Case law

Cates v. McKinney

48 Ind. 562 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1874

Such declarations and expressions off *567 grief, no matter how or when made, if in the absence of the defendant, can not establish the contract. … The court should have so-framed or qualified the charge as to convey clearly to the j ury the understanding that the declarations, etc., of the plaintiff could only be considered as evidence of a promise on her part.

Miller v. Resler

172 Ind. 320 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 25, 1909

by the remonstrators by a preponderance of the evidence, and likewise the power of attorneys in fact, if challenged, must be established by the remonstrators. … The holding of the lower court on the question presented upon the filing with the auditor of the cards in controversy, authorizing the execution of the withdrawals, was, under the facts, clearly right. 10.

Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Northwest, Hawai'i, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, Inc.

Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 30, 2023

“A statute challenged under the Indiana Constitution stands before this Court clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.” Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. … There is likely a qualified right to bodily autonomy under Article 1, Section 1.

Hendershot v. State ex rel. Bennett

162 Ind. 69 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 28, 1904

term, assumed that the commissioners would do their duty, and elect at the time appointed, and that it was intended that the term should begin in about one month after election, if the *74 person elected should so soon qualify … We must have regard for the intention of the legislature in construing the law, and avoid giving it an effect that it clearly did not intend.

Greening v. State

198 Ind. 706 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 8, 1926

The facts stated in the affida- *714 vit properly pleaded might show another crime; but same is immaterial as the allegations therein establish the crime attempted to be charged. … Any words that express this idea or from which it can be clearly *718 inferred will be sufficient.

Marriage of Collier v. Collier

702 N.E.2d 351 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 4, 1998

The regulation clearly includes “modification” among the services provided by the Bureau and the attorneys with whom it contracts. … The explicit legislative directive to comply with federal requirements and thereby qualify for federal funding constitutes yet another persuasive reason to construe the statute as the State does, and as we do, to permit assistance

Family & Social Services Administration v. Robert E Saint

Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 23, 2025

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-MI-101 | April 23, 2025 Page 8 of 19  Here, neither party disputes that FSSA qualifies as a “public agency” and that the White Paper qualifies as a “public record … As such, we find FSSA has failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing the White Paper was an “intra-agency” record under the deliberative material exception.

State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth, School Trustee of Monroe School Township

122 Ind. 462 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 13, 1890

The establishment of public highways being a function of government, no person has a right to establish such a highway without the consent of government; and hence in prohibiting unlicensed persons from keeping a ferry the … So the government, being charged with the duty of establishing and maintaining ferries, has the exclusive right; to establish them, and may prohibit any one it chooses from doing so, because the establishment of a ferry without

Stroud v. State

809 N.E.2d 274 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 25, 2004

The defendant's counsel was not qualified to represent Lowrimore in a capital case and so the court, finding an emergency, vacated the original trial date in order to appoint qualified attorneys under Criminal Rule 24. … R. 24 qualified attorneys were not available who could have prepared Stroud's trial adequately." (Br. of Appellant at 37.)

Manlove v. State

250 Ind. 70 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 16, 1968

establish the crime.” … If the evidence merely tends to establish a suspicion of guilt, or the mere opportunity to do so it is clearly insufficient to sustain the conviction. Easton v. State, supra and Baker v.

State of Indiana v. John Lombardo

Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 3, 2000

[7] Four federal circuits have held that the Federal Wiretap Act does not immunize interspousal wiretaps. See Heggy v. … Two federal circuits have held that Title III does immunize interspousal wiretaps. See Simpson v.

Almodovar v. State

464 N.E.2d 906 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 22, 1984

We now find that Blake's testimony was admissible because it clearly was about what he personally had observed of the crime. … Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the State properly qualified Blake as an expert witness.

Moore v. Korty

11 Ind. 341 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 11, 1858

Indeed, it has been repeatedly decided that “a receipt may be explained, qualified, or even contradicted, by any evidence competent to establish a fact.” … In view of both instructions, we are of opinion that the jury may have been misled by the former, which seems to us to be clearly erroneous. Per Curiam.— The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.

State ex rel. Nebeker v. Sutton

99 Ind. 300 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 11, 1884

Relator asks for a judgment declaring and establishing his rights to the office as against the claims of appellee. … If, in this case, the record had been the ■only evidence, it would clearly have made a prima faeie case in favor of appellee, whom it shows to have been elected superintendent of schools.

James v. State

643 N.E.2d 321 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 29, 1994

It is true that the State alleged and proved two prior separate felony convictions of appellant in order to establish the habitual offender status. … However, if the evidence presented in fact does not qualify as mitigating, the trial court is not required to explain that the factor does not exist. Fugate v. State (1993), Ind., 608 N.E.2d 1370 ; Hammons v.

State v. Banks

48 Ind. 197 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1874

a wife can not be found guilty of larceny for stealing the goods of her husband, and that is upon the principle that the husband and wife are, in the-eye of the law, one person; but this rule is properly and reasonably qualified … She thereby determines her quality of wife, and her property in her husband’s goods ceases.” *199 We have made a careful examination of the authorities, and they very clearly establish the following propositions: 1.

J.Q. v. D.R.L.

525 N.E.2d 298 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 6, 1988

John Harris, Larry Salloway, and Irene Yankauskas qualified as expert witnesses. … Because of our determination that the evidence clearly demonstrated good cause to the contrary, we conclude that the adoptive placement preferences, including established tribal preferences, are not binding under the facts

STATE BD. OF REG. FOR PROF. ENG. v. Eberenz

723 N.E.2d 422 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 10, 2000

Indiana Code ' 25-31-1-12(a) (1993) establishes the minimum evidence, or Arequirements for registration,@ that must be demonstrated by an applicant in order to qualify for registration as a professional engineer … Eberenz=s argument clearly stands or falls on the meaning of the term Aapplicant@ as it is used in subsection (c).

Mumford v. State

514 N.E.2d 624 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 5, 1987

In Lottie, this Court found that the evidence amounted only to "grounds for suspicion" and the identifying testimony "equivocal and qualified," with significant differences between the assailant and the defendant. … Despite defendant's claims of omitted unique identification characteristics, we find that the probative evidence was clearly sufficient to enable the jury to determine that defendant was the victim's assailant.

Graham v. State

441 N.E.2d 1348 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 29, 1982

The evidence in this case clearly supports the jury’s inference that defendant committed the burglary. … All of these exhibits were connected to defendant by the testimony of a police officer, a qualified fingerprint identification expert, who compared the fingerprints in state’s exhibit No. 1, which were known to be defendant