Case law

MATTHEW H THOMAS DAVIS v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · May 3, 2023

But then, contrary to the written agreement, the court qualified its statement by saying: The one exception is because you have a plea agreement that provides the court some discretion about where your sentence … App. 2008) (finding no valid waiver because the trial court clearly stated at the plea hearing that the defendant’s agreement allowed an appeal).

Woods v. State

547 N.E.2d 772 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 28, 1989

The evidence clearly justified the court in not holding a hearing, as it supported adequate competency. Clifford v. State (1984), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 536 . … The testimony of Officer Kleeman alone established corpus delicti, namely that Juan Plaeencia had died from a violent attack with a knife.

Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bedford Recycling, Inc.

Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 13, 2025

First, he believed the proposed use did not qualify because, as he had stated before, Bedford would not be contracted to remove the metal from residential or commercial areas. … The Monroe County Zoning Ordinance establishes eighteen zoning classifications. Some land uses for a zone are presumptively allowed.

Kalady v. State

462 N.E.2d 1299 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 10, 1984

A new jury is qualified to make the determinations necessary for a finding as to the habitual criminal status. Funk v. State, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1081 ; McMillan v. State, (1980) Ind., 409 N.E.2d 612 . … Therefore, the State’s contention is correct that the totality of the circumstances in this cause justified the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant did not sustain his burden to establish inadequate representation

Taylor v. State

840 N.E.2d 324 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 17, 2006

Finding that the evidence “clearly support[ed]” the jury’s conclusion that Taylor was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirmed Taylor’s conviction. Id. at 1047. … Because Taylor has failed to show that this affidavit “is not merely impeaching” and that “it will probably produce a different result at retrial,” the affidavit does not qualify as newly- discovered evidence, and the post-conviction

Richardson v. State

717 N.E.2d 32 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 1, 1999

Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994) (equal privileges and immunities); Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (1993) (free speech). Indeed, all of the opinions in this case tread this independent path. … These Indiana authorities find collateral estoppel notions to be constitutionally based, as Ashe clearly implied.

Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Co. v. Barker

169 Ind. 670 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jan 17, 1908

Barker, his widow, qualified as administratrix, and brought this action for the benefit of herself and children. … It is a well-established rule of pleading that a complaint for negligence against a railroad company must show by proper averments the violation of a duty owing to the plaintiff by the company, or by some one else for whose

Bellmore v. State

602 N.E.2d 111 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 29, 1992

Beginning January 1, 1992, we now require the appointment of two qualified attorneys to represent an indigent person where the death penalty is sought. Ind.Crim.R. 24(B). … The defendant concedes that each of these contentions have been clearly rejected to date. We decline his invitation to reconsider these decisions. 14.

State ex rel. Board of Commissioners v. Flynn

161 Ind. 554 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 18, 1903

This bond was duly approved by the board of commissioners of said county, and on the - day of November, 1894, Elynn, having been duly qualified, entered upon the discharge of his official duties, and continued to hold said … Tbe bond in suit is conditioned substantially in accordance with §7928 Burns 1901, §5842 Horner 1901, and we may again assert that, in order to establish a liability thereon in this action, tbe money in controversy must be

MATTHEW H THOMAS DAVIS v. State of Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 3, 2023

But then, contrary to the written agreement, the court qualified its statement by saying: The one exception is because you have a plea agreement that provides the court some discretion about where your sentence … App. 2008) (finding no valid waiver because the trial court clearly stated at the plea hearing that the defendant’s agreement allowed an appeal).

State of Indiana v. Tyson Timbs

Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 28, 2019

We accept the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Hitch v. State, 51 N.E.3d 216, 226 (Ind. 2016). … The historical foundation of in rem forfeitures places a limit on what property qualifies as an “instrumentality.” See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333 n.8.

Phillips v. State

441 N.E.2d 201 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 4, 1982

also informed Phillips that he would have the right to order into court evidence or witnesses in his favor, the right to require the State to prove the charge against him beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to have a qualified … Accordingly, we hold that the trial court committed no error by failing to state a reason for imposing upon Phillips an aggravated sentence besides clearly indicating in the record that the sentence was imposed pursuant to

State ex rel. Bingham v. Home Brewing Co.

182 Ind. 75 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 23, 1914

The judicial history of the State at least as far back as 1843 shows clearly that every action to forfeit corporate franchises has been instituted and prosecuted under statutory provisions and that when that part of the statutes … The office of a proviso in a statute is generally, either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify or to restrain its generality. Simpson v. State, ex rel. (1913), 179 Ind. 196 , 99 N. E. 980 .

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Estep

873 N.E.2d 1021 · Indiana Supreme Court · Sep 25, 2007

The $615,000 excess judgment was clearly not part of State Farm’s bargained-for risk based on a $50,000 consumer agreement. … Perkins was clearly the “owner” of any claim that may exist against State Farm.

Board of Commissioners v. O'Connor

137 Ind. 622 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 21, 1893

Shirley, 84 Ind. 546 , "he simply stated more fully and clearly than he had previously done” one fact in connection with his cause of action. … “The court instructs you that these allegations are *631 material as pleaded, and if the truth thereof has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff can not recover therefor in this action.”

Zainab Abbas, M.D. v. Hetep Bilal Neter-Nu

Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 26, 2025

This Court will only disturb a trial court’s ruling “if it amounts to an abuse of discretion, meaning the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or it is a misinterpretation … This Court has held that a qualified health-care provider is responsible for the payment of prejudgment interest as it is a collateral-litigation expense, even if payment would cause the health-care provider’s debt to exceed

Hugh David Reed v. Edward Reid Reid Machinery, Inc. North Vernon Drop Forge, Inc. Jennings Mfg. Co., Inc. Reid Metals, Inc. Glen White Douglas Dibble Midwest Environmental Svcs. Inc.

Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 19, 2012

In Defendants’ view “This evidence establishes that David Reed consented to the placement of the Forge material on his property in June 2004 that contained clearly visible waste fragments.” Id. … In that case, an insurance company sold annuities to a business customer for the business’s tax-qualified contributory retirement plan.

Christine Cosme v. Debora A. Warfield

Indiana Supreme Court · May 6, 2024

And the court shall enter judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict if the verdict “is clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence”. Ibid. … The court enters judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when the verdict is “clearly erroneous”, T.R. 59(J), which asks if any facts support the verdict, see Yanoff v.

Andrew Conley v. State of Indiana

972 N.E.2d 864 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 31, 2012

The aggravating factor was clearly established and uncontroverted. The judge was within his discretion in weighing the mitigating factors in the manner in which he did. … Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994) (identifying independent analyses for Indiana Privileges and Immunities and Federal Equal Protection clauses).

Spangler v. Bechtel

958 N.E.2d 458 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 13, 2011

As to the hos- pital, the action is proceeding under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act ("the MMA").2 Bechtel and the Center are not covered by the MMA because they were not qualified health care providers under the MMA … A pure foreseeability rule is "unsatisfactory because genuine emotional disturbance can occur and is foreseeable in many situations in which courts clearly would not permit recovery." Id. § 47f.