ind. 88 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1864

On the second argument, Lord Mansfield said: “ The general rule established ex comitate et jure gentium is, that the place where the contract is made, and not where the action is brought, is to be considered in expounding … Clearly, therefore, the law of England must be the rule, as the money was made payable here.” To the same effect in Indiana. The State Bank v. Bowers, 8 Blackf. 72 ; Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33 : Rose et al. v.

State ex rel. Stallard v. White

82 Ind. 278 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1882

The first rests upon well established rules, either prescribed by law or sanctioned by usage, from which the right to admission is to be determined. … It is clearly within the power of the trustees, and of the faculty when acting presumably, or otherwise, in their behalf, to absolutely prohibit any connection between the Greek fraternities and the university.

Basham v. State

422 N.E.2d 1206 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 8, 1981

Such evidence clearly supports the ruling of the trial court. See Jackson, 411 N.E.2d at 611 ; Feller v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 541, 544-45 , 348 N.E.2d 8, 12-13 . … ISSUE V Defendant submits that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of establishing insanity upon him.

Wellpoint, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA

29 N.E.3d 716 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 22, 2015

To qualify for coverage, Anthem’s entire liability need not arise solely out of its claims handling activities. … A court may refuse to enforce a contract, however, that (1) contravenes a statute, (2) clearly tends to injure the public in some way, or (3) is otherwise contrary to the declared public policy of this State.

John E. Moriarity and Mae E. Moriarity v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources

113 N.E.3d 614 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 3, 2019

To the contrary, we have a well-established rule to deal with these situations: “[u]ndefined words . . . are given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning.” … It clearly knows how to define words for the Act, see 312 Ind. Admin. Code 1-1- 21(a) (2018), http://www.in.gov/legislative/iac/T03120/A00010.PDF?

Frye v. State

197 Ind. 615 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 11, 1926

While it does not clearly appear from the evidence, yet it may be inferred, that the still in question, when seized, was on the real estate owned, controlled and in the possession of appellant’s father, and *619 at least … While this statute purports to confer upon such appointee “all the power of constables,” yet it is silent on the question of qualifying him as such officer.

Kelly v. Finney

207 Ind. 557 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 21, 1935

Section 1 of the 14th amendment provides as follows: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life … We think these cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, and the principles there involved are not controlling in this case.

State Ex Rel. Seal v. Superior Court of Knox County

221 Ind. 36 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 30, 1943

Dale Eby, regular Judge of the, Gibson Circuit Court, as special judge, and he qualified as such. … That a writ of prohibition will issue from this court under such circumstances is clearly established by the cases cited and many others that might be cited. The temporary writ heretofore issued is made permanent.

Hursh v. Hursh

99 Ind. 500 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 9, 1885

The court below erred in the appointment of a receiver, because the insolvency of the defendant Philip Hursh was not established by the proof. “3. … Adhering to these decisions, and applying to this case the rule established by them in this State, we can not consider the sufficiency of the complaint.

Serrano v. State

266 Ind. 126 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 31, 1977

State, (1972) 259 Ind. 166 , 285 N.E.2d 279 , ‘clearly establish the principle that absent some form of waiver or stipulation by the parties the results of polygraph examinations administered to witnesses or parties are not … The defendant does not challenge the establishment of the corpus delicti.

State Ex Rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n. v. Miller

770 N.E.2d 328 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2002

Compliance with the new rules established by the Board will avoid unlicensed practice of law. … We agree that the first challenge clearly involved questions of law.

Maddox v. State

230 Ind. 92 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 4, 1951

The court says at page 319: *107 “If, after the unsuccessful attempt on the part of the State to establish that the juror was disqualified by reason of relationship, the court had not allowed the State to challenge or remove … There is no right to immunity from one trial. The right to immunity from a second'prosecution for the same offense is a fundamental right which is firmly embedded both in the common law and in our constitution.

Long, Mayor v. Kinney

210 Ind. 192 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 20, 1936

It qualifies and limits that which preceded. Board of Commissioners v. Millikan (1934), 207 Ind. 142 , 190 *197 N. E. 185; City of Gary v. Gary, etc., Cemetery Assn. (1917), 186 Ind. 446 , 116 N. E. 741 ; Murray v. … The resolution of the common council of the city of Peru, adopted September 1, 1933, set out in the appellees’ complaint and established by the proof given at the trial, clearly shows that the city of Peru did have a board

State ex rel. Indianapolis Water Co. v. Boone Circuit Court

261 Ind. 583 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 6, 1974

Instructions 10E and 7E both clearly indicate that the difference between the book cost and the sale price shall be credited as surplus. … As an administrative agency, it is pre *588 sumed to be qualified by knowledge and experience to perform this function.

Matter of Brown

636 N.E.2d 1249 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 29, 1994

The facts recited here clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent violated Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(c) by failing to personally pay the discovery expenses the Jay Circuit Court ordered him to pay. … Although restitution is occasionally considered a mitigator, forced or compelled restitution, such as that occurring after disciplinary proceedings are initiated, does not qualify as such.

Reynolds v. State, ex rel. Titus

61 Ind. 392 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1878

In this position counsel are so clearly right, in our opinion, that we deem it unnecessary to cite their authorities in its support. … That this is so is abundantly and clearly shown, we think, by the statute of this State on the subject of elections.

Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division

271 Ind. 233 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 18, 1979

Neutral objective standards must be met to qualify for compensation. In Lewis v. … This situation is clearly distinguishable from our recent case, Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., (1978) Ind., 380 N.E.2d 1225 , in which the Indiana Supreme Court found Ind.

Hanley v. STATE, DEPT. OF CONSERVATION

234 Ind. 326 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 21, 1954

From Colonial times it has been established legislative policy to grant to veterans of certain wars or campaigns material benefits in appreciation of their military services. … Unless an act is clearly unconstitutional, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.

Douglass v. State ex rel. Wright

31 Ind. 429 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1869

The same principle is clearly recognized in Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112, and in Allen v. McKean, 1 Sumner, 276. And so, in Boyter v. … Under these admitted facts, we are not able to perceive any good conscience there would be in permitting the defendant to retain anything over a bare compensation, nor, in view of the well established class of decisions in