Case law

Noel v. State

247 Ind. 426 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 14, 1966

The context in which the words in the indictment is used reveals clearly, and in our opinion, definitely its meaning. … This rule would not apply to a defendant himself unless he took the stand and waived his constitutional immunity against self-incrimination.

Williams v. State

525 N.E.2d 1238 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 8, 1988

Williams characterizes the State’s alleged conduct as a grant of immunity. … Clearly, the instruction was erroneous, and it compromised the reliability of the jury’s recommendation.

Lutz, Atty.-Gen. v. Arnold, Atty. Tr.

208 Ind. 480 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 29, 1935

Selection, on’ the contrary, is the determination of the taxable class, and unless impressed with such arbitrary methods of classification as violate the equal privileges and immunities provision of the Constitution, it is … In my opinion the appeal brief of the State Board of Tax Commissioners clearly establishes' that “rate,” as used in section 1, article X, was intended to mean and, reasonably construed, must mean “mode” or “rule” or “method

Niehaus v. State

265 Ind. 655 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 25, 1977

Clearly, the evidence was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they were. … Over objections that the witness did not qualify as an expert in the area and the further objection that the reliability of the area of claimed expertise was not sufficiently established to permit the expression of an opinion

Horseman v. Keller

841 N.E.2d 164 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 31, 2006

Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous. … Eligible voters may qualify to cast absentee ballots when faced with certain enumerated circumstances that make it impossible to vote at their polling places on Election Day.

Lowery v. State

547 N.E.2d 1046 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 8, 1989

The defendant further concedes that no jurors were excused for am swering affirmatively to death-qualifying questions. … produces juries somewhat more ‘conviction-prone’ than ‘non-death-qualified’ juries,” but declared nonetheless, that “the Constitution does not prohibit the States from ‘death qualifying’ juries in capital cases.” 476 U.S

Latshaw v. State ex rel. Latshaw

156 Ind. 194 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 19, 1901

It is next insisted that the evidence does not support the complaint, as it fails to establish that the defendant entered into the marriage in question to escape a criminal prosecution. … We have examined the evidence and it clearly and beyond controversy, we think, establishes all of the material facts alleged in the complaint.

Logan v. Hite, Admr.

214 Ind. 233 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 22, 1938

The widow qualified as administratrix of her husband’s estate. She died on March 27, 1935, and the appellee Edgar E. Hite was duly appointed and qualified as her successor. … Actions of this character are clearly recognized under our practice (Rodebaugh et al. v. Rodebaugh [1923], 79 Ind. App. 324 , 138 N.

Indiana Department of Revenue v. Glendale-Glenbrook Associates

429 N.E.2d 217 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 21, 1981

They protested this finding on the basis that another section of the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act specifically exempted qualified insurance companies from gross income tax liability as they were taxed under a separate section … It is a well-established principle that when this court is *219 called upon to construe words in a single section of a statute, it must construe them with due regard for all other sections of the act and with due regard for

City of Teree Haute v. Hudnut

112 Ind. 542 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 1, 1887

It was objected that this testimony was incom *550 petent because the witness was not shown to be an expert qualified to give an opinion. … The witness was, as the evidence shows, one of the owners of the mill, engaged in operating it, and had knowledge of the structure and its injury, and we regard this as prima faeie sufficient to qualify him.

French v. State

547 N.E.2d 1084 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 18, 1989

We fail to see how this qualified as incompetency of counsel. In fact, a review of the record clearly demonstrates that *1088 counsels (two had been appointed to represent appellant) were adequately prepared for trial. … This Court will not hold counsel ineffective on matters that are clearly a matter of trial strategy. VanEvey v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 245 .

Naanes v. State

143 Ind. 299 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 10, 1896

Her counsel insists that the action of the trial court in admitting in evidence these proceed *304 ings was clearly erroneous and prejudicial to the rights of the appellant. … also be said that a person found, upon the inquiry of a commission, not to be a fit subject for admission, as a patient, for treatment, into an insane asylum, may, nevertheless, be of such mental unsoundness, as to have immunity

Bennett v. Richmond

960 N.E.2d 782 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 31, 2012

McCabe had not had any specific “education or training relevant to determining the etiology of brain injuries,” Bennett, 932 N.E.2d at 709, he clearly demonstrated his knowledge of how a brain injury might result from the … The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden of establishing the reliability of the scientific principles on which it is based. Kubsch, 784 N.E.2d at 921 (citation omitted).

Matter of Adoption of TRM

525 N.E.2d 298 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 6, 1988

John Harris, Larry Salloway, and Irene Yankauskas qualified as expert witnesses. The three qualified experts testified that J.Q.' … Because of our determination that the evidence clearly demonstrated good cause to the contrary, we conclude that the adoptive placement preferences, including established tribal preferences, are not binding under the facts

State ex rel. McGuyer v. Huff

172 Ind. 1 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 19, 1909

show an agreement between relator and Armstrong by which some consideration was to move to relator, for resigning, in order that Armstrong might be appointed, it wholly failed, and the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish … This was unauthorized by, and unknown to, relator, and was clearly inadmissible against him upon any theory of the cause or of the law.

Deal v. State

140 Ind. 354 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 26, 1895

State, 53 Ind. 420 , is the first case cited as establishing the contrary doctrine. … Very clearly it discredits the testimony of the appellant.

Landes v. Walls

160 Ind. 216 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 11, 1903

The complaint sets out numerous matters that it is claimed were irregular in the enactment of said ordinance ' It is disclosed that appellants immediately qualified upon the making of said pretended appointment, and that … The authorities clearly establish that courts of equity will not interfere to determine questions concerning the appointment or election of public officers or their title to office. Markle v.

Manor v. State ex rel. Stoltz

149 Ind. 310 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 26, 1898

The question is, do the facts entitle the relator to the warrant for the money in the county treasury belonging to the township, of which, as the facts apparently establish, he is the trustee? … Some other questions are argued by counsel for appellant, but these in effect are decided by the conclusions herein reached, and as the judgment is clearly right under the evidence, they merit no further consideration.

Thomas v. State

436 N.E.2d 1109 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 30, 1982

lack of credibility. (2) Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts, in that the alibi evidence was not rebutted and prosecution testimony was not credit-worthy. (3) Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish … It is Defendant’s claim that the evidence clearly disclosed that the oath would not deter them from lying and that they were, therefore, not qualified or qualifiable as witnesses.

King v. S.B.

837 N.E.2d 965 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 23, 2005

As to non-statutory matters already governed by common law, modification is appropriate to reflect clearly established, widespread social changes, not to advance or favor one movement over another. … It does not constitute established social change.