Case law

Linda Gierek v. Anonymous 1

Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 9, 2025

The legislature clearly knows how to eliminate—and, in fact, has eliminated—this procedural device in other contexts. … In other words, claims not clearly subject to the act must be excluded from its coverage, not included.

Peak v. State

240 Ind. 334 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 11, 1960

Every statement that we have been able to find relating to the use of an assumed or fictitious name by a person in taking title to property is always qualified by the provision that it cannot be done for the purpose of fraud … To keep the issue clearly before us it must be kept in mind that appellant herein was charged by indictment with falsely attesting an acknowledgment of a deed under § 10-3603, supra, and that this is not an action against

State Ex Rel. McManamon v. Blackford Circuit Court

229 Ind. 3 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 1, 1950

It seems, however, to be pretty well established that a petition for a writ of error coram nobis asks for a new trial, but is in the nature of a civil action. State ex rel. Emmert v. … Instead of seeking ways to overthrow legislation, this court should presume legislation valid until it is clearly shown unconstitutional.

Williams v. State

669 N.E.2d 1372 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 7, 1996

authority to manage and control proceedings generally, and to supervise voir dire in particular, and to remain impartial and eschew advocacy, (#) the cherished role of the peremptory challenge in assuring the selection of a qualified … The defense indicated that it sought to strike prospective juror Brandys, a white female, because she didn't "understand[ ] that the defendant has the absolute right not to testify" and that "[slhe clearly indicated ... in

Schiro v. State

451 N.E.2d 1047 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 5, 1983

evidence presented had established historical facts constituting some mitigating circumstance. … Clearly, the statute merely authorizes the imposition of the death sentence, under such circumstances.

Ben-Yisrayl v. State

690 N.E.2d 1141 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1997

To qualify as fundamental error, the defendant bears the burden of proving that "the error [was] a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant." Hart v. … First, the aggravating circumstances were clearly proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Wireman v. State

432 N.E.2d 1343 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 26, 1982

The statutes further provide: "If at any time a jury shall not be drawn, then the clerk of the court shall select from among the properly qualified residents of such county, a jury for such term who shall be summoned and … There is no testimony to establish that fact, nor can the matter be resolved by resort to inference on the basis of the record before us.

Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Miller

141 Ind. 533 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 10, 1894

It has long been the established rule in this State that an exception to the conclusions of law stated on a special finding of facts admits that the facts have been fully and correctly found. Hartman v. … When the case is one in which all the facts *554 can be presented to the jury, then no opinion can be given, because the jury are as well qualified as the witness to form a conclusion.

Dowdle v. Central Brick Co.

206 Ind. 242 · Indiana Supreme Court · Mar 6, 1934

These options, under a provision contained therein, were renewed from time to time until finally exercised, the exact number of times is not clearly shown. Neither Mr. Cowles nor Mr. … The Southern Indiana Clay Products Company, being cause No. 7249, by which complaint, the Uhl Pottery Company sought to establish and quiet title to an easement across certain property owned by the Southern Indiana Clay Products

Maxey v. State

251 Ind. 645 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 20, 1969

There is authority to the effect that a third party can not waive another person's constitutional immunity against unreasonable search and seizures. C.f., Dalton v. State *650 (1952), 230 Ind. 626 , 105 N.E.2d 509 . … It is well-established in Indiana that the use of a deadly weapon against an unarmed person in a manner likely to produce death is sufficient evidence *656 from which to conclude that malice existed. Sparks v.