Case law

Phillips 66 Co. v. Edgar

164 Ill. App. 3d 63 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 23, 1987

As we have stated, the evidence clearly showed plaintiffs agents intended that the 100% method be selected. … Defendants maintain they have a qualified immunity from suit under that legislation. We note that only injunctive relief is sought. (See Wood v. Strickland (1975), 420 U.S. 308 , 43 L. Ed. 2d 214 , 95 S. Ct. 992 .)

People v. Lambert

60 Ill. App. 3d 280 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 31, 1978

It was further established that he was testifying after being granted immunity from prosecution for his participation in the alleged crime. … The case of Holmes clearly holds that efforts to impeach a verdict on such grounds must fail.

People v. Henderson

2014 IL App (2d) 121219 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 12, 2014

As such, the court found that the affidavit did not establish the availability of the alleged evidence and that the defendant’s claim was meritless. … . ¶ 31 The State argues that Phillips’ affidavit similarly does not qualify as newly discovered evidence, because he executed it at least four years after the incident for which Phillips had invoked his

State Farm v. Du Page County

2011 IL App (2d) 100580 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 16, 2011

The court, explaining the purpose behind the immunity waiver rule, stated that, in the case of commercial insurance, “the immunity is waived since government funds are no longer in jeopardy and immunity … Thus, the village had not waived its immunities from the plaintiff’s lawsuit.

Ponto v. Levan

972 N.E.2d 772 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 27, 2012

First, an employee may qualify for discretionary immunity “if he holds either a position involving the determination of policy or a position involving the exercise of discretion.” (Emphases in original.) … He clearly testified that the River Street and River Road projects were distinct undertakings.

Palmer v. FREIGHTLINER, LLC

383 Ill. App. 3d 57 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 4, 2008

Illinois, arguably, has slightly more of a relationship under this analysis; however, no state enjoys a strong and clearly superior relationship under these facts. … Under Illinois law, third-party defendants are permitted to bring contribution lawsuits against a plaintiff’s employer to prevent paying more than its established share of fault for the injury.

Colatorti v. Republican Legislative Committee for the Twenty-Sixth Legislative District

2026 IL App (2d) 250230 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 17, 2026

political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly … “The mere fact that political rights and questions are involved does not create immunity from judicial review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kluk, 125 Ill. 2d at 323.

McCann v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection District

115 Ill. App. 3d 702 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 21, 1983

Section 5 — 103(b) of the Tort Immunity Act provides that the fire protection district statute and the municipal fire department statute are exceptions to the provisions of section 5 — 103(b) that grant immunity to a local … App. 3d 683, 687 , the court pointed out that the fire protection district statute is an exception to the broad immunity granted under section 5 — 103(b) of the Tort Immunity Act and therefore, by implication, to the provisions

Office of the Lake County State's Attorney v. Human Rights Commission

235 Ill. App. 3d 1036 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 30, 1992

The question before us does not concern the absolute immunity doctrine discussed in Morton, and we need not discuss it further. … Indeed, the State’s Attorney specifically argued at the hearing on his motion for summary judgment that he was not interposing the defense of absolute immunity.

Townsend v. City of Chicago

2019 IL App (1st) 180771 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 5, 2021

for summary judgment. ¶ 22 Defendants, in turn, respond that the court properly found that they were immune from liability under the Tort Immunity Act because the record clearly establishes that Anderson was … immunity in its decision in Molitor v.

Rognant v. Palacios

224 Ill. App. 3d 418 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 31, 1991

Therefore, the Muscare decision already had established that the section 41 one-year statute of limitations applied to CTA employees. The Penkava opinion presents an analogous situation. … The purpose of section 41 is more analogous to that of the notice requirement of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (Ill. Rev.

Commercial Union v. City of Chicago

308 Ill. App. 3d 314 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 30, 1999

Clearly, this incident had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce on the Chicago River. … The first goal of being consistent with Reliable Transfer is clearly satisfied.

Laster v. Chicago Housing Authority

104 Ill. App. 3d 540 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 22, 1982

Plaintiff further argues that despite the settled law his complaint should not have been dismissed for the further reason that it alleged facts sufficient to establish a binding covenant on defendant’s part to repair the … Plaintiff’s contention that the fact that defendant had insurance constitutes a waiver of immunity is without merit.

American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. Ryan

332 Ill. App. 3d 866 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 10, 2002

on the following grounds: (1) the trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a judgment on appeal; (2) the temporary restraining order violates separation of powers; (3) the temporary restraining order violates sovereign immunity … Planning Act The Center qualifies as a “hospital” under the Planning Board’s regulations (77 Ill. Adm.

Godair v. Metro East Sanitary District

2021 IL App (5th) 200160 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 17, 2021

Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. … We find that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the district owed her a duty.

Rogy's New Generation, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

252 Ill. Dec. 193 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 29, 2000

Language development was clearly supported in preemergent activities in literacy with children.” … Case law provides that to qualify for an educational exemption, a private entity must meet two prerequisites: (1) it must “offer a course of study which fits into the general scheme of education established by the State”;

Kucinsky v. Pfister

2020 IL App (3d) 170719 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 11, 2021

Mackoff, which had been clearly marked as legal mail. … Sovereign Immunity ¶ 41 Defendants argued that Kucinsky’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Tagliere v. Western Springs Park District

408 Ill. App. 3d 235 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 25, 2011

Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3—106 (West 2008)) (hereinafter Tort Immunity Act). … However, the legislature, in the amendment, clearly indicated that it requires the use of the statutory definition of willful and wanton to evaluate the conduct of public entities in Tort Immunity Act cases to the exclusion

Leonardi v. Chicago Transit Authority

Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 30, 2003

She cites section 3-102(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act), 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2000). … To qualify as a lease contract, "there must be an agreement as to the extent and bounds of the property, the rental price and time and manner of payment, and the term of the lease." Ceres Illinois, Inc. v.

Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Department of Insurance

42 Ill. App. 3d 155 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 1, 1976

We agree with that proposition of law but must point out that here the words are qualified by the modifying clause “ ° ° ” over and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance.” … It is our opinion that “merit pay” is qualified by, and the exclusion of “merit pay” is limited to that, “over and above the salary established by the appropriation ordinance.”