Case law

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  • Adams v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System

    407 Ill. App. 3d 592 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 18, 2011

    Lacking consideration, the amount of money that is subject to the agreement does not qualify as salary under TRS’ salary rule.” … The Board found monies paid to Adams “subject to the agreement [did] not qualify as salary under [the Administrative Code].”

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Williams v. City of Evanston

    Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 28, 2007

    from liability under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. … Tort Immunity Act

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Matchett v. Chicago Bar Ass'n

    125 Ill. App. 3d 1004 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 17, 1984

    In addition, Matchett asked for a declaratory judgment against the CBA, stating that, aside from the age criterion, he had been found qualified or well qualified. … and supporting facts sufficient to establish the “actual malice” necessary to overcome the privilege.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Goodknight v. Piraino

    197 Ill. App. 3d 319 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 19, 1990

    Further, while the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev. … Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 3 — 102) provides liability for a public entity, and it may be arguable that the defendants are liable under the Tort Immunity Act, the Tort Immunity Act simply codifies the common law duty of a local

    Cited 21 timesPublished
  • Alter v. Starbucks

    Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 10, 2006

    In holding that sovereign immunity did not shield the State-employed physician from immunity, the Kiersch court stated, "[T]he duty plaintiff alleges that defendant breached in this case arose independently of her State … This language clearly indicates that the Agreement was not intended to make the University liable for all matters arising out of its operation of the Starbucks store.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Montano v. City of Chicago

    308 Ill. App. 3d 618 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 26, 1999

    Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3 — 104 (West 1994)) and struck paragraph 7(d) from the complaint. … On January 16, 1998, the City filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the City was immune from liability pursuant to section 3 — 102(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 — 102(a) (West 1994)).

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co.

    56 Ill. App. 3d 967 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 28, 1977

    Freeman brought the latter under Edison’s, control since his failure to comply with policies established by Dr. Mehn, simply put, would subject him to discharge. … Clearly, Dr. Freeman was an Edison employee whose treatment of plaintiff was in his course of employment as a staff physician.

    Cited 15 timesPublished
  • People Ex Rel. Krich v. Hurley

    16 Ill. App. 2d 503 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 18, 1958

    We think that the public policy of Illinois against falsehood is clearly implied in the civil and criminal statutes against fraud, libel, false pretenses and the like. … The court held in effect that where the false statement of qualification (a qualification established by the commission and not by statute or ordinance) is not relied on by the commission and does not induce it to permit

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • People v. Wilson

    208 Ill. Dec. 716 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 3, 1995

    And that is clearly collateral to the issue in the case. … It has nothing to do with the issue of immunity ***.”

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Zonta v. Village of Bensenville

    167 Ill. App. 3d 354 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 23, 1988

    We agree with the parties that the correct standard of care in this case is imposed by section 3 — 102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. … However, once such right is clearly established, summary judgment should be granted. (Lorek v. Hollenkamp (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 1103 , 495 N.E.2d 679 .) In Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • Smith v. General Paving Company

    24 Ill. App. 3d 858 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 27, 1974

    This principle of non-liability is based on the theory that the contractor is entitled to share the immunity of the public body for such incidental injuries “where he is not guilty of negligence.” (See § 135, at 1008.) … It is our conclusion, therefore, that the trial court clearly erred in dismissing Counts, I, II, and III on the ground that none of them mentioned the government contract.

    Cited 6 timesPublished
  • Big Ten Conference, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

    312 Ill. App. 3d 88 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 22, 2000

    The ALJ found that the Big Ten played no role in accreditation and established no academic standards or other admission policies for its members. … Our supreme court held that the organization’s property qualified for a property tax exemption.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Matarese v. Buka

    386 Ill. App. 3d 176 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 31, 2008

    On appeal, a trial court will not be reversed “for giving faulty instructions unless they clearly misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the appellant.” Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at 274 . … On appeal, the court ruled that the trial court’s hybrid instruction was not error but, rather, a correct statement of the law that clearly and accurately instructed the jury to determine the standard of care based on expert

    Cited 12 timesPublished
  • Raffen v. International Contractors, Inc.

    349 Ill. App. 3d 229 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 3, 2004

    On appeal to our supreme court, the defendant contended that it was immune from liability pursuant to the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (see 745 ILCS 10/1 — 101 et seq. (West 2002)). … The courts that have found third parties in the best position to avoid the injury are clearly distinguishable.

    Cited 1 timesPublished
  • Kavales v. City of Berwyn

    305 Ill. App. 3d 536 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 24, 1999

    Thus, in the case at bar, looking to the property itself, it is clearly intended for use by pedestrians. … The testimony was not sufficiently detailed or specific enough to establish evidence of a routine business practice.

    Cited 22 timesPublished
  • Ladao v. Faits

    2019 IL App (1st) 180610 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 28, 2019

    As the movant, defendant bore the burden of establishing that she was entitled to such a holding. … The trial court clearly found that defendant failed to carry that burden and did not establish that her statements were protected opinions.

    Cited 4 timesPublished
  • Rivera v. Arana

    Appellate Court of Illinois · May 9, 2001

    Genuine Issues of Material Fact A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file establish that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and, therefore … App. 3d 553, 561 , 720 N.E.2d 360 (1999), the issue was what constituted an emergency call for purposes of the Tort Immunity Act.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • Board of Education of Glen Ellyn Community Consolidated School District No. 89 v. Department of Revenue

    Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 21, 2005

    to the established facts is or is not violated. … The Department's finding that Glen Ellyn failed to qualify for an exemption under section 15--35(e) is not clearly erroneous.

    Cited 0 timesPublished
  • DePaul University, Inc. v. Rosewell

    176 Ill. App. 3d 755 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 16, 1988

    The court followed the well-established principle that a property used for more than one purpose, to qualify for an exemption, must be used primarily for an exempt purpose and only incidentally for a nonexempt purpose. … Since DePaul does not claim that Fullerton’s use of the property would qualify for the exemption, the property qualifies only if DePaul’s use for school purposes was the primary use.

    Cited 7 timesPublished
  • People v. Lake

    61 Ill. App. 3d 428 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 7, 1978

    But such is clearly not the case here since Lake was afforded ample opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine his accomplice, Cronk. … such immunity.

    Cited 16 timesPublished

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