Case law

Torf v. Chicago Transit Authority

Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 12, 2010

As such, the CTA argued that it was immune from liability under section 27 of the Act. … Viewed under this standard, Torf’s complaint was clearly and solely directed at defendant’s alleged negligence in failing to provide a safe and clear means for passengers to evacuate the train so as to avoid the risk of

Mullins v. Evans

2021 IL App (1st) 191962 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 31, 2021

Accordingly, plaintiffs claimed that sovereign immunity was not applicable and that the Ethics Act applied to defendants’ conduct. … Plaintiffs also claimed that the State Lawsuit Immunity Act did not bar their Whistleblower Act claims against the chief judge.

Neal v. Yang

Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 30, 2004

Because these facts established that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant had prior notice of the injury or illness, the court was required to find that the Act did not immunize the defendant … in hospitals is not granted such immunity.

Struve v. Department of Conservation

14 Ill. App. 3d 1092 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 25, 1973

At first blush this appears to be a case which clearly repudiates the well established rule that the state is immune from suits prosecuted in courts of law or equity. … Our views regarding the question of severeign immunity as presented by this appeal coincide with those set forth in the case of Powers v. Telander, 129 Ill.App.2d 10 , 262 N.E.2d 342 .

Wilkey v. Wax

82 Ill. App. 2d 67 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 20, 1967

Respondent indubitably had grounds for divorce and the choice was clearly hers to seek one. … Knowledge of the purchaser may be established by the pendency of litigation (citing case).

Bailey v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission

Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 10, 2010

The court refused to find, as a matter of law, that the defendant's establishment was a school as intended by section 24-24. … The church asserted that it was immune from liability under section 24-24 of the School Code, while the plaintiff argued that immunity under section 24-24 did not cover the operation of a day care facility operated by a

Lanphier v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation

Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 21, 2002

Once a borrowed employment relationship exists, both employers share immunity for tort damages for an employee's work-related injuries and the employee's exclusive remedy is under the Act. … The court determined that the purpose of defining "loaning employer" in the Workers' Compensation Act was to establish the secondary liability of the loaning employer and to relieve the employee from having to establish

Anderson v. City of Chicago

29 Ill. App. 3d 971 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 11, 1975

Clearly, this is not merely a question of weighing the evidence. … Accordingly, the trial judge held that the immunity provisions of section 2 — 202 were inapplicable.

Anderson v. Sutter

119 Ill. App. 3d 1070 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 7, 1983

Starcevich appears to be an application of the rule established in Jones v. … Thus, though the complaint does not clearly allege when the injury arose, nor precisely how the injury was caused, it is apparent that plaintiffs do not allege that the cause of the injury was the plan or design of the dam

Village of Northbrook v. Cannon

61 Ill. App. 3d 315 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 12, 1978

Sections 16.1 (p) and (q) clearly establish two categories of persons to whom responsibility for animal nuisances will attach, “harborers” and “owners,” and define each. … It is possible that defendant was confused as to the applicability of stare decises to render him immune from village enforcement efforts.

Foster v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board

113 Ill. App. 3d 721 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 30, 1983

App. 3d 1111 , 419 N.E.2d 628 , appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 566 , cited by petitioners, is clearly distinguishable. … If the legislative purpose of section 10 — 5 was to prohibit confusion, the section should be amended to express clearly that intent. It is not the province of the courts to rewrite the section.

Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302

29 Ill. App. 2d 471 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 4, 1961

No. 302 (1959) 18 Ill. 2d 11 , 163 N.E.2d 89 clearly denies recovery to any plaintiff except Thomas Molitor and admits of no other interpretation, and that subsequent proceedings in the Thomas Molitor case in the Illinois … For this reason we feel justice will best be served by holding that, except as to the plaintiff in the instant case, the rule herein established shall apply only to cases arising out of future occurrences.”

Bernabei v. County of La Salle

236 Ill. App. 3d 958 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 14, 1992

Sections 5 — 205.1, 5 — 205.3, and 6 — 407 clearly are not safety measures enacted for the benefit of the public. … Plaintiff’s amended complaint also fails to establish that defendants’ conduct was the proximate cause of his injury.

Boub v. Township of Wayne

Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 9, 1997

Illinois case law has clearly established that, under section 3--102(a) of the Act, vehicles, as defined by the Vehicle Code, are intended users of public streets, roadways, and highways and that, with narrow exceptions, … Recognizing that the legislature has established a clear public policy to immunize government from the financial burdens of preventing injuries that occur as a result of unintended uses of roadways, our supreme court has

Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc.

317 Ill. App. 3d 1104 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 7, 2000

Municipal defendants moved for and were granted summary judgment upon a claim of immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1 — 101 et seq. (West 1998) (Act)). … Although in the case sub judice the record does not clearly indicate statistics noting the frequency of aircraft that deviate from the runway, the FAA requirement for airports to have an RSA concedes the foreseeability that

Luss v. Village of Forest Park

377 Ill. App. 3d 318 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 5, 2007

(West 2006)) (Tort Immunity Act) governs the question of liability. … There is no dispute that the Village of Forest Park and Officer Baker qualify as “a local public entity” and “a public employee,” respectively, within the meaning of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4 — 105 (West 2006))

Hull v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services

356 Ill. App. 3d 300 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 10, 2005

Heymach’s report nor his curriculum vitae indicated that he has performed a radiological procedure such as that involved in this case, he failed to establish that he was qualified by experience or demonstrated competence … Heymach established that he was qualified by experience or demonstrated competence in the subject of the case. See 735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(a)(1)(iii) (West 2002); Apa, 288 III.

Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection District

255 Ill. App. 3d 933 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 26, 1994

Legislation is presumed to be valid, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of establishing its invalidity. (DeLuna v. St. … Clearly, as the situation now stands, there is an invalid classification. The classification is of the kind expressly prohibited by supreme court authority.

Holum v. Morgan

236 Ill. App. 3d 594 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 15, 1992

Both, however, had clearly expressed their desire (while still competent) that they not be kept alive artificially or allowed to linger. … The Act sets forth three qualifying conditions, which trigger the surrogate’s authority to act when one or more of the conditions is certified to exist by the attending physician and at least one other qualified physician

O'Malley v. Village of Palos Park

Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 23, 2004

These employees held "Computer operator I" positions at Cook County Hospital and they were hired before the examination requirement was established. … The minutes of the November 10, 1997, Village Board meeting clearly establish that the Board approved the development plan "subject to the confirmation that the 1994 extension to the annexation agreement was in order."