Case law

Sharon Gill, on her own behalf and on behalf of the Estate of Gale Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc.

970 N.E.2d 633 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 25, 2012

Code § 32-30-1-5 (2004).5 Parsing the statute’s plain language indicates that a defendant is entitled to immunity un- der the statute only if four criteria are established. … Indi- ana trial courts may establish local rules for their own governance as long as the local rules do not conflict with the rules established by this Court or by statute. Ind.

State ex rel. Hargrave v. Reitz

62 Ind. 159 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 15, 1878

In section 38 of the act to establish courts of common pleas, 2 R. … The doctrine of the case last cited is clearly right, and is decisive of the case at bar. Section 3 of the salary act of March 10th, 1873, is constitutional and valid in all its provisions.

Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Boney

3 L.R.A. 435 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 6, 1889

Thereupon, in August, 1885, this suit was instituted by Boney in order to establish his claim against the appellant railroad company, and to obtain the decree of the court directing the sale of the road-bed constructed by … Moreover, the court said, in substance, that it would be clearly violative of the policy of the State under whose laws the railroad company had been organized, to permit a private individual *507 to seize and appropriate,

Michael Ackerman v. State of Indiana

51 N.E.3d 171 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 5, 2016

[T]here is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.” Id. at 313-14. 22 “indicia of solemnity.” … Eisele was a legally qualified physician, and he performed the autopsy in question on W.W. (Tr. Exhib. at 25.) Dr.

State ex rel. McGregor v. Cooprider

96 Ind. 279 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 18, 1884

We are of opinion that the court clearly erred in sustaining the appellee’s demurrer to each paragraph of the alternative writ of mandate. … It was shown by the relator, in each paragraph of the alternative writ, that he had established the validity of his claim against Harrison School Township, of which township the appellee was the trustee, by the judgment of

Collins v. State

192 Ind. 86 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 2, 1921

D. 1918, duly qualified and gave bond, and then and there duly entered upon the discharge of the duties of his said office as the successor of said Cecil B. … The statute now makes the act of omission the conversion, and the crime is established by proving a failure to pay over.

Delarosa v. State

938 N.E.2d 690 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 21, 2010

Cassada was granted ―use immunity‖ to testify.3 Cassada testified that sometimes in the fall of 2006, Payne began making plans with Lucio to kill Rebecca to get full custody of their son, and he gave Lucio a key … The trial court found that Delarosa qualified for sentences of life without parole (LWOP) for the murder counts, and imposed consecutive LWOP sentences.

Felker v. Caldwell

188 Ind. 364 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 25, 1919

one occupying the office under a claim of right until the former shall have established his title in an action at law. … The question involved in this latter case was clearly for the law side of the court.

Edward Zaragoza v. Wexford of Indiana, LLC

Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 25, 2024

And, applying our well-established summary- judgment standard, we find conflicts in the evidence that require us to reverse the trial court. … In any case, trying topical medications before immune-system drugs, the court concluded, aligned with the “treatment protocol.” Id. at 636–37.

Langley v. State

256 Ind. 199 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 22, 1971

This is not to say that a petitioner must first establish the fact that no waiver has occurred in relation to a particular error from which relief is sought in order to obtain a hearing. … The law is clearly against Richardson on his first contention.

George Kraft Co. v. Heller

188 Ind. 612 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 12, 1919

entered an order declaring and appointing appellant George Kraft Company receiver of the stock of goods so purchased from the Independent Five and Ten Cent Stores of New York for the benefit of plaintiff, and directing it to qualify … took the steps provided by the act in conformity with its terms, the court can say as a matter of law that the purchaser had no intent to defraud the creditors of the seller, and that his title to the goods acquired is immune

Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, Lodge No. 255

521 N.E.2d 678 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 15, 1988

The percentage of income (2.8) given as charitable donations can hardly be claimed to cloak the appellee with charitable immunity. … The wording of the statute clearly did not apply to appellee's situation. The taxing authorities simply were not following the statute in that instance.

Richmond Baking Co. v. Department of Treasury

215 Ind. 110 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 1, 1939

Clearly the Legislature possessed the constitutional authority to classify upon that basis. The highways are public property. … The state may establish regulations and impose license fees as-compensation for the use of the hiyhway, based upon load per axle or carrying capacity. Hicklin v. Coney (1933), 290 U. S. 169, 173 , 54 S. Ct. 142 , 78 L.

Allgire v. State

575 N.E.2d 600 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 21, 1991

Phipps was not sufficiently qualified to give expert testimony on that subject. Appellant then made a lengthy offer to prove and moved that the court qualify Dr. … Defense counsel also established that Dr.

Kelso v. Cook

184 Ind. 173 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 5, 1916

Any person who will be a qualified elector at the election for which such primary is being held, whose name does not appear on such book of registration, shall be entitled to vote if he shall make affidavit that he is a qualified … Section 23 of our Bill of Rights (Constitution, Art. 1) prohibits the granting to a citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, on the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.

Trustees of Indiana University v. WILLIAMS

252 Ind. 624 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 14, 1969

However, we are not in a position to say that appellant’s witnesses are any better qualified, or more expert in appraising the valué of real estate than appellees’ witnesses. … Therefore, the testimony was clearly not hearsay. Judgment affirmed. *632 DeBruler, C.

Armstrong v. Board of Commissioners

4 Blackf. 208 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1836

The admission is qualified by the suggestion, that if a change be made, the act authorising it must provide an indemnity to the appellants, who, it is contended, have vested rights based upon contract. … These authorities likewise establish, that where a law creates a contract, and absolute rights are vested under it, such rights cannot be divested by a repeal of that law.

Allen v. Pavach

263 Ind. 574 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 7, 1975

two classes (individual-insurance company) to sell bail bonds; b) Arbitrarily establishing different standards for the two classes established which must be met before they may sell bail bonds; c) Arbitrarily establishing … Not only has the philosophy of Adams been abandoned, but also this Court almost 15 years ago expressly pointed to another *581 opinion of this Court as having ‘clearly undermined’ Adams.

State Ex Rel. McGonigle v. Madison Circuit Court

244 Ind. 403 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 21, 1963

“[A] statute on the books at any given time, not judicially declared unconstitutional or invalid, 1 is presumed to be valid 2 until the contrary clearly appears; 3 . . .” I. L. E. … which time territory formerly outside the city can be either rearranged or re-established within the city for election purposes.

Canfield v. Sandock

563 N.E.2d 526 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 27, 1990

Clearly, none of this information has the slightest causal or historical connection to the condition in issue nor any possible relevance to the trial of this cause. … It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly appears to the [trial] court that he is mistaken. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 , 95 L.Ed. at 1124 .