Case law

Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey

178 Ind. 258 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 16, 1912

The theory of a complaint must be determined from its general tenor and character; that is, on the theory most clearly outlined by the leading averments. State, ex rel., v. Scott (1908), 171 Ind. 349, 353, 354 , 86 N. … This instruction is criticised, (1) because the court did not qualify “use” by the word “excessive”. This criticism is untenable.

Flying Squadron Foundation v. Crippen

201 Ind. 482 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 4, 1930

belongs to that class of cases in which, on appeal, this court is required to consider and weigh the evidence, and, if in the performance of such judicial duties, the judgment is not fairly supported by the evidence, or is clearly … In its introduction of the letters, it introduced specific letters which had been addressed to specific persons, but qualified the introduction of the letters as being of like tenor with the one introduced by Enquirer Printing

Matter of Briggs

502 N.E.2d 879 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 13, 1987

This Court appointed a second Hearing Officer and, upon Respondent’s objections, removed him and appointed the present Hearing Officer who qualified on February 24, 1982. … The Respondent was also charged with attempting to collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee, in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A) and (B).

Campbell v. City of Indianapolis

155 Ind. 186 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 29, 1900

The first section of this statute of 1871 provides that “In all cities of this State of 30,000 or more inhabitants, according to the United States census for the year 1870, there shall be elected, by the qualified electors … It is established by the decisions of this court heretofore cited that this proposition is not true.

Richey v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co.

176 Ind. 542 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 28, 1911

A. 787, that the second clause of the fourth subdivision of the act only qualifies the liability expressed in such clause. 2. The second clause of subdivision four is a declaration of the common-law liability. … Foland, supra, if a railroad employe in constructing a bridge is injured, and the railway is liable, and an employe of a private person doing the same work is injured, and there is no liability, the statute would clearly

John Haegert v. University of Evansville

977 N.E.2d 924 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 13, 2012

It was qualified by prohibiting entry “unless accompanied by security staff,” (Supp. … To the extent Haegert is asserting that his anecdotal file was used against him to establish a pattern of misconduct before the FPAC, we do not see the evidence the same way.

Michael Carr v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 24, 2026

To qualify as an eligible juror in a criminal case in the State of Indiana, a juror must be a citizen of the United States, at least eighteen years of age, a resident of the summoning county, be eligible to vote, meet certain … An error is fundamental error when the error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for

Crawford v. State

669 N.E.2d 141 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 28, 1996

Rule Crim p. 3 definition.[ [4] ] The use of "untried" as the qualifier for all three words supports this conclusion. … Clearly, the majority cannot be correct on this point. Such a requirement would simply afford the prosecution the means of avoiding the burdens of the Agreement, while enjoying the benefits of detainers.

Jones v. State

425 N.E.2d 128 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 2, 1981

Clearly the results of the test increased the likelihood that the bullets found in the defendant's pocket were from the same box as the bullet removed from the victim. … That is not to say that FBI Agent Riley was not a properly qualified expert witness on the subject.

Holmes v. State

671 N.E.2d 841 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 7, 1996

Furthermore, the trial court might well have added support for the finding by noting appellant's incriminating admissions made after the crimes, as well as the wounds he suffered to his hand in the attack, which showed clearly … Furthermore, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant was the more culpable of the two. The sentences were thus not disproportionate. Roche v. State, 596 N.E.2d 896 (Ind.1992). 12.

Kathryn Davidson v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 21, 2023

By establishing a system that apportions all liability and damages in the same lawsuit, the Act functionally requires plaintiffs to name all defendants in a single suit. … Davidson’s Monroe County action is clearly subject to the Act under this definition. And nothing in subsection 1(b) exempts the Monroe County action from its coverage.

Cooper Industries, LLC v. City of South Bend

899 N.E.2d 1274 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 22, 2009

It also held that the transaction qualifies as a de facto merger or as a “mere continuation” of the previous corporate enterprise. … The Proxy Statement also establishes that there was a continuity of shareholders between Studebaker and S-W. (Appellees‟ Br. at 4.)

Pennycuff v. State

745 N.E.2d 804 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 18, 2001

These references were sufficiently related to Pennycuff’s claim of cooperation to qualify as a rebuttal. … Long before the trial began it must have been obvious that the transcript was clearly in play and a subject of dispute.

State v. Kuebel

241 Ind. 268 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 31, 1961

In other words, does the statute deny the accused a reasonable opportunity of establishing a defense, excuse, or justification for the prohibited act? … It is a constitutional principle too long established to question. No right, constitutional, fundamental or otherwise, is absolute and unlimited in this society of ours.

Smith v. State

465 N.E.2d 1105 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 24, 1984

Defendant claims there was error in the voir dire of the jury because death qualifying questions were asked by the State for the purpose of rejecting prospective jurors who are not in favor of capital punishment. … In order to establish a conflict of interest such that ineffective representation of counsel resulted, a defendant must show that his counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and establish that this adversely

Todd v. State

229 Ind. 664 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 4, 1951

That opinion established the law of this case. … On the subject of the sanctity and conclusiveness of a final judgment in a criminal case this court has *692 spoken clearly and with emphasis.

Katelin Eunjoo Seo v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 2020

And if law enforcement wants to get into a smartphone for reasons other than prosecution, they can offer immunity to the device’s owner. See Doe I, 465 U.S. at 614–15. … Although the issue in this case is clearly one of great public importance and will surely recur with other defendants, it will not evade review.

State ex rel. Western Construction Co. v. Board of Commissioners

166 Ind. 162 · Indiana Supreme Court · Feb 21, 1906

In that case the facts were that in 1819 a majority of the qualified voters of Daviess county, Indiana, had, pursuant to statute, voted in favor of a proposition to subscribe for stock in a railroad company, and to issue … E. 913 , where it was said: “Complainants, by their own bill and proceedings under it, have established the rights of defendants which they now attempt to defeat. This, clearly, they can not do.” See, also, Kelly v.

City of Logansport v. Public Service Commission

202 Ind. 523 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 1, 1931

Braden, supra, it was held that a city had implied or inherent power, not only to light its streets and to establish works to produce the electric current for that purpose, but also, in connection therewith, to furnish its … The right to regulate public utility rates is a power vested in the state.It may be delegated to the municipality but such an *536 intent must clearly appear.

Ben-Yisrayl f/k/a Peterson v. State

Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 31, 1998

To qualify as fundamental error, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “the error [was] a substantial blatant violation of basic principles rendering the trial unfair to the defendant.” Hart v. … First, the aggravating circumstances were clearly proven beyond a reasonable doubt.