Case law

Murray v. Chicago Youth Center

Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 16, 2004

The principles to be applied in construing provisions of the Act are well established: " '[O]ur primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. … The plaintiff argued that section 3-108 of the Act does not establish unconditional immunity but, rather, provides an exception for willful and wanton misconduct.

Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler

405 Ill. App. 3d 113 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 20, 2010

The court must grant the motion and dismiss the claim unless the nonmovant “has produced clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized … Butler asserts that the trial court was therefore correct in holding that Hytel did not establish any defense to her motion to dismiss under the Act.

Kontos v. Boudros

241 Ill. App. 3d 198 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 1, 1993

The Workers’ Compensation Act has a different policy of establishing a new system of liability without fault, designed to distribute the cost of industrial injuries without regard to the common-law doctrines of negligence … Section 5(a) immunizes both employees and agents of the employer. Executive officers, who may not qualify as employees of the corporation, are nonetheless its agents. A corporation speaks through its agents.

Somoye v. Klein

285 Ill. Dec. 55 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 8, 2004

In interpreting a statute, it is never proper for a court to depart from plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. … The Appellate Court, First District, has recently commented on the definition of “emergency” as that term is used in section 25 of the Act: “[T]here are a variety of situations which may qualify as emergency care under the

Hopkinson v. Chicago Transit Authority

211 Ill. App. 3d 825 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 28, 1991

subsequent legislation abolishing the immunity. … We find no abuse of discretion in qualifying O’Mahoney as an expert in rapid transit security.

People Ex Rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc.

135 Ill. App. 3d 765 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 13, 1985

It is established that the State and its agencies, when in pursuit of public rights, are not barred by a statute of limitations unless specifically included within the terms of the statute. … A statute is presumed valid and the burden of establishing unconstitutionality rests upon the challenger. (Sayles v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 122, 124-25 , 457 N.E.2d 440 ; Scott v.

King v. City of Chicago

66 Ill. App. 3d 356 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 26, 1978

In lightof the record before us, it does not appear clearly evident that the policemen were in the execution or enforcement of any law. … We hold, accordingly, that the immunity provisions of section 2 — 202 are inapplicable. Therefore, the City of Chicago is liable for plaintiff’s injuries.

Melvin v. City of West Frankfort

93 Ill. App. 3d 425 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 23, 1981

When enacted in 1967 the portion of section 10 — 2.1—6 here under attack must necessarily have been intended to insure quite literally that able-bodied and fully qualified persons were to be employed by municipal police and … Stat., 1979 Supp., ch. 68, par. 1 — 102(A)) and it expressly serves to implement the guarantees established by §19 of article I of the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979 Supp., ch. 68, pars. 1 — 102(C).)

Torres v. City of Chicago

218 Ill. App. 3d 89 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 26, 1991

Section 3 — 102(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) sets forth the City’s duty to maintain its property: “[A] local public entity has the duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain … These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar in light of the fact that the plaintiff in each case was clearly not an intended or permitted user of the street.

A.R. v. Chicago Board of Education

311 Ill. App. 3d 29 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 27, 1999

Section 4 — 102 provides, in pertinent part: “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police protection … The conduct complained of in the present action clearly falls within the ambit of disciplinary conduct contemplated under section 34 — 84a.

Board of Education of the City of Peoria, School District No. 150 v. Sanders

150 Ill. App. 3d 755 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 8, 1986

Senn Park and City of Springfield establish that the plaintiff’s request was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and thus was properly brought in the circuit court. … Section 22 — 19 clearly recites the powers which the legislature intended the ISBE to have. (Aurora East Public School District No. 131 v. Cronin (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 313, 328 .)

Monat v. County of Cook

322 Ill. App. 3d 499 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 14, 2001

The court grounded its judgment on findings that Monat would need to violate the forest preserve code to take his horses into the nearby forest and that the “general consensus of the neighborhood is clearly against the idea … Defendants argue that Monat’s motion to vacate the trial court’s order did not toll the time for appeal because it did not qualify as a proper posttrial motion.

Razavi v. School of the Art Institute of Chicago

2018 IL App (1st) 171409 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 17, 2019

To establish defamation, plaintiff must show that defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff and published the statement to a third party, causing damage. Anderson v. Beach, 386 Ill. … Where only a qualified privilege is granted, the person making the statment is immune from liability unless some element, such as malice, is present.

Nichol v. Stass

Appellate Court of Illinois · Jun 17, 1998

employment status for sovereign immunity purposes. … Clearly, the duty to comply with Department of Children and Family Service rules and regulations would not exist outside of the relationship between the State and the foster parents.

Willis v. Khatkhate

373 Ill. App. 3d 495 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Apr 27, 2007

Plaintiff contends that the allegations in her complaint and the evidence contained in the supporting documents establish that Dr. … Plaintiff contends that this establishes a negligent treatment scenario, which is not immunized as stated under subsections 6 — 106(b), (c), and (d) of the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 10/6 — 106(b), (c), (d) (West 1998).

Estate of DeBow v. City of East St. Louis

228 Ill. App. 3d 437 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 4, 1992

immunity and the ordinance in question did, in fact, seek to establish sovereign immunity even though it restricted only the manner in which a judgment against the city may be collected. … It is a well established principle of statutory construction that where the same words appear more than once in a statute, they should be given a consistent meaning unless legislative intent to the contrary is clearly expressed

Kozik v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

2025 IL App (1st) 242219 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 9, 2025

Each statute stands “in its own sphere” and the immunities provided by the Vehicle Code and the Tort Immunity Act serve different purposes (internal quotation marks omitted)); Young v. Forgas, 308 Ill. … ¶ 78 Here, the statute and the rule clearly serve very different purposes.

Courson v. Danville School District No. 118

Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 18, 1998

Those cases are different from this one because they clearly involved the making of a choice, a policy choice, and not mere inad­ver­tence. … It is sufficient to note that the District is not entitled to summary judgment, because it has not established that the failure to provide the saw guard was a discretionary act. Reversed and remanded.

Vilardo v. Barrington Community School District 220

Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 20, 2010

"The well-established rule is that mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal." People v. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d 743, 746 (1991). … In this case, the trial court concluded that plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to establish a duty under section 3--102(a) for defendant to protect plaintiff.

O'Malley v. Village of Palos Park

346 Ill. App. 3d 567 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Feb 23, 2004

These employees held “Computer Operator I” positions at Cook County Hospital and they were hired before the examination requirement was established. … The minutes of the November 10, 1997, Village Board meeting clearly establish that the Board approved the development plan “subject to the confirmation that the 1994 extension to the annexation agreement was in order.”