Case law

Scoa Industries, Inc. v. Howlett

33 Ill. App. 3d 90 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 16, 1975

The State is immune from suit without its consent. (Powers v. Telander (1970), 129 Ill.App.2d 10 , 262 N.E.2d 342 .) … The court of claims has been established with exclusive jurisdiction to provide for the orderly disbursement of State funds if plaintiff’s claim has merit. See Chicago Welfare Rights Organization v.

Chicago City Railway Co. v. Kastrzewa

141 Ill. App. 10 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 30, 1908

That the car was being propelled at an excessive rate of speed, in approaching and crossing the street intersection, the scene of the collision, is clearly demonstrable from the evidence. … that he is the plaintiff and interested in the result of the suit, in weighing and giving credence to his testimony, is ill-founded, because the qualifying conditions clearly and plainly appear in another part of the judge

Enterprise Recovery Systems v. Salmeron

Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 31, 2010

She clearly breached that duty when, as her own admission establishes, she lied to Enterprise in signing the general release in order to induce a significant settlement payment knowing at the time that she had no intention … Yet Salmeron did not seek to invoke the immunity of the Act which she now claims.

River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park

281 Ill. App. 3d 154 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 12, 1996

App. 3d 11 (1995), we stated: "A complaint should be dismissed under section 2 — 615 for failure to state a cause of action only when it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings which would … Nothing in this opinion should be construed as establishing or supporting the proposition that — absent the kind of extreme and extraordinary allegations of bad faith, corruption, or maliciousness contained in the present

Radcliff v. Hanger

239 Ill. App. 292 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 31, 1925

We are not warranted in reversing the judgment upon the facts unless we are compelled to say from an examination of all the evidence it clearly does not support the verdict. This we cannot say. … It was not the legislative purpose to establish that right. But all uncertainty as to when they may or must be removed is eliminated. That was the purpose.

D. Gottlieb & Co. v. City of Chicago

342 Ill. App. 523 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 21, 1951

Plaintiff prays: That a mandatory injunction issue, compelling and requiring defendants to accept proper applications for licenses for the Bowlette machines, and upon tender of'the license tax, to issue licenses to the qualified … that of the owner of a machine it could place, sell, distribute, etc. in any place of public resort within the City of Chicago without a license and anyone who bought the Bowlette from the plaintiff was accorded the same immunity

Board of Trustees v. Illinois Community College Board

63 Ill. App. 3d 969 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 28, 1978

They cite “An Act in relation to immunity for the State of Illinois” (Ill. Rev. … Although it is well established that the legislature is presumed not to have done a useless thing in enacting a statute (Pinkstaff v. Pennsylvania R.R.

People v. Spargo

103 Ill. App. 3d 280 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 19, 1982

The court held that whatever the scope of the “right to receive” referred to in Stanley, it was not so broad as to immunize dealings in obscenity. … Ct. 958 , shows clearly that this is not the statute’s aim.

City of Chicago v. Latronica Asphalt & Grading, Inc.

Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 17, 2004

Further, "it is well established that where a statute of limitations does 'expressly include the State, county, municipality, or other governmental agencies,' common law governmental limitations immunity will not bar a limitations … Cecola , 75 Ill. 2d 423, 427 , 389 N.E.2d 526 (1979)(privately owned establishment for prostitution). In Young v. Bryco Arms , 327 Ill.

Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer

292 Ill. App. 3d 416 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 29, 1997

As to the immunizations, the evidence was that Lindy was late in getting the children’s necessary immunizations and that her failure in this regard amounted to tardiness but not medical neglect. … Both children were current in all of their immunizations at the time of the hearing.

Bell Leasing Brokerage, LLC v. Roger Auto Service, Inc.

372 Ill. App. 3d 461 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 30, 2007

Third, the Defendant should have been found to be immune from civil liability pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/4—213. … The evidence at trial established that Roger’s Towing, through its employee, misrepresented the amount of money required to recover the van.

Gas Research Institute v. Department of Revenue

154 Ill. App. 3d 430 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 31, 1987

GRI insists that it is such a qualifying, not-for-profit corporation. … The creation of an exemption for organizations such as GRI must be addressed to the legislature for its establishment.

ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORP. v. Bank One, NA

284 Ill. Dec. 710 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 19, 2004

The statements also clearly establish that the client’s signature was notarized, yet they do not indicate that an actual assumption of the client’s identity was necessary to gain the notary’s endorsement. … We also point out that the documents clearly disclose that the attorney tendered the covenant not to sue bearing the client's forged signature and that the hospital tendered its check, but they do not establish that the notarized

Brown v. State Officers Electoral Board

2026 IL App (1st) 260169 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 6, 2026

We review a mixed question of fact and law under the clearly erroneous standard. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 211. … Souders maintains that the appeal raises a mixed question of fact and law and the clearly erroneous standard should be employed.

Illinois County Treasurers' Ass'n v. Hamer

2014 IL App (4th) 130286 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 17, 2014

To interpret the quoted language as an open pledge or commitment by the General Assembly to make appropriations in the future would be clearly unreasonable.” … Thereafter, “the General Assembly reestablished sovereign immunity in the State Lawsuit Immunity Act.” PHL, Inc. v.

Winfrey v. Chicago Park District

211 Ill. Dec. 46 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 8, 1995

Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. … Clearly, defendant was not prejudiced by the photographs.

People v. Quinn

332 Ill. App. 3d 40 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 24, 2002

An offer of proof “is not required where it is apparent that the trial court clearly understood the nature and character of the evidence sought to be introduced, or where the question itself and the circumstances surrounding … Most notably for purposes of the present appeal, the Knight court did not establish an absolute rule but, rather, recognized that a qualified privilege does exist at trial for the disclosure of a surveillance location.

Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Cady

369 Ill. App. 3d 486 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 13, 2006

A decision of an administrative agency is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record. City of Belvidere v. … Consequently, even if Cady had established a discriminatory motive in recruiting for the music position, the Board established by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have hired Cady in the absence of any

Commerce Bank v. Youth Services of Mid-Illinois Inc.

Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 23, 2002

immunity. … Clearly, the majority's finding that "every interaction defendant had with the Augsburgers was dictated by DCFS regulations" is erroneous. Slip op at 9.

Curtis v. Chicago Transit Authority

341 Ill. App. 3d 573 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 23, 2003

ANALYSIS A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint while raising a defect, *86 defense or other affirmative matter that appears on the face of the complaint or is established … Plaintiff here was represented by counsel, who was clearly aware of the requirements of section 41, but failed to comply with those requirements.