Case law
Opinions from 1658 to today.
1,680 results
0.29s
Ennis v. State Highway Commission
231 Ind. 311 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 17, 1952
Such provisions are but incidental to the accomplishment of the purpose of the act, and are clearly within the scope of the act as indicated by the title.” … Replacement (1951 Supp.), provides: “. . . the construction, operation and maintenance of toll road projects shall be deemed and held to be essential governmental functions of the state, but the commission shall not however be immune
Cited 42 timesPublished857 N.E.2d 977 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 5, 2006
That is, the finder of fact would be required to find the presumed fact once the basic fact is established, unless the opponent of the presumption persuaded the factfinder of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. … They argue that giving continuing effect to the rebuttable presumption in Indiana Code section 34-20-5-1 “allow[s] manufacturers to effectively immunize themselves from liability upon a showing that their prod- ucts comply
Cited 19 timesPublished32 N.E.3d 1164 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 11, 2015
And under its more recent “classification” analysis, the statute’s regrettable consequences under the facts of this case establish no as-applied constitutional violation. … The party challenging the statute must clearly overcome that presumption by a contrary showing. Hubbard v. State, 849 N.E.2d 1165, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
Cited 26 timesPublishedIndiana Supreme Court · Mar 13, 2014
Though it was “disappointed” that the CHINS court failed to appoint counsel for J.A. even though she qualified, it nevertheless found the error to be harmless. Id. at 791. … We note that the case law does not clearly define how sections 31- 32-4-3 and 31-34-4-6 are to be read in conjunction with each other.
Cited 0 timesPublished753 N.E.2d 649 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 28, 2001
A petitioner has the burden to establish grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). … A lawyer who did not raise these various challenges to the prevailing rule of a “death-qualified jury” would be well within the standard of performance required by the Sixth Amendment.
Cited 22 timesPublished829 N.E.2d 943 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jun 28, 2005
Moreover, it is too broad and may be misapplied to any and all claims of injury to employees of subcontractors even when any one of the five recognized exceptions are clearly applicable. … I believe, however, that this innovation is detrimental to more important and established principles of responsibility and accountability in tort.
Abrogated on other grounds by Helms v. Carmel High School Vocational Building Trades Corp., 2006 Ind. LEXIS 865 (2006)Cited 31 timesPublished252 Ind. 161 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 29, 1969
The above recital from the report of the Sheppard case is a very cursory summation of a part of the publicity surrounding the trial and clearly demonstrates that that case is inapplicable to the facts in the case at bar. … In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors
Cited 48 timesPublished947 N.E.2d 392 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 18, 2011
As to the golfer's hitting an errant drive which resulted in the plaintiff's injury, such conduct is clearly within the range of ordinary behavior of golfers and thus is reasonable as a matter of law and does not establish … The determination of duty is one of law for the court, Sharp, 790 N.E.2d at 466, and we hold that the risk of a person on a golf course being struck by a golf ball does not qualify as the "unreasonable risk of harm" referred
Cited 126 timesPublished247 Ind. 95 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 6, 1965
an expert could not express an opinion as to the legal sanity or insanity of the appellant on the basis of this demonstrative evidence, there is no reason to believe that the jurors, who were not experts, would be more qualified … Clearly these facts are not applicable to the present case. 8 . On oral argument, it was established furthermore, that the attorney so complaining did not even use all of his allotted time.
Cited 17 timesPublishedBradford v. Frankfort, St. Louis & Toledo Railroad
142 Ind. 383 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 17, 1895
Louis and Toledo Railroad Company whose stock had been depreciated by the alleged consolidation and the interest of the cross-complainant was in establishing her franchises and property rights, of which she alleged she had … In our opinion the judgment of the circuit court was clearly right, and it is affirmed. Note. — The character of directors de facto in corporations is the subject of annotation to Waterman v. Chicago & I. R. Co.
Cited 8 timesPublishedBrenda Sue Gittings and Marc Richmond Gittings v. William H. Deal
109 N.E.3d 963 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 2, 2018
The NDR Trust Agreement thus established the NDR Primary Trust, NDR Trust A, and NDR Trust B. And the GLR Trust Agreement similarly established the GLR Primary Trust, GLR Trust A, and GLR Trust B. … Based 1These provisions are known as Qualified Terminable Interest Property, or Q-TIP, provisions. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(7) (2012).
Cited 17 timesPublished24 L.R.A. 206 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 19, 1894
It has long been established that a contract against public policy will not be enforced. Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238 (240). … The evil tendency of the contract in suit is clearly manifest. The mere statement of it shocks the sense of justice and fair play.
Cited 37 timesPublished926 N.E.2d 8 · Indiana Supreme Court · Apr 14, 2010
In our order scheduling briefing in this matter, the parties were advised that the Commissioner‟s findings would be reversed only if found to be clearly erroneous. See GKN Co. v. … Conclusion The evidence establishes that the respondents have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Cited 0 timesPublished737 N.E.2d 719 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 19, 2000
State, 730 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. 2000) (“An express written or oral waiver of rights is not necessary to establish a waiver of Miranda rights.”). … Furthermore, Albrecht’s rights under Miranda were not implicated because he was clearly not in custody when the call was recorded. See Dye v.
Cited 26 timesPublishedCALVIN FARRELL HADLEY v. State
251 Ind. 24 · Indiana Supreme Court · Jul 23, 1968
It was firmly established in the common law as one of the bright features of the Anglo-Saxon contributions to human progress. It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. … On the other hand, the decisions of the highest court in this nation, when so clearly well-reasoned and analogous, should not be so lightly dismissed.
Cited 11 timesPublished161 Ind. 648 · Indiana Supreme Court · Oct 7, 1903
He presented his side clearly and logically in a fifteen-minutes address, and won the judgment of the commissioners to his side. … She has undertaken to establish the invalidity of Clark Wait’s will for want of testamentary capacity. The burden is upon her to prove that which she affirms.
Cited 19 timesPublishedSmith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc.
9 N.E.3d 154 · Indiana Supreme Court · May 28, 2014
Clearly, the affidavit was not crafted to contradict any then-existing testimony from Russell. … “Unsworn statements and unverified exhibits do not qualify as proper Rule 56 evidence.” Indiana Univ. Med. Ctr., Riley Hosp. for Children v. Logan, 728 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind.2000).
Cited 29 timesPublishedLake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Cincinnati, Wabash & Michigan Railway Co.
116 Ind. 578 · Indiana Supreme Court · Dec 19, 1888
If, without doing violence to the words of the statute, a wise and just policy can be established, it is the duty of the courts to so interpret the statute as to establish that policjn A construction which will overturn a … It is generally held that the fact of inability to agree is a jurisdictional one, but our judgment is that it is a jurisdictional fact only in a qualified sense, for we believe that, as held in Ney v.
Cited 32 timesPublished66 Ind. 1 · Indiana Supreme Court · Nov 15, 1878
Erazer was thereafter duly and legally qualified as the executor of said decedent’s estate, by the circuit court of Kosciusko county, State of Indiana, and is still such .executor of said estate. “ Plaintiff further avers … We have seen that they show clearly a sale of the goods by the plaintiff to the deceased, and a delivery in pursuance of the sale.
Cited 21 timesPublished577 N.E.2d 221 · Indiana Supreme Court · Aug 29, 1991
The mere repetition of similar crimes will not suffice to qualify as an exception to the general rule. Gibbs, 588 N.E.2d at 939; Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346 . … Because identity was still at issue, it was proper to admit evidence of the extrinsic offense to establish identity.
Cited 29 timesPublished
Ask Donna