Case law

Petryshyn v. Slotky

387 Ill. App. 3d 1112 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 29, 2008

275, 283 , 885 N.E.2d 1120, 1130 (2008) (where the First District, using the abuse-of-discretion standard, reversed the trial court’s order for a new trial in a medical-malpractice case). “ ‘ “Abuse of discretion” means clearly … Furthermore, it was established that the allegations of negligence were well within the testifying doctors’ knowledge and experience.

Peoria County Treasurer & Collector v. Grange

106 Ill. App. 3d 785 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 17, 1982

It is clear that three factors must be met to qualify for an exemption. First, the taxpayer must qualify as an organization described in sections 19.1 through 19.23 — 4 of the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. … Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 359 , 326 N.E.2d 737, 741 , that: “ ‘[Ujnlimited freedom to seek judicial review of the merits’ where the legislature has established an express procedure for judicial review ‘would severely

People v. Fernandez

2014 IL App (1st) 120508 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 26, 2014

In this case, to establish that defendant’s federal conviction qualified under the Act, the State directed the court to look to defendant’s plea declaration in his 1999 federal case, in which he admitted to … We will not overrule the legislature’s sentencing mandates, unless the penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations.

Board of Education v. State Board of Education

160 Ill. App. 3d 769 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 19, 1987

Findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence only if conclusions opposite to those reached by the agency are clearly evidenced. (Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 501 v. … Charge 5 accuses Parkman of acting contrary to published Department of Public Health Guidelines and established procedures of plaintiff.

Gorman-Dahm v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A.

2018 IL App (2d) 170082 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 28, 2018

. ¶ 28 The Ringier court noted the existence of a narrow class of cases in which an absolute privilege provides complete immunity from civil action for statements made in the course of litigation, even … Clearly, this communication was an out-of-court communication not authorized by statute, unlike a deed transfer following the entry of an order approving a foreclosure sale.

Steinmetz v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 529

68 Ill. App. 3d 83 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 22, 1978

Section 3 — 32 of that Act empowers the Board “to establish tenure policies for the employment of teachers and administrative personnel, and cause for removal.” … The Community College Act authorized the Board to “establish tenure policies.” This grant of authority is a very broad one.

Cirilo's, Inc. v. Gleeson, Sklar & Sawyers

154 Ill. App. 3d 494 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 25, 1987

In Doyle, a third-party defendant claimed that he was not “subject to liability in tort” because he was statutorily immune to tort claims by the initial plaintiff, his employee. … Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1 , 374 N.E.2d 437 , which established the right of contribution among tortfeasors in Illinois.

Fortas v. Dixon

122 Ill. App. 3d 697 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 19, 1984

Kelly clearly evidenced a pattern of fraud, false swearing, and total disregard for the mandatory requirements of the Election Code. … We believe plaintiff had clearly sustained his burden of proving Kelly had not personally circulated sheets 95, 113, and 5 and that Kelly’s oath to the contrary was false.

Knapp v. Palos Community Hospital

176 Ill. App. 3d 1012 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Nov 30, 1988

Section 2b, on the other hand, provides an immunity from civil liability for peer-review participants and an exception to that immunity for wilful and wanton misconduct. … Similarly here, plaintiffs’ argument that there has been no finding that the preliminary injunction entered by the trial court was wrongfully issued is clearly untenable.

People v. Smallwood

256 N.E.3d 382 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Sep 24, 2024

was 18 years of age by the third qualifying offense. … “[T]he party challenging the 15 statute must clearly establish that it violates the constitution.” Id. (citing People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000)).

Bennetto v. Department of Public Aid

194 Ill. App. 3d 1 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 12, 1990

Clearly, the spirit of the law is that IDEA personnel should render whatever assistance is necessary to a qualified applicant so that benefits available to that person are not withheld or denied because of the applicant’s … The Act at section 203 changed the requirements to establish residence under color of law.

Miller v. DANVILLE ELKS LDG. 332, BPOE

211 Ill. App. 3d 145 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Mar 28, 1991

Plaintiff’s contentions are without merit, and it is clear Hedges was entitled to a qualified privilege as he properly established all its elements. … The facts supporting a qualified privilege for Hedges’ statement are undisputed and sufficiently establish Hedges was entitled to a qualified privilege as a matter of law.

People Ex Rel. Clark v. Hurley

343 Ill. App. 182 · Appellate Court of Illinois · May 7, 1951

Granted that the courts aj*e empowered to undertake such review, the bounds within which the inquiry is confined have been clearly indicated in reviewed cases. Drury v. … The term ‘ experience ’ shall be understood to mean training tending to qualify an applicant to perform the duties of the position to be filled.

Seacord v. People

22 Ill. App. 279 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jan 15, 1887

The establishment was in quitea thickly settled farming neighborhood. … The establishment of Seacord was carried on for profit, the same as any other business; and when it became a nuisance, it was indictable. A person can not abate one nuisance by creating another, and then claim immunity.

Smith v. MARVIN, MD

377 Ill. App. 3d 562 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Dec 4, 2007

of something that a reasonably well-qualified surgeon would not do, under the circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. … The law does not say how a reasonably well-qualified general surgeon would act under these circumstances.

Wilfong v. Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10

107 Ill. App. 3d 930 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 14, 1982

Clearly the board had the authority to eliminate Rauh’s position. The question becomes whether the school board properly allowed Rauh to choose as her reassignment the position held by petitioner. … It was undisputed that she was qualified to teach the kindergarten class formerly taught by petitioner.

In Re Nitz

250 Ill. Dec. 632 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Oct 26, 2000

Both the settlement agreement and the uniform qualified assignment utilize the qualified assignment language of section 130(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 130 (c)(2)(B) (1994). … Clearly, the provisions were bargained for and cannot be simply discarded or waived.” Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 551-52 . But see Powless, 315 Ill.

Cianci v. Pettibone Corp.

298 Ill. App. 3d 419 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 31, 1998

App. 3d 662, 669 (1995) (statements made in reports to worker’s compensation insurers protected by qualified privilege because insurers “clearly have an interest in determining the validity of worker’s compensation claims … Nowosad also argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that Hall’s statements enjoyed a qualified privilege.

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Johnson

993 N.E.2d 563 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Jul 26, 2013

Given that the purpose of the HAMP is to assist borrowers in maintaining their properties, proceeding to sale in violation of a guideline that mandates that a servicer “must suspend the sale” is clearly the … The proper course is for a servicer such as plaintiff to define in its internal policy what qualifies as a change in circumstance, and, if it receives a successive application that does not qualify due to a

Chaney Ex Rel. Chaney v. Yetter Mfg. Co.

315 Ill. App. 3d 823 · Appellate Court of Illinois · Aug 16, 2000

Clearly, Genie qualifies as a “loaning employer” under the Act. The issue in this case is whether Chaney’s status as a loaned employee was properly decided as a matter of law. … By designating temporary employment agencies as “loaning employers,” the Act merely establishes another party from whom the employee can seek workers’ compensation recovery. 820 ILCS 305/l(a)(4) (West 1996) (establishing