Case law

Opinions from 1658 to today.

Filtersind

1,680 results

0.92s

  • Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railroad v. Board of Commissioners

    192 Ind. 1 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 29, 1922

    to be graded, drained and paved” any such new highway, or “to .cause to be straightened, graded, drained and improved” any such highway already established, if such action was properly asked by fifty or more qualified petitioners … And that neither the viewers nor the board of commissioners has any power to lay nut, establish or construct any improvement except as petitioned for by a sufficient number of properly qualified freeholders who are voters

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Gersh Zavodnik v. Irene Harper

    17 N.E.3d 259 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 30, 2014

     Require the litigant to state clearly and concisely at the beginning of a motion the relief requested. … A judge's exposure to evidence through judicial sources is generally insufficient to establish bias. The fact that a litigant has appeared before a judge in prior cases does not establish bias or prejudice.

    Cited 93 timesPublished
  • IN High School Athletic Assoc. v. Jason Carlberg

    Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1998

    (footnote: 6) It is clearly established that decisions of the IHSAA with respect to student-athletes constitute “state action” for purposes of federal and state constitutional review under the Equal Protection and the Privileges … and Immunities Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Thornton Ex Rel. Thornton v. Pender

    268 Ind. 540 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 20, 1978

    The clear implication of the Thorn-tons’ proposed duty to discover vehicles entering or about to enter a preferential highway goes well beyond the established duty to see that which is clearly visible. … The evidence established that large bushes obstructed the view of the driveway from the road except for the last several feet.

    Cited 78 timesPublished
  • Blackmon v. State

    455 N.E.2d 586 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 1, 1983

    The witness here was properly qualified as an expert witness. In fact, the trial judge required the state to establish the witness's expertise before allowing him to answer the question. … The state introduced five exhibits to establish that the defendant was an habitual offender.

    Cited 33 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Maxwell v. Dudley

    161 Ind. 431 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 20, 1903

    Dudley, the respondent, was the duly elected, qualified, and acting sheriff of Sullivan county, during the same period. … The complaint clearly counts upon an interest in the office of sheriff — that is, in the official franchise, acquired solely through the action of the mob in lynching appellee’s prisoner.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • State Ex Rel. Rose v. Worden, Special Judge

    216 Ind. 83 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 6, 1939

    He afterwards qualified and assumed jurisdiction over said cause. … Worden, qualified on March 3, 1939, and set the case for trial for April 3, 1939.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • SCHEPP v. Evansville Television, Inc.

    236 Ind. 472 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 3, 1957

    He thereupon gave bond and qualified as required by law. … Felker also gave bond and qualified as required by the law under which he claimed to act, appointed deputies, and proceeded to take steps to enforce the oil inspection law.

    Cited 3 timesPublished
  • Garcia v. State

    271 Ind. 510 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 11, 1979

    The result would be the same under the Draft if the only co-conspirator established a defense of renunciation under Section 5.03(6). … Clearly “any reason,” as recited therein, includes the absence of criminal culpability on the part of a co-conspirator — including a sole co-conspirator.

    Cited 27 timesPublished
  • Hoy v. State, ex rel. Buchanan

    168 Ind. 506 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 28, 1907

    But where the relator holds a prima facie and uncontested title to the office, or his title has been adjudicated upon and finally established by a competent tribunal, a writ of mandate may be issued to put him in possession … within the time allowed by the indemnity act, which, among other things, granted immunity for the omission to take the Lord’s Supper within the time prescribed. 5. 6. 7.

    Cited 34 timesPublished
  • State ex rel. Clawson v. Bell

    169 Ind. 61 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 8, 1907

    Under the facts the relator falls far short of establishing any legal right to or interest in the office. … Clute was declared elected, and, having qualified as required by law, entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office.

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Resnover v. State

    507 N.E.2d 1382 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 27, 1987

    The determination of appellant's culpability rests not so much on an inference that he actually fired the fatal shot or shots but rather on the clearly established fact that he used deadly force to resist arrest. … After the State declined his request to grant Palmer immunity, appellant made his offer to prove.

    Cited 17 timesPublished
  • Stepp v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division

    521 N.E.2d 350 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 4, 1988

    In a discharge case, the burden of establishing just cause initially rests with the employer. … She was clearly required to perform a task which she refused to do. The evidence most favorable to the Laboratory reveals no waiver occurred. The Review Board is in all things affirmed.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Indiana Alcohol and Tobacco Commission v. Spirited Sales, LLC

    79 N.E.3d 371 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 21, 2017

    In addition to our well-established statutory interpretation precedent, Indiana’s alcohol statutes provide additional interpretive guidance. … The denial does not violate Indiana’s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause.

    Cited 46 timesPublished
  • Rogers v. Calumet National Bank

    213 Ind. 576 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 18, 1938

    That *581 since this action is prosecuted under the Declaratory Judgments Act, and, not by way of quo loarranto, the title to the offices was not in issue, and that it was sufficient for the members of the new board to establish … It appears from the stipulation joined in by all the parties that the members of the new board “were duly qualified as provided by law and each qualified according to Senate Bill 176 of the Acts of the General Assembly of

    Cited 19 timesPublished
  • Cameron v. State

    270 Ind. 185 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 3, 1979

    The law is clear that final instructions are not to be orally qualified, modified, or in any manner orally explained to the jury by the trial judge. Ind. Code § 35-1-35-1 (Burns 1975). … The events of the present case, recited and discussed above, clearly show such reversible error to have occurred here. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Pabey v. Pastrick

    816 N.E.2d 1138 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 6, 2004

    As to the Deliberate Actions ground, the legislature could not reasonably have intended to immunize obviously corrupt elections where the resulting distortion of an election outcome could not be precisely traced and mathematically … And this objective was clearly achieved. Given the exceptional facts and circumstances of this case, any other conclusion is inconceivable.

    Cited 40 timesPublished
  • Tinkle v. Wallace

    167 Ind. 382 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 27, 1906

    The alleged bribery was committed in appellant’s behalf and in his name, and under such proved circumstances as clearly justified the court in receiving the evidence at the time it was offered. People v. … This finding is clearly sufficient to uphold the judgment rendered, and appellant is in no position to complain because the court did not find and adjudge that some opposing candidate was entitled to the office, if it were

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Males v. State

    199 Ind. 196 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 30, 1927

    The word “if,” which qualifies the first clause, was intended to and does qualify the second clause to which objection is made. The language did • not bind the consciences of the jurors. … It is not the law that a defendant is presumed to be at fault, by being the aggressor, until it is established as a fact- beyond a reasonable doubt that he was at fault.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Niehaus v. State

    265 Ind. 655 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 25, 1977

    Clearly, the evidence was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they were. … Over objections that the witness did not qualify as an expert in the area and the further objection that the reliability of the area of claimed expertise was not sufficiently established to permit the expression of an opinion

    Cited 46 timesPublished

Ask Donna

Ask Donna

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.